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“Dying is not easy but it needn’t be this hard”: 
Contemporary Narratives of Good and Bad Deaths 
Chloe Hansen, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2020 
The 21st century has seen a surge of discourses critiquing discussion of and approaches to 
end of life in the U.S. In this dissertation, I perform a conceptually-oriented rhetorical 
analysis of the concept of the good death in narratives published in ‘The End’ (2015-2016), The 
New York Times op-ed series about end of life, and Atul Gawande’s bestselling book 
Being Mortal (2014). Grounded in rhetorics of health and medicine, I conduct an in-depth 
analysis of narratives of patient deaths told by healthcare practitioners in order to uncover 
images of good and bad dying constructed within, some ideological investments of those images 
and the historical contexts that shaped them. Taking seriously the idea that public narratives 
surrounding health and medicine impact how medical situations are approached, I argue that a 
narrative shift away from decision-making and the dying person as primary agent at end of life 
may shift standards of judgment with regard to dying, enabling instead the circulation of 
narratives with a networked view of agency and that take seriously the importance of ending 
the dying person’s life story. I find that the narratives in my archive are told through the logic 
of choice, which focuses on the dying individual as autonomous agent in a context that is 
increasingly out of their control. This narrative construction often functions as a barrier to 
the good death. I speculate that a shift toward narrating end of life through the logic of care 
instead – which centers on ending the dying person’s story and on distributed care, agency and 
responsibility – would shift the concept of the good death and, thus, standards of judgment for
evaluating end of life. The question of how we might live a good life until the end and what 
discourses and structures might enable the most people to achieve that goal is worth exploring 
precisely because death is something everyone will experience. Shifting end of life rhetorics 
would allow us to tell different stories and may shift interactions with medical institutions, 
judgments about end of life, preparations for dying and our identities as (future) dying people 
and their loved ones.  
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1.0 Introduction  
Every society organizes around death in one way or another. The beginning of the 21st 
century has seen a surge of discourses critiquing how medical institutions and Americans, broadly 
speaking, discuss, prepare for and treat end of life. In this dissertation I perform a conceptually-
oriented rhetorical analysis of the ideal of the good death, tracing this concept across a subset of 
contemporary discourses surrounding end of life. I analyze narratives of patient deaths recounted 
by healthcare practitioners in public discourse in order to understand the images of good and bad 
dying that are constructed within, some ideological investments of those images and the historical 
contexts that have given rise to these discourses. The primary goal of this dissertation is to provide 
a snapshot of some contemporary discourses surrounding end of life, accounting for the historical 
context, discursive constructions of the good death and some of the ideological implications of 
those constructions. Through close readings of contemporary narratives of the good death – 
including stories about both desirable and undesirable, both good and bad deaths – this project 
illuminates some of the attitudes, beliefs and values surrounding death and dying which are 
articulated in the course of arguing for and against particular ways of death.  
Overall, while productive in some ways, the narratives within my archive don’t go far 
enough to address the end of life issues we face. Taking seriously the idea that public narratives 
surrounding health and medicine can shape how medical situations are understood and acted upon, 
I argue that a narrative shift away from the focus on decision-making and the dying person as the 
primary agent at end of life may shift standards of judgment with regard to dying, enabling instead 
the circulation of narratives that center on the distribution of agency across networks and take 
seriously the importance of ending the dying person’s life story. Consistent with other recent 
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analyses (see Kopelson, 2019), I find that, collectively, the narratives in my archive are told 
through the logic of choice, which focuses attention on the dying individual as decision-maker and 
primary agent in a context that is increasingly out of the patient’s control. This narrative 
construction makes the tasks of managing a good death more difficult. I speculate that a shift 
toward narrating end of life through the logic of care – which centers on distributed responsibility, 
care and agency, and which takes the idea of ending the dying person’s life story seriously – would 
shift the concept of the good death and, thus, standards of judgment with regard to dying. Such a 
shift would allow us to tell different stories and, in turn, to see and act upon end of life situations 
differently.    
In this introduction, I first give more detail about the project itself – its timeliness, the 
construction of my archive and a review of methods – and then provide the theoretical background 
which informed my approaches to public discourse and narrative within rhetorics of health and 
medicine, as well as an initial orientation to the concept of the good death and overviews of 
literature on end of life in rhetoric and communication. I end with an overview of the chapters of 
the dissertation.  
1.1 Project Overview 
The contemporary moment presents a unique opportunity to analyze the values, beliefs and 
attitudes surrounding death and dying. Death and dying have been somewhat common topics in 
academic literature in the United States since the 1950’s. In particular, much has been said about 
the medicalization of death, which was propelled by rapid advances in medical technology during 
and following WWII, making it increasingly possible to delay death (see Butler, 2013; Clarke et 
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al., 2010; Gawande, 2014). This prolongation of life led, in part, to the advancement of the denial 
thesis in psychological and sociological literature: the claim that Western cultures, and the United 
States in particular, are death denying cultures or that death is a taboo (Zimmerman & Rodin, 2004, 
p. 212). Despite routinely being contested and refuted, especially in sociology literature (see Exley, 
2004; Kellehear, 1984; Walter, 1991), the idea has persisted, becoming a common trope in 
academic, as well as public discourses. Academic articles about death and dying, many claiming 
that Western cultures are in denial, have proliferated since the 50s, with thousands published in 
the US by the early 1990s (Water, 1991). In addition, Segal (2000) and, more recently Kopelson 
(2019), point us toward the idea that public discourses surrounding death and dying have cycled 
in and out of prominence – with ‘waves’ occurring in the mid-60s, attributed primarily to Kübler-
Ross’ (1969) On Death and Dying, in the ‘90s with Nuland’s best-selling How We Die and again 
in the 2010s.  
That the early 2010s saw a renewed interest in end of life issues is evidenced by a 
proliferation of texts dealing with death, dying, grief and end of life issues. For example, news 
outlets routinely report on topics such as debates over aid in dying laws (e.g. Hartocollis, 2015), 
preparing for the management of email and social media accounts after a death (e.g. Sydell, 2015), 
the popularity of college courses on death (e.g. Hayasaki, 2014), and so on. In addition, books 
dealing with questions of what makes life worth living at the end, like Gawande’s (2014) Being 
Mortal and Kalanithi’s (2016) When Breath Becomes Air, became best sellers. End of life issues 
have also been the subject of recent movies, documentaries and conversation groups (see Institute 
of Medicine [IOM], 2015, pp. 352-54). Furthermore, people like Brittany Maynard, Lisa Bonechek 
Adams, and Oliver Sacks have challenged the idea that dying is supposed to be private, that one 
should shy away from the spotlight once they know they are dying (see Egan, 2014; IOM, 2015, 
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p. 366; Sacks, 2015). In different ways, each of them publicized their dying and worked to make 
their deaths visible, though there was pushback to this ‘dying out loud,’ indicating that 
ambivalence about talking publicly about dying remains (see IOM, 2015, pp.366-67). Despite this 
pushback, there seems to be an ongoing ‘national conversation’ surrounding death, dying and end 
of life issues.   
There are many factors that contribute to this prominence of end of life issues in public 
discourse.1 As mentioned, rapid technological and medical advances have led to longer lives 
through the ability to delay death. As these advancements have occurred relatively recently, 
today’s Baby Boomers are, really, the first generation to have witnessed dying prolonged through 
medical and technological intervention (Hardwig, 2006; IOM, 2015, p. 353). Furthermore, with 
increased life expectancies and as the Baby Boom generation ages, the overall population of the 
United States has aged and will continue to do so. As more and more people are reaching the stage 
of life where death is statistically most common, it follows that these issues would be coming to 
fore. Experts speculate that this will only increase (see Doka, 2003; IOM, 2015, p. 352). In 
addition, the ideal of patient autonomy is a highly-regarded value in medical contexts and, as a 
result, patients have increased say in – and are increasingly responsible for – their medical 
treatments and overall health. The former Institute of Medicine2 (IOM, 2015) notes the extent to 
which the patient as consumer trend renders people “less passive about accepting care that violates 
their own wishes” (p. 353). All of this is, of course, amplified by changing media and increased 
access to media platforms, enabling people like Bonchek Adams, for example, to develop a 
following by blogging about her experiences of dying from breast cancer (p. 366). Increasingly, 
 
1 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 1. 
2 Now called The Health and Medicine Division of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 
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people are able and willing to share end of life experiences, especially negative ones, and have 
found and created audiences for the topic (p. 353). All of which is to say that the conditions are 
ripe for analyzing discussions of end of life issues. 
This national conversation presents an opportune moment to study the cultural, social and 
rhetorical dimensions of death and dying. Death is the only certainty in life – or one of two, as the 
old adage goes – but what is not given is how we organize around, make sense of and approach 
end of life. The stories we tell ourselves and each other about end of life matter: they shape 
expectations of, preparations for and approaches to dying and death – our own, as well as those of 
others; additionally, these stories impact what stories are told later, whose deaths are narrated and 
whose are not, how those stories are told from which platforms, how those deaths are evaluated 
and so on. Thus, the question of how we might live a good life until the end and what discourses 
and structures might enable as many people as possible to achieve that is one worth exploring 
precisely because death is something everyone will experience. In the process of presenting 
arguments about how Americans do die and how we should, about how American society is 
organized around death and how it could be otherwise, these contemporary rhetors articulate 
beliefs, attitudes and values about death, dying and how we approach end of life. The contemporary 
discursive landscape presents a kairotic moment in which to consider the worldviews inherent in 
discussions of death and dying. 
I was struck by how many contemporary texts surrounding end of life issues rely on 
narrative evidence for their claims that medical institutions, as well as broader American culture, 
needs to change how they approach and organize around death. These narratives include stories of 
patients, colleagues, friends, parents and other loved ones enduring drawn out and painful endings 
or, on the other hand, of people who witnessed deaths that were meaningful and moving; I 
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encountered stories of people who came to terms with the inevitability of their own deaths and of 
people who were unprepared for the deaths of their loved ones, in some instances even while they 
knew that their loved ones’ condition was terminal or incurable. Journalist Amanda Bennett (2013, 
April) gave one such TED Talk following the death of her husband in which she laments a lack of 
stories about letting go, citing this lack as one reason for her own unpreparedness. Bennett, and 
other end of life researchers (e.g. Lynn, 1997), have called for the development of new stories to 
supplant the common narratives of the heroic patient and doctor battling death, and those of 
prolonging life at all costs (see Segal, 2000). They speculate that part of what is needed are new 
narratives about letting go, narratives for accepting death and focusing on the present, rather than 
on hope for extended futures. Given the prominence of narrative that I saw within contemporary 
end of life discourses, and in the context of ongoing calls for new narratives, I center my analysis 
on narratives of patient deaths. 
1.1.1 Research Questions and Archive 
For this project I analyzed physician narratives of good and bad deaths in order to 
understand some images of the good death that are circulating within contemporary discourse. 
While not all of the texts in my archive explicitly mention the good death, it is an animating 
concept that helps us understand how end of life is framed and evaluated. My overarching goal in 
this project is to provide a snapshot of these discourses and how the concept of the good death is 
mobilized in the early 2010s by addressing the following questions:  
- What is the historical context that has given rise to end of life discourses in the 2010s? To
what are these discourses responding?
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- What image(s) of the good death are constructed and advocated for within these
discourses?
- Within these constructions, what contributes to a good death and what is a barrier?
- What ideological investments are inherent within these image(s) of the good death? What
are the implications of these ideologies? What impacts might they have?
I attempt to understand these discourses by considering the interplay between texts and the 
contexts in which they were produced and circulated, by reading them through the concept of the 
good death.  
In order to address these questions, I assembled an archive of 27 narratives of good and 
bad deaths written by physicians, published in print and digital media, and circulated through broad 
publics.3 This archive is comprised of narratives by medical professionals (doctors, nurses, 
surgeons, and so on) in The New York Times (NYT) op-ed series about end of life, ‘The End’ (2015-
2016), as well as by practicing surgeon Atul Gawande in his bestselling book Being Mortal (2014). 
For this project I don’t consider the NYT articles or book or chapters from Gawande as a whole, 
but rather pulled out the narratives used in support of the larger arguments being made – by which 
I mean, stories recounting presumed true-events told from a particular point of view and including 
a causal and temporal structure.4 They include stories about the good or bad deaths of patients, 
colleagues, friends, and loved ones, which are primarily used as evidence supporting the authors’ 
arguments for changing the ways Americans approach and organize around death.  
3 Of these 27 narratives, there are four that factor into my analyses but that I do not reference as examples in the 
dissertation: Helen Ouyang (2016) ‘The cultural contours of saving a life’ and David Casarett (2015) ‘Lessons in end-
of-life care from the V.A.,’ both from ‘The End,’ and the stories of Lee Cox (pp. 158-161; 164-65) and an unnamed 
patient of Gawande’s (pp. 180-81) from Being Mortal (2014).  
4 The definition of narrative is discussed below in section 1.2.1.  
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‘The End,’ which ran from January 2015 through February 2016, covered a range of issues 
surrounding end of life, written by people who had lost loved ones, medical professionals, people 
diagnosed with life-limiting diseases and a few by non-medical death-related professionals (for 
example the president of Compassion and Choices, the U.S.’s oldest advocacy group for aid in 
dying laws, or a co-founder of The Conversation Project, an initiative to facilitate end of life 
conversations). I singled out the 16 articles from the series that were authored by medical 
practitioners – emergency room (ER) or intensive care unit (ICU) doctors and nurses, surgeons, 
hospice and palliative care doctors, specialists or nurses, and primary care physicians – and 
included at least one narrative.5 In these articles, as well as in the broader series, there is quite a 
bit of attention paid to advanced care planning conversations and documentation, in part, at least, 
because Medicare reimbursement for advanced care planning conversations with doctors went into 
effect at the beginning of 2015. In addition, these op-ed articles cover topics such as the steps that 
occur in pronouncing a death in the hospital, the complexities of different cultural approaches to 
end of life, barriers to a good death and so on. The majority of the articles make use of patient 
narratives in order to make their overall points, either with several shorter examples given in 
support of different points or structuring the entire article around a single narrative or two. While 
I could not find information on the readership of this particular series, the overall circulation of 
the NYT is large, with the 18th largest circulation in the world. Furthermore, several of the articles 
 
5 There are a total of 19 articles authored by healthcare practitioners that ran as part of ‘The End.’ I excluded the three 
following articles: VJ Periyakoil’s (2015) ‘We need a role reversal in the conversation on dying,’ which does not 
include any narrative elements; Mary Ersek’s (2015) ‘Transforming nursing home care,’ which includes one six-
sentence story about discovering that one particular nursing home patient with dementia preferred powder instead of 
lotion at bedtime as the only narrative; and Scott Eggener’s (2015) ‘The murderer in the mirror,’ dealing with a 
surgeon’s complicated grief after losing a patient during surgery. The first excluded article does not refer to any 
narratives to make its case and the second two are different enough in kind from the rest of the archive that I excluded 
them from analysis.  
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published as part of ‘The End’ include published reader responses, so at least some of them sparked 
enough conversation and/or controversy for the paper to publish letters in response. 
In addition to the NYT articles, I also analyze 11 of the narratives dealing with end of life 
recounted by Atul Gawande in his 2014 bestseller, Being Mortal: Medicine and What Matters in 
the End. The primary argument of Gawande’s book is that the project of medicalizing and delaying 
death has failed. Gawande is hopeful that individual people and medical institutions can find ways 
to improve end of life experiences, primarily through a focus on well-being, rather than on 
treatment, survival or health, throughout a person’s life but especially at the end (pp. 259-60). 
Gawande is a practicing surgeon and spoke with doctors, specialists in geriatrics, hospice and 
palliative care, nursing home directors, staff and residents, as well as patients of various ages and 
conditions and their loved ones, in order to explore contemporary end of life. Some of the 
narratives he recounts are experiences he witnessed or in which he participated, though he also 
repeats experiences recounted to him by others.6 Throughout the book, Gawande makes use of 
these narratives to provide evidence for his claims, to give concrete examples of statistics and data, 
or to contextualize recommendations from the specialists he spoke to. Being Mortal appeared on 
a range of bestselling lists, including the New York Times, The Economist, The Wall Street Journal 
and NPR, was the subject of a number of reviews and was made into a Frontline documentary on 
PBS.    
I selected texts by medical professionals because these authors chose to recast experiences 
with death and dying that occurred in medical contexts for broader public circulation. These 
stories, many of which are narrated as first-hand accounts, carry the implicit ethos of medical and 
 
6 The first half of Being Mortal centers on what makes life worth living for elderly people, especially focusing on 
nursing homes and other elder care models. I do not discuss those narratives here, instead analyzing the 11 narratives 
about medical intervention and decision-making at end of life, which, generally, makes up the second half of the book.  
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health professionals and offer specific types of evidence of cultural, systemic and institutional 
failures when it comes to death and dying – namely, evidence that is based on multiple experiences 
with end of life issues and the medical and institutional knowledge through which to understand 
those experiences. Which is to say, while personal narratives of a loved one’s or even one’s own 
experiences with end of life issues are persuasive, by their nature as one, situated experience they 
don’t speak to larger cultural or institutional issues in the same way as narratives from someone 
who is embedded within an institution, has many experiences with end of life and chooses to speak 
out. Additionally, I was curious about the translation of medical experiences, likely cast in medical 
and institutional terms in other retellings, for lay audiences. Presumably it is because of their 
experiences with patients and loved ones at end of life that these authors are moved to push for 
changes in the way Americans die and, in order to do so, have translated their experiences into 
narratives to circulate within public discourses in an effort to enact social and institutional change. 
These texts do not come anywhere near representing the totality of contemporary 
approaches to death in the US – and there are many differences along class, racial, ethnic, religious, 
regional and individual lines, which the narratives in this archive are largely silent upon. These 
texts circulated through one dominant public in the US: the middle class, typically white, person 
who consumes print and digital media and, generally, can be understood to be in a position to 
attempt to manage, control and prepare for their future, end of life included. Calls to prepare for 
death, to ‘have their affairs in order,’ to consider their values so that they might guide decision-
making at end of life and so on, are calls to people who, statistically, will die in old age, likely 
from a terminal or chronic condition and who have access to the resources (money, time, 
healthcare, familial networks, etc.) that makes shaping end of life possible. Generally speaking, 
this means middle- and upper-class people with longer life expectancies (see Chetty, et al., 2016; 
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Murray, et al., 2006). Additionally, much of the academic literature on the good death and death 
studies more broadly focuses here as well, particularly on people with terminal illnesses such as 
cancer.  
I choose to focus on these relatively mainstream publications because that they saw fit to 
cover end of life issues is indicative of some shift in discursive norms and part of my interest has 
been in how these (counter)discourses and articulations of the good death within have changed 
over time. If, as the broader discourse to which these texts contribute seem to claim, there is a push 
to tell new stories about end of life and to challenge the status quo in some way, I was initially 
curious what these stories were about, what they focused on and the concept of the good death 
within.  
1.1.2 Methodological Approach 
While I draw on literature from a range of disciplines in this project, I am analyzing 
instances of health and medicine-related public discourse from a decidedly rhetorical lens. 
Following other scholars of rhetorics of health and medicine, rhetorical analyses allow us to 
examine the roles of discursive practices in shaping judgment, understanding, and future action, 
in making and/or enacting collective decisions in pursuit of the good life (see Keränen, 2014; Lyne, 
2001). Thus, a rhetorical analysis of concepts related to end of life points us toward the ways that 
various forms of symbolic action influence our perceptions of, approaches to and judgments of 
death, dying and end of life issues.  
Following this disciplinary focus, my research questions are aimed at understanding the 
historical context for contemporary end of life discourses, articulations of the concept of the good 
death within and what these articulations may mean for how we understand, approach and evaluate 
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end of life; which is to say, very simply, I am asking why now, what is this version of the good 
death and what are some of its implications? In order address these questions, I approached my 
archive through a conceptually-oriented analysis, centering on the concept of the good death.  
Conceptually-oriented criticism calls attention to the interplay between text(s), their 
contexts and the concepts that animate or influence them. “The conceptual orientation examines 
the way that particular concepts that shape or inform symbolic activity are expressed in significant 
texts and using [sic] this exchange to explore shifts in human consciousness and standards of 
judgment” (Grey, 2009, pp. 342-343). In the attempt to understand a text (or set of texts) and how 
it may influence consciousness or standards of judgment, the conceptually-oriented rhetorical 
critic first identifies a concept at work in a text and, second, analyzes how that concept functions 
within the text. In providing an account of the concept in relation to the text and its potential 
impacts the critic, third, illuminates shifts – or potential shifts – that contribute to shaping standards 
of judgment and/or human consciousness. The concept at work in the text informs understandings 
of the text, as well as the possibilities for action or judgment in response to it and, in turn, the text 
itself shapes understandings of the concept. The concept thus shapes and is shaped by the standards 
of judgment of those participating in the circulation of the particular public discourse, including 
the critic themselves, and, further, shapes and is shaped by the text.  
Conceptually-oriented criticism seeks to understand a particular concept as an idea or 
framework that informs how a text is read and acted on, as well as illuminating how that concept 
functions within the text, how that concept is impacted by the text itself, and how it impacts broader 
cultural dialogues through shifting standards of judgment and/or human consciousness. Analyses 
of this sort consider the broader ideological, historical, strategic or aesthetic frameworks that shape 
the texts’ appearance, affect our own perceptual processes and standards of judgment, and make 
13 
legible particular actions. This general orientation to a set of texts, the contexts which produce 
them and in which they are read, and the concept(s) that shape their reception calls for 
methodological flexibility, and thus, while considering the texts through the concept of the good 
death throughout, I employ a slightly different approach in each chapter, discussed further in the 
chapter overview section.  
Through the overarching framework of conceptual orientation, I consider shifts in the 
concept of the good death, how the good death shapes and is shaped by end of life narratives and 
what types of actions and further narrativization are warranted based on this conceptualization. As 
noted, I argue that while the narratives are productive in some senses, collectively they perpetuate 
some of the very risks of bad deaths that they advocate against.  
1.2 Theoretical Framing 
1.2.1 Rhetorics of Health and Medicine, Public Discourse and Narrative 
While I draw from other bodies of literature, this project, which seeks to uncover the 
worldview(s) inherent within stories of good and bad deaths circulating through particular publics, 
is founded on rhetorics of health and medicine, public discourse and narrative theory. Following 
Keränen (2012), rhetorics of health and medicine is a sub-field of rhetorical studies concerned with 
“how specific symbolic patterns structure meaning and action in health and medical contexts and 
practices” (p. 37) and, further, Meloncon and Frost (2015) identify it as one that seeks to uncover 
how “discourses create situations and allow participants and users to act on them” (p. 7). Thus, 
rhetorics of health and medicine direct attention to the various ways that conceptualizations and 
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performances of health and medicine-related concepts impact knowledge, action, identities, 
judgments and so on. The goals of my project align with those of the study rhetorics of health and 
medicine as I am seeking to understand how end of life – and the ideal of the good death in 
particular – is constructed within a particular set of public discourses authored by healthcare 
practitioners. Understanding these constructions provides, among other things, insight into how 
end of life is approached as a significant life event, including what types of knowledge are 
available or sought out, how people act in response, the standards of judgment that inform 
evaluations of dying and so on, for a particular public.  
While rhetorics of health and medicine began with a narrower focus on medical institutions 
and medical models of care, work in this sub-field has broadened to include health-and medicine-
related discourses that circulate as part of broader public discourses, as the narratives in my archive 
do (see Scott, Segal & Keränen, 2013; Keränen, 2014; Meloncon & Scott, 2018). Public discourses 
are those that are circulated, contested, enacted and/or rearticulated by publics and counterpublics 
(Wilson & Eberly, 2009). They both articulate and reinforce viewpoints with which people identify 
and, possibly, influence people to identify in particular ways (Condit, 1999). Following Warner 
(2002), discourses are ‘world-making;’ that is, they portray the world in particular ways and 
“attempt to realize that world through address” (p. 422). Thus, discourses carry with them 
worldviews, beliefs, values, and, following Foucault (1990), transmit, reproduce, undermine 
and/or expose power relations that the publics through which they circulate are, at least implicitly, 
asked to identify with (p. 101). There are a multiplicity of mutually-shaping publics and 
constitutive discourses, which respond to different elements of rhetorical situations – and to one 
another – in fluid, interacting systems, with differing levels of institutional or infrastructural 
support, as well as different levels of access to different platforms (see Edbauer, 2005; 
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Kuchinskaya, 2014). Regardless of the interplay of multiple contesting discourses, in any public 
members are active participants in the circulation, performance, articulation and/or re-articulation 
of the inherent worldviews. Speaking specifically of medical texts, Keränen (2014) summarizes, 
saying “In short, a rhetorical model of publics presents an inclusive vision of health and medicine 
as [a] networked, public exchange and encourages us to see participants in health and medical 
processes as more than consumers, clients and patients” (p. 105). The practitioner-authors in my 
study are thus attempting to ‘realize’ particular worlds through the narratives they tell and those 
who consume, respond to, contest and/or act upon these discourses are active participants in 
shaping these worlds. With this in mind, this project is aimed at uncovering what versions of death 
– and therefore of life – are being called for in these practitioner narratives.  
Narrative is one site of research at the intersections of public discourse and rhetorics of 
health and medicine, especially focusing on the role of cultural narratives surrounding illness, 
health and human life and, in particular, the capacity of those narratives to empower and constrain 
storytellers. Insofar as rhetoric is concerned with symbolic meaning-making, it makes sense that 
narrative would be one site of rich theorization within rhetorical scholarship in general. While 
conceptions of what a narrative is vary somewhat (see Avraamidou & Osbourne, 2009), the 
minimum characteristics necessary to constitute a narrative include at least two events, linked 
causally through a temporal structure, told from the point of view of a narrator or author (see Foss, 
2004). These constitutive characteristics are typically expressed in the form of characters, who we 
understand to be representative of actual people in non-fiction or personal narrative, to whom 
events happen, making up the general plot of a narrative which takes place in particular settings. 
As practitioner of narrative medicine Rita Charon (2001) writes, narratives rely on experiences, 
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rather than explicit proposition, in an attempt “to illuminate the universally true by revealing the 
particular” (1898).  
Narratives are of particular importance as they are a foundational way of shaping 
understandings of the world by creating meaning out of events, orienting us toward some things 
over others and, importantly, constituting identities. Narrative is thus a means of creating and 
sharing knowledge, judging individuals and events, transmitting values and shaping actions within 
a particular community (see Charon, 2001; Fisher, 1999; Foss, 2004; Rowland, 2009). They are a 
resource to help manage the uncertainty of human life by creating ways of being, knowing and 
evaluating in common and, as with other forms of discourse, function as implicit arguments for 
viewing the world, ourselves and others in particular ways. Furthermore, we understand ourselves 
and share ourselves with others through the stories we tell about ourselves, which provide 
understanding of and structure for one’s sense of self (see Linde, 1993; Lingis, 2007). Arthur Frank 
(1995) asserts, our “selves are perpetually recreated in stories. Stories do not simply describe the 
self; they are the self’s medium of being” (53). Thus, our lives have beginnings, middles and, 
eventually, endings made up of particular moments collected into our narrative self. There are 
many events that can disrupt one’s self-narrative – chronic or terminal illness being one such, 
which may “require[s] the construction of a new life story” (Romanoff & Thompson, 2006, p. 
309). Additionally, as the dying person does not get the opportunity to end their own story, at some 
point it is left to others to narrate the dying person’s life story, and that of their death. The narratives 
in my archive portray the particular experiences of healthcare practitioners with patient deaths and 
thus attempt to constitute a shared vision of end of life – including evaluations of dying, how we 
understand ourselves and others as dying people, what actions and reactions are called for and so 
on; visions both of how it is and how it could be otherwise.  
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There is relatively little research on physician narratives of patient illness/death, especially 
those narratives circulated in public discourse, however patient or survivor illness narratives have 
received quite a bit of scholarly attention. The end of the 20th century in particular saw a rise in 
the publication of illness narratives. Some theorize that this growth of the personal illness narrative 
is a pushback against the scientific focus of modern medicine and is an attempt at reclaiming the 
individual’s experience of illness (see Segal, 2006, p. 60). However, there is concern that the 
inducement toward coherent narrative accounts of illness, and narratives that fit particular genres, 
can limit how we understand ourselves and our diseases (see Defossez, 2018; Segal, 2005; 2007). 
These limitations may further shape how others approach their own illnesses, as these types of 
narratives serve communal functions as well: “People tell stories not just to work out their own 
changing identities, but also to guide others who will follow them. They seek not to provide a map 
that can guide others – each must create his own – but rather to witness the experience of 
reconstructing one’s own map” (Frank, 1995, p. 17). Kleinman (1988) further argues that the 
retrospective illness narrative “reaffirms core cultural values under siege and reintegrates social 
relations whose structural tensions have been intensified” (p. 50). These narratives are not only 
about reconstructing one’s sense of self or ‘providing a map’ to others but are also about 
reinforcing or changing the values of the community in some way. Segal (2005) agrees, arguing 
that all illness narratives – retrospective or not – perform this epideictic function (pp. 59-73).  
Much of this literature on patient illness narratives can be applied to practitioner narratives 
as well, including those published for public or lay audiences. Physicians are increasingly 
reflecting on their own experiences practicing medicine through narrative, publishing not only in 
professional journals but also books and essays for public audiences (Charon, 2004, p. 862; 
Kopelson, 2019). As with autobiographical patient illness narratives, these narratives are told to 
 18 
give some sort of coherence to the experience of practicing medicine and caring for ill and dying 
people, which is often emotionally tasking, at times even dehumanizing. Narratives help render 
their experiences whole, as Charon put it (2004 p. 862), thereby proving insight on the experience. 
Additionally, many practitioner narratives are explicitly told for some purpose, to transmit a 
lesson. The insights healthcare practitioners learn through narrativizing their experiences call to 
be witnessed by others, serving a similar epideictic function as illness narratives. The narratives 
shared with colleagues re-create and transmit the shared culture of medicine and practitioner 
narratives published for lay audiences reshape perceptions of medicine, contributing to a “social 
rhetoric of illness” (Frank, 1995, p. 21). One could take this further and make explicit that these 
narratives, drawing from the professional ethos of medical practitioners, not only shape how we 
talk about illness, health and interactions with medical institutions, but guide actions, shape 
judgments and help constitute our identities with respect to these things too. 
Drawing on these understandings of the functions of practitioner narratives, in this project 
I analyze publicly-circulated practitioner narratives of patient illness to uncover the lessons 
practitioner-authored narratives of patient deaths share with the publics through which they 
circulate. As with other health- and medicine-related discourses, rhetorical framing of death, dying 
and end of life issues is an attempt to create shared visions of death, the dying process and dying 
people. In praising some types of deaths, and imploring that we avoid others, the narratives in this 
archive draw on and actively shape the concept of the good death in the attempt to realize particular 
ways of organizing around the fact of our mortality, thus reinforcing particular values over others. 
The ideal of the good death has a long history, some of which will be covered in Chapter One, 
though an initial orientation to the concept, and how it is understood in sociological and medical 
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literature, is useful for understanding my approach to the individual texts and the project as a 
whole. 
1.2.2 The Good Death  
While there are many different facets of end of life discussed as part of the ongoing 
conversation on end of life issues, I focus on discussions about the ideal of the good death. Any 
prescriptions for or questions about how one should die – for example: how one would choose to 
die if they could, the nature of the deaths people and institutions should aim to facilitate, strategies 
for successful or at least ‘good enough’7 dying and so on – are discussions about achieving a good 
death. The evaluation of a death, whether it is good, bad or somewhere in between, is co-
constructed by the dying person, loved ones and healthcare professionals (Steinhauser et al., 2000). 
Thus, the ideal of the good death functions both as a goal to strive for while dying and as a way of 
framing someone’s dying process in hindsight. For example, calls to ‘prepare for the unexpected’ 
by having one’s affairs in order (e.g. will, advanced directive, naming a healthcare proxy, life 
insurance, etc.) is a strategy to help one achieve a good death by being prepared in advanced to 
mitigate the negative impacts of dying. Or, to take another example, a mother requesting that her 
children visit as her health deteriorates so that they might all, hopefully, achieve some measure of 
closure in the chance to say goodbye, is an attempt to shape the dying process such that 
psychological and social consequences are managed. On the other hand, narratives of a soldier’s 
‘heroic sacrifice in the name of their country’ or of a 30-something who ‘lost their battle with 
 
7 As the good death is an idealized version of dying, the concept of a ‘good enough’ death, which allows for a dying 
person to come as close their idealized version of dying as possible given their circumstances, has also been forwarded 
(see McNamara, 1998). Additionally, while there does not seem to be a strict definition of the term, some use the term 
‘successful dying’ as essentially interchangeably with ‘good death’ (e.g. Meier, et al., 2016).   
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cancer’ are both examples framing the dying process after the fact in order to help to make sense 
of the death, through the virtues of sacrifice for the good of society or the refusal to give up even 
against insurmountable odds, for example.  
All of which is to say, the ideal of the good death shapes preparations for end of life in 
advance, during the dying process and reflections on a death after the fact. Further, the ideal of the 
good death, as both a goal to strive for and as a way of framing a death after the fact, serves an 
epideictic function, reinforcing a society’s highest values, by reinforcing the systems, myths, 
narratives and/or ideologies through which it is perpetuated (see Kastenbaum, 2012, p. 465). 
We are in a transitional moment in approaches to end of life. Up until World War II, people 
were statistically most likely to die in the ‘prime’ of life and, as a result, the goal of medicine was 
to prolong life as long as possible (Hardwig, 2006). As mentioned, narratives still circulate today 
that support this goal: the heroic doctor battling death, the courageous patient who sacrifices 
everything for the chance of pushing death back a few more years, if not into old age. However, 
with the widespread availability of advanced medical technology and practices in the years after 
WWII, it has become possible to significantly delay death and, as we see now, the majority of 
people in the U.S. will die in old age (Arias & Xu, 2019). Furthermore, medicine is increasingly 
able to identify and diagnose the diseases from which, statistically, most people will die, extending 
the dying process into long dying – dying which can take weeks, months or even years (see Walter, 
2003). Given that medicine runs up against the biological limits of the human more often than up 
against medicine’s ability to prolong life, the question of when to permit death, rather than seeking 
to prolong life, is raised, necessitating new narratives, as well as, possibly, a new ideal of the good 
death.  
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There is little agreement as to what, specifically, constitutes a good death for an individual 
person (Meier et al., 2016, p. 262; Steinhauser et al., 2000, p. 830). However, contemporary 
academic literature generally conforms to a palliative care conception of the good death, which 
emphasizes awareness of dying, autonomy and a self-chosen coping style, open and honest 
communication about death, and acceptance of dying, or at least the idea that “death is something 
to be learned from,” as general elements (Goldsteen et al 2006 p. 379). According to several 
reviews of academic literature patient treatment and dying preferences – as well as patient 
preferences on the timing of death, when to delay death and when to permit it – are central elements 
of the good death (see Goldsteen et al., 2006; Meier et al., 2016; Steinhauser et al., 2000). In 
addition, emotional, psychological, spiritual and/or social support for the dying person, as well as 
their loved ones, open communication between patient, family and healthcare personnel, 
awareness of dying, and acceptance or transcendence of death all figure in as elements of a good 
death in one form or another, though, again, what these elements entail in practice will differ based 
on the dying individual. Adequate management of pain and symptoms are key features, as well, 
and are considered to be a foundational element, enabling the dying person to take up the dying 
role by completing the practical, relational and personal tasks associated with dying – such as 
completing end of life planning, saying goodbyes, passing the torch on to successors, giving 
permission for spouses to remarry, completing last rites or otherwise achieving some measure of 
closure (see Emanuel, Bennet & Richardson, 2007).8 Inherent within this conceptualization of the 
 
8 The idea of the ‘dying role’ is, essentially, another frame for understanding the ideal of the good death, largely 
through social constructivism. Oliver-Parker (1999-2000) is often credited with developing the concept, however 
Noyes & Clancy (1977) originally proposed dying as a social role distinct from the sick role in a critique of hospital 
care at end of life. See Emanuel, Bennett and Richardson (2007) for a thorough summary of key features of the dying 
role, breaking them into practical, relational and personal tasks.  
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good death is that individuals continue to ‘be themselves’ for as long as possible and that the 
ending should fit the individual (see Goldsteen, et al., 2006, p. 381; Kastenbaum, 2012, p. 467).  
This individualized approach to end of life mirrors trends in healthcare, and discourses 
surrounding health, more broadly. Scholars in the medical humanities, rhetorics of health and 
medicine and other related areas have argued that individuals are increasingly responsible for 
seeking out health-related information, maintaining their health, preventing health issues, deciding 
courses of treatment and so on. This responsibility is often framed as empowering patients to take 
an active role in their healthcare and/or increasing patient (or consumer) choice when it comes to 
healthcare, but many rightly note the extent to which these discourses further biopolitical regimes 
of self-control and self-regulation (e.g. Lupton, 1995; Metzl, 2010; Spoel et al., 2014). These 
discourses center on the concept of autonomy, which gives a patient the authority to control their 
own treatments but also carries with it a particular subjectivity. As Keränen (2007) writes, “Once 
a necessary corrective for the abuses of Tuskegee, Nazi experimentation, and rampant physician 
paternalism, autonomy is predicated on the assumption of an autonomous individual agent who 
desires to make informed (read rational) decisions about individual health” (p 189). The 
autonomous patient is in control and, thus, is considered to have agency, which is usually the 
framed as the capacity to know, prevent and/or decide in health-related situations (see Defossez 
2016). This individualized and active version of the ‘patient’ is something of a contradiction of 
terms, as the patient has historically been conceived of as a passive recipient of medical treatment 
administered by the paternalistic, authoritative doctor. While some have shifted to speak of patients 
as ‘consumers’ of medical services or as ‘lay people’ in the lay-professional relationship (see Dew 
& Jutel, 2014), I use the term ‘patient’ in this project primarily because that is the term used by 
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the practitioner-authors of the texts I analyzed and, further, to reinforce that these stories are 
narrativized from within a medical view of end of life. 
In this context of contemporary individualized medicine, the ideal of the good death 
includes control over the dying process itself, ideally guided by the individual patient, in order to 
facilitate the patient’s capacity to take up the dying role and complete practical, relational and 
personal tasks independently or delegating them as needed. This control can only extend so far 
though – as Byock (2015) reminds us in an NYT op-ed, “modern medicine has yet to make even 
one person immortal” – and so the primary question at end of life eventually becomes when to 
cede that control, to cease treatment and permit the person to die. As noted, many of the common 
myths and narratives of end of life support the idea of pursing the prolongation of life at all costs. 
Among other things, this focus has contributed to the trope of the US as a death denying society 
(see Becker, 1973; Zimmerman & Rodin, 2004), though this is contested in sociological literature 
(see Kellehear, 1984; Walter, 1991).  
Regardless of where one falls on the question of the denial thesis, in some senses death is 
always a public matter. The three primary tasks following a death are first to dispose of the body, 
then to make the implications of the death real to community members and to reintegrate the 
community that has just lost a member (Corr, Nabe & Corr, 2009, p. 292). The rituals surrounding 
mourning after a death – as well as many of the preparations while a person is dying – work to 
achieve these goals and are carried out by survivors in accordance with the traditions and laws of 
the community. As such, death is always bound up in public and communal life, though how the 
tasks associated with death are conceived of and distributed has shifted over time, with the work 
of dying increasingly individualized and recognition of dying increasingly public in globalized 
societies (Kellehear, 2007). Which is to say, on the one hand, preparations for dying have shifted 
 24 
from a community task to an increasingly individual or personal sphere of responsibility and 
awareness that someone is dying has shifted toward institutional or public control in the form of 
hospital/biomedical, nursing home and/or state definitions of death, an argument echoed in 
Keränen’s (2007) article about patient preferences for end of life worksheets. Overall, sociologist 
of death and dying, Kellehear (2007) argues that public control over recognition of dying has 
resulted in decreased awareness of death. 
Additionally, many sociologists and death studies researchers have debated the discursive 
norms through which death, dying and related end of life issues are discussed. Noting several 
competing discursive frames – including practical, biomedical, public health and governmental, 
semi-psychiatric and therapeutic, as well as religious frames – Walter (1991) speculates that the 
loss of a coherent language with which to discuss issues surrounding death and dying contributes 
to the perception of its taboo (pp. 303-4). Related, rhetorics of health and medicine scholar, Judy 
Segal (2000), discusses two competing sets of discourses for approaching end of life, one which 
constructs dying as a human experience that circulates in public discourses and the other, based in 
biomedical discourses, especially those occurring within hospital settings, construct death as a 
medical failure. The contemporary narratives I analyze for this project are perhaps evidence of an 
attempt to overcome this divide, to realign the discourses of the public and the technical spheres 
by portraying deaths in hospital settings, narrated by healthcare practitioners as, more or less, 
human experiences.  
Despite the epideictic nature of the ideal of the good death, the inherently public nature of 
the work associated with dying and this focus on public discourse, there is not a lot of literature on 
end of life issues within rhetoric or rhetorics of health and medicine. As Kopelson (2019) notes, 
most rhetorical work on end of life considers deliberation over aid in dying discourses and 
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legislation (e.g. Hyde, 2001; Hyde & McSpirit, 2007; McDorman, 2005), or on decision-making 
at end of life (e.g. Segal, 2000; 2005; Keränen, 2007). Kopelson’s article, published at the end of 
2019 and looking at some of the same discourses as this project, is the only study I know of that 
centers on the ideal of the good death. 
Thus, this project seeks to enter and extend conversations about the potential of public 
narrative – especially practitioner narratives of patient illness/death – to shape how medical 
situations are approached and judged. In this project I provide a snapshot of a transitional moment 
in end of life discourses and practices.9 The importance of end of life issues in medical- and health-
related discourses has been slowly established within rhetorics of health and medicine, but, as 
indicated, there is an overall dearth in rhetorical literature on the ideal of the good death. 
Furthermore, there is little theorizing in general on the logic through which the concept of the good 
death is articulated and acted upon.  
Centering on narrative not only points us toward a particularly influential form of public 
discourse, as overviewed above, but also one in which it is potentially easier to intervene in pursuit 
of addressing issues surrounding end of life. In attempting to uncover some of the attitudes, beliefs 
and values imbedded in a potentially influential set of rhetors’ constructions end of life and the 
ideal of the good death, I am not only commenting on how past, present and future end of life – 
and potentially other medical – situations are understood, but also how a fundamental aspect of 
our lives is discursively constructed and organized around. The good death is one lens through 
which death and dying are understood. Careful attention to how end of life narratives draw their 
conclusions allows us to intervene in that conceptualization. A shift in the rhetoric of dying may 
shift responses to health and medical-related situations, interactions with medical institutions, 
 
9 See Cross & Warraich, 2019, Dec. 12; also, discussed further in the conclusion to this dissertation.  
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judgments about and preparations for end of life, as well as how we live in the face of death and 
understand our identities as (future) dying people and their loved ones. In part this project is an 
attempt to shed light on what we, broadly speaking, value as evidenced through public narratives 
about end of life. Dying is the one event that touches every single living thing and, as such, broadly 
shapes the structure of our lives and society, whether we are aware of it, accept it or not (see 
Bauman, 1992; Becker, 1973). Understanding more about the end of life narratives that circulate 
through public discourse helps shed light on how our individual lives and social structures are 
organized, conceived of and evaluated.   
1.3 Chapter Overviews 
In the first chapter, I provide historical and discursive context the concept of the good death 
and the texts that make up my archive, arguing that contemporary narratives of good and bad dying 
are part of larger advocacy for death acceptance. This advocacy, I further argue, is an extension of 
the mid-twentieth century death awareness movement. I break contemporary advocacy into two, 
interrelated strands: on the one hand, the death positive movement, which seeks to counter cultural 
denial of death, and, on the other hand, what I am calling advocacy for ‘well-timed’ dying, which 
primarily focuses on addressing the prevalence of futile treatments or unwanted life prolongation. 
The practitioner narratives that make up my archive fall in this second strand in that, generally, 
they are concerned with medical approaches to dying and attempt to facilitate better deaths by 
encouraging better choices at end of life. In this chapter, I overview contemporary death 
acceptance discourses as a whole, as well as the earlier death awareness movement in order to 
provide context for understanding end of life narratives and articulations of good versus bad dying 
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circulating in the 2010s. I rely on both primary and secondary sources to account for the interplay 
between text and contexts considering the ways that articulations of the good death have (and have 
not) changed over time.  
The second chapter introduces the narratives that form the basis of the dissertation and 
addresses the question of the images of the good death constructed within, as well as the practices 
(and so on) that facilitate or function as barriers to a good death. This chapter places the concept 
of the good death within the texts themselves, finding that the good death functions as an ideal to 
strive for and shapes the evaluation of the narratives. I organize the narratives into a critical 
typology, arguing that they focus on type of treatment, the role of the patient and/or on broader 
social and structural issues, with stories of good and bad deaths told within each focus. 
Collectively, I read these narratives as forwarding an ideal of the good death that results from low 
medical intervention and in which uncertainty on the part of patients and/or loved ones is 
minimized, the patient retains agency as long as possible and the social needs of patients and loved 
ones are met. While stated somewhat reductively here, one of the primary ‘lessons’ of these stories 
is that a good death is contingent on patients and/or proxies making the right decisions: medical 
knowledge and established approaches to end of life are generally presented as given and it is up 
to patients and loved ones to decide what to do in response. However, I do identify two narratives 
that don’t fit this generalization and, in different ways, make calls for medicine to adjust to specific 
patients and to change approaches to dying in medical contexts. Thus, in Chapter Two I account 
for the interplay between text and concept through a close textual analysis of the texts themselves. 
I identify the evaluatory ideal constructed within these texts and offer one argument for how they 
reinforce or seek to shape judgments of the roles of medicine at end of life.  
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The final chapter considers some of the implications of those constructions of the good 
death – that is, what actions, judgments, narratives and so on are warranted by the particular 
conceptualization of the good death – by rereading the narratives of my archive through the lens 
of what Annemarie Mol (2008) calls the logic of choice versus the logic of care in medical 
practices. These narratives are predominantly narrativized through the logic of choice, which 
perpetuates the ideology of the autonomous individual decision-maker and typically renders 
healthcare practitioners narratively passive. While some dying people and their loved ones are able 
to articulate narratives of good dying through the logic of choice, I argue that the narrativized logic 
of choice more often acts as a barrier to good dying, as it cannot account for the historical life of 
the dying person and often cuts patients off from their caring networks. When viewed through the 
lens of care, the concept of good dying shifts, directing attention to the distribution of agency 
across a dying person’s caring networks and the necessity of ending the dying person’s story. In 
this chapter, I seek to address the question of the ideological investments of these constructions of 
good and bad dying, as well as their potential implications, by an ideological analysis of the 
narratives. Ultimately, I speculate that a generalized shift from choice to care in end of life 
narratives may also shift standards of judgment with regard to end of life, helping to facilitate 
better approaches to dying by telling different stories.  
Altogether, I argue that narratives centering on the agency of the autonomous, dying 
individual – and especially those that center on end of life decision-making as the primary moment 
that agency is enacted – won’t address the issues of futile treatment or prolonged deaths, won’t 
protect patients from practitioner or institutional overstep, nor expand access to the possibility of 
the good death to those who are disadvantaged socially, economically or otherwise. Indeed, as 
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recent trends in end of life show (see Cross & Warraich, 2019, Dec. 11; 2019, Dec. 12),10 making 
the, ostensibly, right decisions at the right time does not necessarily lead to better dying. A shift 
away from the logic of choice, possibly toward the logic of care, would also shift the focus in end 
of life discourses, enabling us to more effectively address the issues rightfully raised within 
contemporary end of life discourses.  
Overall, as stated, my primary goal is to provide a snapshot of these discourses in order to 
understand what impacts they might have on how we, broadly speaking, organize around death. 
Personally, I am interested in the creation of structures and discourses that facilitate better dying 
and coping with death. Which is to say, those structures and discourses that enable more people to 
prepare for their own death, or those of loved ones, and facilitate dying in the least distressing 
manner possible, for the dying person, as well as any surviving loved ones and, if possible, 
healthcare practitioners. While I am excited about the existence of the broader discourse I analyze 
here, I am simultaneously critical of its potential to change organization around death or to 
facilitate good dying on a broad scale. 
 
10 This is discussed in more detail in the Conclusion.  
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2.0 Chapter One: End of Life Advocacy in the U.S. 
Contemporary end of life discourses are often explicitly framed as arguments against 
standard practices in caring for dying people. The majority of these discourses characterize the ill 
effects of these practices as a result of three interrelated things, each of which poses issues for 
pursuit of the good death: a thoroughly medicalized view of death and dying, overcomplicated 
healthcare systems and a perceived taboo on discussing death and dying. Here, I argue that 
contemporary conceptualizations of the good death forwarded in books, op-eds, essays, blog posts 
and so on, originate with the end of life movements that emerged in the mid-20th century. These 
contemporary discourses advocate for death acceptance by seeking to counter the perceived denial 
of death in contemporary culture and/or the prevalence of futile or unwanted prolongation of life 
common in medical institutions.     
In this chapter, I offer a brief overview of these end of life movements in the United States, 
attending in particular to the discourses surrounding social, technological and medical 
developments of the 20th and early 21st centuries as a context for understanding contemporary 
narratives of good and bad deaths, and the concept of the good death more broadly. Specifically, I 
argue that end of life discourses of the early 2010s are an extension of the mid-20th century death 
awareness movement.11 Originating in the ‘60s, this movement argued that Western societies, and 
the U.S. in particular, were death-denying societies that overly medicalized and professionalized 
dying. Thus, proponents argued, the need to promote awareness of death, dying and other end of 
 
11 Reflecting literature in the sociology of death and dying, I refer to the loose network of scholars and activists 
working toward death awareness as a ‘movement’ (see for example Doka, 2003).  
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life issues and, further, to articulate the possibility of a good death. I argue here that contemporary 
counterdiscourses build upon the foundations of the earlier movement for death awareness in 
arguments for death acceptance, which, I further argue, has two basic camps.  
I see contemporary advocacy for death acceptance falling into two primary strands, one 
focusing on death and the other on dying. The first is called the ‘death positive movement’12 by 
proponents (see Order of the Good Death) and, through death-centered media, gatherings and 
discussions, has the goal of normalizing death, breaking the perceived taboo surrounding death 
and even celebrating the fact of our mortality in everyday life. The second, which I call advocacy 
for ‘well-timed’ dying,’ aims to impact the medical choices of dying persons.13 It is this second 
strand that is the primary focus of this dissertation. Both strands of death acceptance build on, 
respond to and extend the legacy of mid-century death awareness movements and clearly overlap 
in their purposes, one of which is to promote the ideal of the good death. However, proponents of 
death positivity are primarily working to address a perceived taboo surrounding discussions of 
death, while advocacy for well-timed dying attempts to counter the prevalence of futile or 
unwanted treatment by encouraging better decision-making at end of life.  
In order to set the stage for these discourses surrounding death acceptance, I first give an 
overview of the mid-century death awareness movement and second consider in more depth the 
movement’s articulations of the history of death as professionalized, medicalized and denied, as 
well as their promotion of death as natural and suggestions for the possibility of a good death. It is 
this set of articulations that set the foundation for contemporary discourses surrounding end of life. 
The second half of the chapter provides an overview of contemporary advocacy for death 
 
12 Death positivity is called a ‘movement’ by participants. I will reflect their language throughout this chapter. 
13 I explain the phrase ‘well=timed dying’ in more detail in section 2.3.2.  
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acceptance. Responding to and building off the work of the earlier death awareness movement, the 
contemporary death positive movement has developed a cultural narrative about end of life in 
pursuit of acceptance of death and advocates for well-timed dying are developing individual 
narratives of dying in practice.  
2.1 Part One: The Death Awareness Movement 
The death awareness movement of the 1960s and ‘70s was a loose network of scholars, 
activists, counselors and practitioners who sought alternatives to the prevailing attitudes toward 
death, dying and bereavement. They were primarily responding to developments in medical 
technology that became prominent after World War II, which, they argued, shifted responsibility 
for the work of dying from the individual and their community to the sphere of medical 
professionals (Doka, 2003). They objected to the common practice of hiding terminal diagnosis 
from patients and the medical abandonment of people who could not be ‘fixed.’ Overall, the 
movement for death awareness critiqued the deathways of the time as overly medicalized, 
institutionalized and generally characterized by denial. They looked back nostalgically to previous 
eras, in which, it was argued, dying people were in control of their own deaths and the work of 
dying was largely undertaken by family and community members.  
The late 1950s through the 70s saw a flurry of writing and activism on end of life issues, 
primarily in the U.S. and the U.K. This included a range of scholarly works that inaugurated the 
sociology of death and dying subfield, as well as the interdisciplinary subfields of death studies 
and thanatology, and led to the creation of academic societies and journals (Doka, 2003). In 
addition, there were several influential works that resulted in institutional, political and cultural 
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change: Dame Cicely Saunders’ work in medicine and as a social worker led her to establish the 
modern hospice in London in 1959, which spread to the U.S. with the opening of Connecticut 
Hospice Branford, Connecticut in 1974; journalist Jessica Mitford’s investigations into the U.S. 
funeral industry, published in the popular book The American Way of Death (1963), led to 
governmental intervention and industry changes in funeral practices; and Elizabeth Kübler-Ross’ 
influential research on dying people, which became On Death and Dying (1969), established a 
widely popular paradigm for approaching dying and bereavement. These and other works 
propelled end of life issues into public discourse. Many included narratives of illness, dying, 
bereavement and/or funerary practices, which might have been considered morbid even just ten 
years earlier but were readily consumed in the late ‘60s and ‘70s (Bregman, 2017, p. 469). 
Elizabeth Kübler-Ross’ On Death and Dying (1969) became one of the groundbreaking 
works of the movement as a whole and is likely one of the most enduring legacies of the death 
awareness movement. While working as a psychiatrist at the University of Chicago’s Billings 
Hospital, four theological students approached Kübler-Ross asking for help with a research paper 
on death. They decided to interview dying people in order to understand a first-hand perspective 
on end of life. However, while searching for patients to interview, the task was complicated as 
none of the healthcare workers or staff would identify any of the patients as ‘dying’ (Kübler-Ross, 
1969, p. 19-21; Bregman, 2017, p. 468). Once interviews finally began, patients expressed that 
they were living in isolation, scared of abandonment, angry, depressed and unwilling to accept 
their imminent deaths.  However, they were also thankful for the opportunity to share their 
experiences and, for some, to talk about approaching end of life. In contrasting these experiences 
with her recollection of end of life in the Swiss village of her childhood, Kübler-Ross argued that 
there were better ways of dying. 
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These interviews provided the foundation for On Death and Dying in which Kübler-Ross 
posits five stages of dying: denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance. This stage theory 
was later extended beyond dying and applied any type of loss, bereavement in particular. Overall, 
Kübler-Ross’ message was one that “rejected dehumanizing medical technology” (Doka, 2003, p. 
6) and championed the idea that there was room for growth and development even in dying. The 
idea that someone could actually accept their own or someone else’s death was a radical idea at 
the time (Bregman, 2017, p. 468).  
On Death and Dying was widely read and indeed established a new paradigm for 
approaching dying, loss and bereavement, one that is still frequently applied today. However, 
many academics criticized the work as including ‘unverified’ research that romanticized dying 
(see Doka, 2003, pp. 12-13). Furthermore, some questioned the methodologies Kübler-Ross 
employed (Hart et al., 1998, pp. 68-69), argued that there was little evidence for the stages – for 
example, no patient was depicted as having reached the stage of acceptance (Bregman, 2017, p. 
468) – and that while the work was an account of dying within a hospital setting, the findings were 
presented as a-contextual (Hart et al., 1998, pp. 68-69). Despite these and other critiques, there is 
no doubt that Kübler-Ross’ work was particularly influential and has impacted how people 
approach death and loss in public, private and technical spheres. Indeed, one of the primary 
critiques of the stage theory is that it has been too readily accepted and people – including 
healthcare providers – apply it too rigidly, possibly resulting in feelings of failure if someone fails 
to progress through the stages ‘properly’ (Hart et al., 1998, p. 69; Bregman 2017, p. 468).   
Just before Kübler-Ross published her pioneering work, Cicely Saunders was developing 
the first modern hospice in London. After working as a wartime nurse, social worker, and training 
as a doctor, Saunders focused her clinical attention on patients in the terminal phase of illness – 
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who at the time were often overlooked or abandoned by physicians – and was particularly 
concerned with the management of pain at this stage of life. She founded St. Christopher’s Hospice 
in 1967 with the goal of integrating her research on pain management with the “tender loving care” 
approach that hospices of the time were already practicing (Saunders, 1978, p. 726). Saunders 
theorized the unity of physical and mental suffering, developing the concept of total pain which 
includes suffering at the physical, mental, emotional and social levels (Clark, 2007, p. 431). Pain 
and symptom management were thus the foundation of Saunders approach to end of life care:  
The care of the dying demands all that we can do to enable patients to live until they die. It 
includes the care of the family, the mind, and the spirit as well as the care of the body. All 
these are so interwoven that it is hard to consider them separately. (Saunders, 1965 p. 71)  
Saunders’ was one of the first to argue that dying people require special care and, similar to some 
of Kübler-Ross’ work, she argued that end of life was not “defeat, but rather… life’s fulfillment” 
(p.70), an innate and natural part of life. Thus, the ideal of the good death is central to the modern 
hospice movement.  
The idea and ideals of modern hospice were one of the most influential aspects of the 
movement for death awareness. After St. Christopher’s opened in 1967, hospice spread across the 
Atlantic to the U.S. in 1974. There were upwards of 1,200 hospices across the U.S. within the next 
four years (Doka, 2003, p. 10). The ideas that dying people require and deserve special care, that 
a good death is possible and, along with Kübler-Ross, that dying can be a time for development 
and growth have shaped contemporary approaches to end of life.  
The death awareness movement included more scholarly, popular and professional works 
than just these, but, even from this brief overview, we can identify some key ideas on which the 
movement was founded. First, that the medicalized and professionalized approach to dying led to 
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a denial of death, hence the need to raise awareness of end of life issues. And second, the call to 
reclaim death from this institutionalized approach, returning to a view of dying as a natural part of 
life, one requiring particular care and attention. This approach to end of life has generally been 
accepted within public discourses and, further, similar arguments circulate as part of contemporary 
end of life narratives. 
The advocacy of the death awareness movement has had some lasting impacts on 
approaches to death, dying, bereavement and end of life. In particular, following the work of 
Kübler-Ross, Saunders and others, literature on end of life and dying people shifted to primarily 
focus on systematic observation and research, as opposed to relying on isolated, individual 
anecdotes. There was also a shift toward active care of dying people and a view of end of life as a 
period calling for special attention and care, as noted. Much of this care came to focus on the 
dignity of the dying person and on finding meaning at end of life. These shifts were enabled by 
the broader movements for patient autonomy and bioethics, and as informing patients of their 
terminal status became standard practice. Additionally, Saunders’ concept of total pain was part 
of a revolution in understanding the relationships between physical and all forms of mental 
suffering (Clark, 2002, p. 905).  
Finally, as noted, the spread of hospice has arguably been the biggest medical impact of 
the death awareness movement. According to the CDC, as of 2016, there are currently more than 
4000 hospice care agencies in the US, serving 1.4 million patients (2016).14 Contemporary ideals 
of the good death generally conform to a hospice and, closely-related, palliative care15 approaches 
 
14 Data on the number of hospices is as of 2016 and the number of patients is from data collected in 2015. 
15 The concept of palliative care was developed by Balfour Mount, who trained at St. Christopher’s Hospice with 
Dame Saunders. The primary distinction between palliative and hospice care is when care begins. Palliative care may 
begin at the time of diagnosis and continue concurrently through curative treatment, while hospice care begins once 
curative treatments have stopped.  
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to end of life, centering on the dignity and autonomy of the dying person, awareness and 
acceptance of impending death, adjustment to and preparedness for dying and peacefulness 
(Goldsteen et al., 2006 p. 378; Howarth, 2007, p. 137). By the 1990s, the death awareness 
movement had become largely institutionalized (Doka, 2003, p. 11).  
While institutionalization represents one type of win for any social movement, there are 
also concerns that come along with it. In particular, as hospice has expanded and been incorporated 
in mainstream healthcare institutions, there have been concerns about hospice and palliative care 
actively contributing to the further medicalization of dying and about the goals of hospice being 
subverted by these medical institutions (Clark, 2002; Field 1994; McNamara et al., 1994). The 
ideological differences between hospice and mainstream curative treatment pose challenges for 
the incorporation of hospice into healthcare institutions and, while hospice care still serves as a 
“symbolic critique” of terminal care in other settings, it is still dependent upon the structure and 
rituals of traditional, institutionalized medicine (McNamara, 1998, p. 171). Similar to some 
critiques of Kübler-Ross’ stage theory, the concept of the good death which has been inspired by 
this shift toward the ethos of hospice care has established normative expectations surrounding 
dying – especially the idea that death should somehow be meaningful for patients and loved ones 
– that may lead to the idea that people can fail to die properly (see Goldsteen et al., 2006; 
McNamara et al., 1994).  
 As Lucy Bregman (2017) has argued in her review of the death awareness movement, 
medically speaking the movement had limited impact. Physicians still lack adequate training in 
communicating about end of life, despite the reforms of the patient autonomy movement and 
informed consent end of life decision-making is still fraught and difficult, institutional and 
insurance structures still push people toward acute care, and there are still issues over defining 
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when death has occurred and identifying dying people (Bregman, 2017, p. 472; see also IOM, 
2015).  
That being said, the biggest impacts of the movement have arguably come in an increased 
willingness to witness and to discuss end of life, as well as the vocabulary and framework through 
which those discussions take place (Bregman, 2017, p. 472). Which is to say, the idea of the denial 
of death versus those of acceptance, dignity and viewing death as a natural part of life, and the idea 
of a medicalized fight against death versus the possibility of a good death that can be meaningful 
for all involved, have framed ongoing national conversations about end of life issues.  
Given this discursive impact, we now turn to examine the professionalization, 
medicalization and resulting denial of death as articulated in histories of death and dying, largely 
forward by the movement for death awareness. In Part Two below, I draw from Ariès’ (1974a; 
1981) formative work on attitudes toward death over time, which was influential in the movement, 
as well as that of contemporary sociologist of death and dying, Kellehear (2007). This overview 
gives a sense of prevailing views of the social, medical and technological contexts which shaped 
the death awareness movement’s articulations of end of life issues and their conceptualization of 
the good death. Following this, we will consider the move to articulate death as a natural part of 
life and the ideal of a good death as a response to these contexts. 
2.2 Part Two: A History of Death and Dying  
Since about the mid-twentieth century, the history of end of life has largely been articulated 
and re-articulated as a grand narrative. Phillipe Ariès’ work on the history of death and dying in 
Europe was a landmark moment, inaugurating the study of the history of death and inspiring much 
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of the later death awareness movement. Based primarily on analyses of literature and art, Ariès 
was one of the first to chart shifts in attitudes toward death in western Europe and the United States 
and his books – Western Attitudes Toward Death (1974a) and The Hour of Our Death (1981) – 
were very influential. Despite this, Ariès’ work has been widely criticized, most notably for 
offering overly romanticized versions of death and dying in the Middle Ages. Additionally, the 
historical rigor of his work has been called into question, as his work makes use of evidence from 
all over Europe without attending to cultural or religious differences across space and time (Walter, 
1991, p. 297). These and other critiques notwithstanding, Ariès work is at the center of both 
modern conceptualizations of the good death and the history of death and dying (Hart et al., 1998, 
p. 66). Later social historians and sociologists have corrected and updated Ariès’ work, including 
sociologist Allan Kellehear, who’s A Social History of Death and Dying (2007) I also draw on in 
this section – though many essentially offer their own grand narratives in place of the one Ariès 
authored. 
In what follows I give a summary of the history of death and dying, drawing especially 
from Ariès (1974a, 1974b, 1981) and Kellehear (2007). As indicated by the critiques summarized 
above, Ariès’ history is a sweeping narrative that, taking western Europe as a whole, breaks history 
from ancient times to his contemporary moment into four epochs of attitudes toward death: the 
‘tame death’ stretching from ancient times through the 11th and 12th centuries, the ‘death of the 
self’ up to the early 18th century, the ‘death of the other’ encompassing the 18th and early 19th 
centuries and the ‘forbidden’ or ‘invisible’ deaths of the late 19th and 20th centuries. These 
characterizations of attitudes toward end of life, especially the tame death of Middle Ages and the 
death of the self in the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods, offered a comparative for the death 
awareness movement and were influential in their articulations of alternatives. Ariès’ final period 
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of the forbidden or invisible death generally characterizes how advocates for death awareness 
perceived their contemporary moment.  
Kellehear’s (2007) social history also breaks the history of end of life into four categories. 
However, rather than organizing them chronologically, as Ariès does, Kellehear centers his 
categories on broader economic and social organizations, which result in particular challenges for 
end of life, and is careful to point out that each of these social organizations exist today. For 
Kellehear, the first category is the nomadic society in which the issue of anticipating death is the 
most pressing; the second are pastoral or agrarian societies in which preparing for death is the 
biggest challenge. Third, Kellehear considers end of life in the city, in which he says ‘taming’ or 
managing death becomes paramount and, finally, the task of timing death is the biggest challenge 
in cosmopolitan or globalized societies. Contrasting to Ariès, Kellehear draws from a wide range 
of disciplines, marshalling archaeological, epidemiological, historical and sociological data, 
among other sources, to make his case.  
In my brief overview of this history below, I make use of information from both sources, 
as well as a few others, in order to construct a view of the historical impacts of professionalization 
and medicalization on end of life, which, according to the death awareness movement, resulted in 
a deep-seated denial of death in the United States. To do so, I begin with Kellehear’s ‘age of the 
city’ and Ariès history of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. In the second subsection, in which we 
consider the ideas that the death awareness movement articulated in response to that denial, – 
namely that of death as a natural part of life and the ideal of the good death – I  will cover Ariès’ 
earlier epochs of the tame death (up through the 11th or 12th century) and the death of the self 
(which stretched to the early 18th century), as well as Kellehear’s discussion of end of life in 
pastoral or agrarian societies. In Part Three of this chapter, I review what some contemporary 
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sociologists of death and dying have said about the current era of death and dying, including 
Kellehear’s work on the cosmopolitan society, before turning to the contemporary public 
discourses of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, which draw on this history. 
2.2.1 The Professionalization, Medicalization and Denial of Death  
According to Kellehear, the shift toward urbanization affects social organization around 
end of life in three ways. First, the social work of dying was outsourced to professionals. Increased 
urbanization gives rise to a specialized labor force and the accumulation of wealth, leading 
eventually to the development of a middle class. Classes of merchants, artisans and skilled laborers 
grow and consolidate in cities, leading to the development of professional classes whose power 
derived from increasingly specialized knowledge and skill in their profession. The 
professionalization of death in western Europe arose in this context as the middle and upper classes 
began to hire doctors, lawyers and priests to attend to the medical, legal and religious elements of 
dying that had previously fallen to the dying person and their family or community members in 
agrarian communities (p. 131; p. 134). This shift toward professionalization necessitates that 
management of death by hiring the right people, rather than necessarily preparing for one’s own 
death as is the case in agrarian societies. In this way, then, dying became increasingly privatized 
through the Middle Ages and Renaissance in Europe – combined with weakening familial and 
community ties that come along with life in the city – and part of an economic transaction.   
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Second, the epidemiological context of the city eventually gives rise to the long dying16 
that is characteristic of modern and contemporary times. Dying in urban areas is increasingly 
stratified along class lines, with people in lower classes susceptible to infectious diseases from 
which the elite and much of the middle classes were shielded. The life spans of members of the 
upper classes increased during and after the Industrial Revolution and professionalization leads to 
increasingly sedentary lives (pp. 140-42). The extended, painful deaths of the wealthy – for 
example from cancer or heart disease – resulted in increased demand for medical care and the idea 
that a good death is only possible if the dying person is comfortable, relatively pain free and lucid 
enough to make the necessary arrangements (pp. 143-44). The need to manage pain and physical 
symptoms, only possible because of concurrent medical advances, compounds the overall 
management approach to dying to which professionalization gave rise. This increase in medical 
management of dying eventually spread to the lower classes as well, as public health measures 
slowly increased lifespans and spread long dying among populations as a whole. 
Third, both Ariès and Kellehear speak of a growing resistance to dying that comes along 
with the social, economic and medical contexts of urban life. There are arguments linking 
professionalization with heightened anxiety, as people are increasingly dependent upon others for 
survival and advancement (see Kellehear, 2007, p. 135). This middle-class anxiety in the face of 
deskilling and reliance on others extends to the work of dying, too. The middle-class cult of 
expertise combined with a desire to produce a solution results in the need to actively solicit the 
right people to perform the right services (as well as the necessity of being able to afford it). 
Middle-class people come to be driven to do something in the face of death – hire the right people, 
 
16 As mentioned in the Introduction, long dying, as opposed to sudden, usually traumatic, deaths, is the statistical norm 
today. Long dying occurs with foreknowledge of death, usually following a medical diagnosis, often of a chronic or 
terminal illness, and is typified by a longer, uneven decline. 
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seek a second opinion, call in another priest, and so on – that manifests in an active battle with 
death. 
These three shifts in approach to end of life – professionalization, changes in what people 
commonly die from and a resistance to dying – occurred alongside the development of medicine 
in the urbanization of Europe. During the Enlightenment, death shifted slowly but steadily into the 
province of science and medicine. Both death itself and the dead body were refashioned as objects 
of scientific investigation (Ariès, 1981, pp. 353-54). The rise in popularity of dissection and 
anatomy, as well as increase in embalming practices and recurring fears over premature burial are 
indicative of both a fascination with and fear of death, Ariès argued (p. 398). Death was considered 
through the lens of science and medicine which distances it from everyday life, taking dying even 
further out of the everyday experiences of lay people and recasting it in scientific and professional 
frames. 
For much of the 18th century, doctor and patient would negotiate diagnosis and treatment. 
While the doctor had formal training, the patient was seen as the source of knowledge about their 
own symptoms. In addition, both doctor and patient would have had at least basic knowledge of 
common remedies (Fissell, 1991, p. 92). Thus, early medicine was just one option among others 
that may heal a person, as Gawande (2014) put it “no different from healing ritual or family 
remedy, no more effective” (pp. 69-70). With the development of the microscope and, 
subsequently, germ theory and medical microbiology, over the course of the 19th century medicine 
became increasingly scientific and less philosophical. Doctors assumed control in diagnosis and 
treatment, while the lived experience of the disease – the patient narrative – was less important. 
The body and disease, now detached from the life and understanding of the individual, became the 
focuses of the gaze of modern medicine (Fissell, 1991, p. 100; see also Foucault, 1973).   
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The rise of medicine laid the foundations for medicalization in the 20th century, 
accelerating with medical and technological developments post-World War II. After World War 
II there were rapid advances in medical technology and treatments: increased availability of 
antibiotics, the use of electrical shocks to manipulate the heart, – leading to the first fully internal 
pace-maker in 1958 – the discovery of drugs to control blood pressure, artificial respirators, kidney 
transplants and so on (Butler, 2013, p. 66, 76; Gawande, 2014, p. 69). This rapid development led 
to the first intensive care unit (ICU) in 1961 to accommodate all the newest machinery and 
monitors (Butler, 2013, pp. 77-78). This innovation, along with the newly developed resuscitative 
practice CPR, and, eventually, emergency response systems, like the U.S.’s 911 system established 
in 1971, saved the lives of many otherwise healthy people who, for example, suffered heart attacks, 
overdosed or were involved in traumatic accidents. The reduction in sudden, accidental deaths 
increased life expectancy, lead to more deaths in old age and dramatically reduced the frequency 
of death. The length of dying increased as well.  
As a result of this trend toward medicalization, Ariès (1974) characterized dying in the 20th 
century as that of extreme denial, naming the epoch ‘the forbidden death.’ The epitome of this 
denial was seen in the once common practice of hiding a terminal prognosis from the dying person. 
According to Ariès, this is the culmination of the replacement of death with disease, which Kübler-
Ross ran up against in her attempts to interview dying people. The dying person was no longer 
labeled as ‘dying,’ and/or not told they are dying, instead they were encouraged to focus on 
defeating the disease, on treatment options and getting better; someone with cancer may recover, 
while someone who is dying, baring the most exceptional cases, will not. Thus, rather than the 
patient ‘is dying,’ the patient ‘has cancer,’ effectively replacing dying with disease. Additionally, 
with the reduction in sudden deaths people were less familiar with death simply because they lived 
 45 
through less of it. Lastly, Ariès also points to a decrease in the length of time spent mourning, as 
well as a weakening in mourning rituals, as evidence of the ‘forbidden-ness’ of death in this epoch. 
Shortly after the publication of his first book on the topic, though, Ariès noticed further shifts and 
re-characterized the time period as one in which death was ‘invisible,’ rather than forbidden in 
subsequent publications (1974b; 1981).  
The ‘invisible death’ was characterized overall by discretion in the dying process and in 
discourses surrounding death and dying. While the practice of hiding terminal prognosis from 
patients was already eroding within a few years of publication of Ariès’ first book, dying people 
were still expected to be very discreet in their dying, he argued. Which is to say, the dying person 
was expected to continue to function in their social roles and, especially within the hospital setting, 
it was important that the dying person not be overly emotional so as not to upset visitors or hospital 
staff. Ariès’ analysis concludes that while death was not necessarily forbidden, one is allowed to 
die “only if he does not use it to upset the living” (1974b, p. 545). Similarly, Ariès notes that 
throughout time literature has dealt with the topic of death, the ‘ordinary man’ of the mid-20th 
century was silent about death, though the fact of that silence was beginning to garner academic 
interest and a proliferation of discourses within sociology and psychology – many of them 
influenced by Ariès himself. This discretion and hiding of death, which is typically talked about 
in terms of denial, resulted from the professionalization and subsequent medicalization of dying 
and was said to have especially characterize the American context. 
2.2.2 Death as a Natural Part of Life and the Ideal of the Good Death 
As a response to this professionalization, medicalization and prevailing denial of death, 
members of the death awareness movement largely looked to the past for guidance on how to 
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reshape approaches to end of life. Ariès’ work on the history of attitudes toward death was 
foundational to a set of nostalgic arguments (Hart, et al., 1998, p. 66; Wood & Williamson, 2003, 
p. 10). In contrast to the era of the ‘wild death’ – the forbidden and invisible deaths of the mid-20th 
century, discussed in the previous section – Ariès described the deathways of agrarian societies, 
and the European Middle Ages in particular, as the era of the ‘tame death.’   
In Ariès’ historical narrative, for most of European history, death was largely familiar and, 
as such, not a fearful event. This familiarity with death constituted a pervasive ‘general attitude’ 
toward death throughout human history: death was an ever-present possibility for which one 
should be prepared and, furthermore, the individual was the primary agent directing preparations 
for their own death (1981, pp. 5-28). Ariès argued that death was familiar and not frightening, thus 
‘tamed’ relative to modern attitudes. Contemporary sociologist Clive Seale (1998) counters that 
the claim of a reduced fear of is difficult to substantiate, but agrees the argument for death as 
familiar was most likely true, citing that people ‘knew what to do’ when death occurred (p. 51). 
For example, Ariès (1981) cites numerous literary illustrations in which the dying person knows 
the proper way to live out their last moments: how to position their body in preparation for death, 
what to say to the people who witnessed their death and so on (p. 14-17).  
It was in this era that death became an individualized moment. In the early Middle Ages 
tombstones and monuments to the deceased were personalized for the first time, containing details 
about the life of the deceased in an apparent attempt to convey a sense of their identity (1974a, p. 
52; 1981, p. 293). Christian images of the Last Judgment changed from depictions of the day God 
would judge humanity as a whole, to depictions of God judging of the life of the individual. 
According to Ariès death was still familiar and thus ‘tamed’ but, in addition, death became what 
completes the life of the individual and the moment in which one discovers their true identity 
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(1974a, p. 52; 1981, p. 293). This development, along with the spread of accepted preparations for 
death, contributes to the developing ideals of good versus bad deaths, which reflected the character 
of the dying person depending on how closely a specific passing aligns with the dominant customs.  
According to Kellehear (2007), the long, slow transition from nomadic to sedentary life, 
which gave rise to more predictable, gradual deaths – as opposed to the sudden, traumatic dying 
more common in hunter-gatherer societies – created the opportunity for dying people to prepare 
for their own deaths.17 Thus, ‘dying’ became a social identity in itself, a role one plays, allowing 
for the possibility to exercise some amount of control over dying. Not control in a medical or 
epidemiological sense, as doctors were few and far between and, for pastoral peoples in Europe in 
the Middle Ages, modern medicine didn’t exist. Rather, control in the sense of mitigating 
consequences to the community following the death of a member. Thus, a good death in these 
smaller-scale agrarian societies was one that affirmed the social and economic orders – in which 
social obligations did not go unfulfilled, in which the land, wealth and/or agricultural equipment 
necessary to ensure the survival and, hopefully, the prosperity of the community and future 
generations was passed on. Arguing against Ariès, Kellehear asserts that these social and material 
preparations were so important to the family and community that it is unlikely they were left 
entirely to the control of the dying person (p. 99). However, there is agreement that the dying 
person was at the center of these preparations and kin and kith were the ones who carried them 
out.  
It is to this type of dying that the death awareness movement looked in order to develop 
their articulations of the ideal of the good death. As noted, Aries’ conceptualization of the history 
 
17 According to Kellehear (2007), in nomadic societies most of the social work of dying is undertaken by family and 
community members after biological death.  
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of death and dying was at the center of understandings of the good death (Hart et al., 1998, p. 66), 
and many of the later arguments against the medicalization of death rely on this history, most 
notably Illich’s (1976) Medical Nemesis.  
One of the primary arguments advocates of the movement for death awareness made is that 
death is a natural part of life, rather than an enemy to be battled or denied. In describing the death 
of a family friend in the Swiss village in which she was raised, Kübler-Ross’ (1969) describes the 
“‘old-fashioned’ customs” she witnessed: spending his last days at home, leaving final words to 
friends and loved ones, distributing his belongings and land, leaving tasks for his children to 
complete, and being laid out in his home following death for loved ones to pay their respects (p. 
5). This scene is presented as evidence of the possibility for peace and dignity through the 
awareness and acceptance of death. Furthermore, Kübler-Ross comments that she, a child when 
this took place, was not excluded from any of these preparations and contrasts that with the practice 
of sheltering children from death by not allowing them to see dying family members or discuss 
their deaths, which was common at the time. When children are allowed to participate in 
preparations for a loved ones’ death, she argues, they come to see death as a natural part of life (p. 
6). This version of dying is contrasted with the “lonely, mechanical and dehumanized” (p. 7) deaths 
she witnessed in modern hospitals.   
The ideal of the good death that arises from this view of death as a natural part of life is 
one of open communication, preparedness, acceptance, dignity and peace. While Kübler-Ross 
states that she does not want to do away with sedatives, pain medication or infusions, the idea of 
natural death is a reaction to what proponents saw as dehumanizing technology and medical 
practices. As Illich (1976) is often quoted as saying, “the medicalization of society has brought the 
epoch of the natural death to an end” (p. 77). Hospice emerged and spread partly as a response to 
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the ‘loss’ of natural dying, in part because it offered an updated version of a natural death: “in bed, 
at home and under benign medical care in which interventions to ensure painlessness are balanced 
with the autonomous choices of the dying individual and their close companions” (Seymour, 1999, 
p. 693). These ideals of a natural and good death, which were inspired by the particular version of 
the history of death and dying overviewed here, have been incorporated into contemporary ideals 
of the good death and have laid the foundation for subsequent discourses surrounding end of life. 
It is to the contemporary advocacy for death acceptance that we now turn.  
2.3 Part Three: Death Acceptance  
It is from this legacy that advocates for death acceptance are making their claims in the 
early 21st century. While there have clearly been gains in the ways end of life is approached and 
conceived of since the mid-20th century, discourses of death acceptance continue to paint 
dominant attitudes toward death as characterized by denial, and even taboo, and dying practices as 
overly medicalized and dehumanizing. While contemporary end of life counterdiscourses share 
many of the arguments found in the death awareness movement, they are responding to the context 
of 21st century approaches to end of life, including demographic shifts and continuing 
developments in medical technology that have shaped the norms and practices of medical 
institutions, all of which shapes conceptualizations of the good death. 
As the Baby Boomer generation ages, the number of Americans over 65 stands to increase 
dramatically. It is expected that 21.7% of the population will be over 65 by the year 2040, with a 
projected 94.7 million by 2060 (2018 Profile of Older Americans, 2018). In addition, we are now 
roughly one generation removed from the medicalized dying death awareness advocates were 
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arguing against, and as more people have witnessed their parents, friends and other loved ones die 
in this way, many are searching for a different end for themselves. Enabled by increased access to 
platforms from which to speak, there is a renewed interest in end of life issues and the ideal of the 
good death in particular.  
Based directly on the legacy of hospice, contemporary literature on the ideal of the good 
death reflects the goals of pain and symptom management – the ideal being a pain-free death – and 
adhering to the preferences and decisions of the dying person as much and as long as possible 
(Meier et al., 2016; Steinhauser et al., 2000). In a recent review of medical and psychological 
articles relating to good (or successful) dying, 100% of patients and family members and 94% of 
healthcare providers included patient preferences for dying (e.g. funeral arrangements, advanced 
directives, preferences for when, where and with whom the patient wants to die, etc.) in their 
criteria for a good death (Meier et al., 2016, p. 267-68). After patient preferences for the dying 
process, pain-free dying (81%) and emotional well-being (64%) were the next most common 
themes reported by all three stake-holder groups, followed by life completion, treatment 
preferences, dignity, religion/spirituality and issues surrounding loved ones – such as family 
support, acceptance or preparedness – which were each identified by more than 50% of 
respondents (p. 265).18 From this, a good death means the dying person makes their own decisions, 
and is thus in control of their dying, and adjusts to being a dying person – whether through 
goodbyes, life completion, meaning-making and so on – with symptom and pain management as 
a prerequisite that enables those things.   
 
18 Interestingly, Meier et al. (2016) report that while quality of life was identified as an important element of the good 
death by only 35% of patients, 70% bereaved and pre-bereaved family members named it as a component. 
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However, the care people receive at the end of life often does not match the care that people 
say they want (Goodman et al., 2013). For example, most people state that they would prefer to 
die at home but the majority of deaths in the United States still occur in the hospital or other 
institutional setting, with only about 33% of deaths at home (Teno et al., 2013, p. 473).19 
Additionally, most cancer patients say they would prefer comfort or supportive care that minimizes 
hospital time at the end of their lives, yet almost 25% of cancer patients die in the hospital, with 
62% hospitalized and 28.8% admitted to the ICU in the last month of life. It is also worth noting 
that, within this same data set, 61% of patients were enrolled in hospice care in the last month of 
life. However, roughly 11% of those people entered hospice only in the last three days of their life. 
Nationally, the average number of days in hospice care for Medicare recipients during the last 
month of life is only nine (Goodman et al., 2013, p. 2). Thus, despite evidence suggesting that 
people want comfort care in their homes in their last days and despite evidence that comfort care 
or hospice care improves the dying process, the most common approach to end of life care remains 
acute care, in hospital or other institutional settings.   
The former Institute of Medicine’s (IOM)20 2015 report, ‘Dying in America,’ builds on 
other IOM reports published in 1997 and 2003 to describe small gains in end of life care but also 
identifies several barriers to high-quality care at end of life. The report identifies barriers in 
accessing care, a mismatch between needed care and what the patient or family can obtain, lack of 
access to palliative care specialists, as well as lack of knowledge of palliative care among 
physicians, a lack of coordination across institutions and specialties within institutions, and the 
 
19 It is worth noting that for some, institutional settings are home, so these data may be misleading.  
20 Now called The Health and Medicine Division of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 
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current insurance system which encourages the use of acute, rather than comfort, care and 
contributes to the high number of transfers between institutions at the end of life.  
Today, the majority of people in the U.S. die of chronic or terminal illnesses later in life.  
The top six leading causes of death in the U.S. are heart disease, cancer, unintentional injuries 
(poisoning, motor vehicle accidents, falls, etc.), chronic lower respiratory diseases (e.g. COPD, 
asthma, occupational lung disease, pulmonary hypertension), stroke and Alzheimer’s disease 
(CDC, 2017). The total life expectancy for people born in the U.S. was 78.6 in 2017 – a slight 
decline from 2016 (78.7 years) and the third year in a row overall life expectancy has declined in 
the U.S. (Jostz, 2018).21 Aggressive interventions later and later in life have become the norm and, 
as a result, we see high levels of care administered at end of life (Kaufman et al., 2004, p. 732). 
According to Gawande (2014), in the U.S. 25% of Medicare spending goes to the 5% of patients 
who are in their last year of life (p. 153). “In the last five years of their lives, a quarter of the elderly 
now spend all of their savings, including the value of their homes, on caregiving and other out-of-
pocket medical expenses. 43% lose everything except their homes” (Butler, 2013, p. 14). 
In addition to these direct financial costs, there are also an estimated 39.8 million 
Americans acting as caregivers for an adult (AARP/National Alliance for Caregiving, 2015, p. 9). 
While noting that there is increased support for and recognition of the role that family caregivers 
play, ‘Dying in America’ (IOM, 2015) finds that demand for family caregivers is increasing and 
that the roles they play are expanding. Increasingly, family caregivers are taking on medical and 
nursing tasks – managing medication, medical equipment, wound care or nutrition, for example – 
in addition to personal care and household tasks. So, as care for the dying is expanding to include 
more laypeople, these laypeople are increasingly delivering medical care, that is care coordinated 
 
21 Note: The life expectancy rose slightly in 2018 (see Xu, et al., 2020).  
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and authorized by medical institutions. All of which is to say there are a lot of people shouldering 
the financial, emotional and physical burdens of longer life expectancies.   
Within this general context, contemporary sociologists of death and dying have moved to 
incorporate late 20th and early 21st century norms in end of life into their end of life taxonomies. 
For example, Tony Walter argues that death has moved into the province of the individual. With 
political and economic globalization and the “fragmentation of modern values,” the modern death, 
against which death awareness advocates were arguing, has largely been replaced by what Walter 
calls the postmodern death (see Howarth, 2007, p. 18). Death in the postmodern condition is highly 
individualized; the individual is the authority in charge of making decisions about their own dying 
process, replacing doctors and medical institutions that were the decision-makers in the modern 
death. The individual is expected to cope with the experience of living with death through the 
expression of their feelings and the work of death takes place in the social context of the family, 
rather than the hospital or the broader community as in Walter’s modern and traditional deaths, 
respectively. 
On the other hand, Kellehear (2007), labels death in the contemporary globalized context 
as the shameful death – in which people die ‘too soon,’ in poverty, without the ability to properly 
prepare, often from preventable or stigmatized diseases (e.g. AIDs) or, on the other hand, ‘too late’ 
after languishing in nursing homes in a form of social death, having outlived loved ones and 
possibly their own bodies or minds. Furthermore, Kellehear sees an erosion of awareness of dying 
as characteristic of globalized societies, though he means this in a more specific sense than those 
advocating for death awareness in the ‘60s and ‘70s. The dying trajectories associated with 
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statistically common causes of death makes identifying the onset of ‘dying’ difficult22 and the issue 
is further exacerbated by the separation of life/living and death/dying into two distinct states of 
being (p. 210). According to Kellehear, then, the biggest challenge in our contemporary, globalized 
society is that of timing death: of ensuring that social death aligns with biological death, of when 
to permit a patient or loved one to die versus when to continue attempting to treat. This issue 
animates a lot of contemporary end of life discourses.   
While there are of course differences among particular populations, especially falling along 
racial, ethnic and religious lines, there is data on where Americans as a whole fall on the questions 
of whether or not and under what circumstances it is acceptable for doctors to permit or hasten a 
patient’s death. A 2013 survey from the Pew Research Center showed that the number of people 
who agree that “medical staff should do everything possible to save the life of a patient in all 
circumstances” doubled since a similar survey in 1990 (IOM, 2014, p. 347); however, this increase 
is at least partly due to a decrease in the percentage of people who responded “don’t know” to the 
question in the more recent survey. In addition, though, the number of people who agree “there 
are at least some circumstances where a patient should be allowed to die” fell seven percent. These 
same polls also show little to no change in the numbers of respondents who would ask to stop their 
own treatments if they were in pain, dependent on others or had difficulty functioning, on the one 
hand, and a rise in the number of people who responded that they would want everything done to 
keep them alive as long as possible, on the other. Again, the 2013 version of the survey saw people 
shift away from “don’t know” in the 1990 poll, toward prolonging life in the 2013 poll (pp. 347-
48).   
 
22 As Gawande (2014) asks, “Is someone with terminal cancer, dementia, or incurable heart failure dying, exactly?” 
(p. 157). 
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The majority of people agree that discussing treatment wishes and other advance care 
planning is important but most have not done so (p. 125). There are many reasons people do not 
participate in advance care planning – uncertainty over process and forms, healthcare professionals 
unprepared to discuss end of life issues, not wanting to upset loved ones, and so on. Furthermore, 
despite the ongoing attention to end of life issues in public and academic discourses over the past 
60 years, for some death is still a taboo topic in U.S. culture.  
Within this context there has been an ongoing ‘national conversation’ surrounding end of 
life issues. News outlets routinely report on topics such as debates over the right to die (Hartocollis 
2015), managing email and social media accounts after a death (Sydell 2015), the popularity of 
college courses on death (Hayasaki, 2014) and so on. Atul Gawande’s (2014) Being Mortal, which 
offers an analysis and, ultimately, commendation of our healthcare system’s approach to end of 
life care, spent many weeks on bestseller lists.  Brittney Maynard’s very public move to Oregon 
in 2014 to end her life through the state’s Death with Dignity Act spurred increased interest in 
debates over aid in dying legislation – leading several states to vote on aid in dying legislation in 
the 2016 election. Citing Gawande and Maynard, as well as the IOM Report published in the same 
year and Ezekiel Emanuel’s (2014) widely circulated article about not wishing to extend his life 
past 75, The Washington Post declared 2014 “The year we finally learned how to talk seriously 
about dying” (Millman, 2014). The New York Times began its end of life series, ‘The End’ in early 
2015. Medicare’s proposal to reimburse doctors for end of life conversations – which garnered 
intense concern over ‘death panels’ in 2009 – was quietly passed in 2015 and implemented in 
2016. Even Jeb Bush spoke in support of advanced care planning, an apparent reversal of his 
position in the Teri Schaivo case (Haberman, 2015). Furthermore, the work of mortician Caitlin 
Doughty – in her ’Ask a Mortician’ YouTube channel, death positive collective Order of the Good 
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Death and its sister group, Death Salon23 – led many to declare that death has been “having a 
moment” (Hayasaki, 2013; Ortiz, 2016).  
This moment seems to have continued throughout the 2010s, with continued attention to 
advanced care planning (Jain, 2019), funeral practices (Quirk, 2017) and corpse disposal (Lee, 
2011; Recompose, 2018). We turn now to the two strands I have identified in these discourses, the 
death positive movement and advocacy for well-timed dying.  
2.3.1 Death Positivity 
Caitlin Doughty, the mortician behind the ‘Ask a Mortician’ YouTube channel, coined 
‘death positivity’ in a tweet in 2013: “Why are there a zillion websites and references for being 
sex positive and nothing for being death positive?” (@TheGoodDeath, 2013). ‘Ask a Mortician’ 
was two years old at the time; Doughty had already formed the “death acceptance collective,” 
Order of the Good Death (caitlindoughty.com, n.d.), and the gathering of ‘deathlings’ at the first 
Death Salon would take place a few months later. With Doughty’s tweet, the budding, mostly 
women-lead movement had a name. The death positive movement aims to reduce anxiety 
surrounding death, seeking a neutral acceptance of death by increasing interaction with death – by 
creating spaces for people to think and talk about end of life (see Booth, 2019). The stated mission 
of the Order is to make “death a part of your life. That means committing to staring down your 
death fears…. Accepting that death itself is natural, but the death anxiety and terror of modern 
culture are not” (orderofthegooddeath.com, 2019). The website is a collection of resources and 
information all about end of life issues and links with the works of other funeral industry 
 
23 Co-founded with Megan Rosenbloom.  
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professionals, academics and artists invested in changing attitudes toward and practices 
surrounding end of life.  
At about the same time Doughty was getting started, Jon Underwood of London came 
across the work of Bernard Crettaz and his café mortels. Using Crettaz’s model, Underwood hosted 
the first Death Cafe – planned, informal gatherings of people to discuss issues related to death and 
to eat cake – in 2011. The movement has hosted over 9,000 conversations in 66 countries since 
2011 (deathcafe.com, n.d.). The first Death Cafe in the U.S. was in Westerville, Ohio in 2012, with 
events happening in over 100 US cities since (Miles & Corr, 2015). Like Doughty, Death Cafes 
have received a lot of press, with articles appearing in the New York Times, NPR and other major 
news outlets, and, more recently, being the subject of some academic work. The objective of the 
group is “to increase awareness of death with a view to helping people make the most of their 
(finite) lives” (deathcafe.com, n.d.). There is no set agenda for the gatherings, the primary 
stipulations being that they are not bereavement groups and that there must be some type of food. 
Attendees have stated that they feel more comfortable discussing death after attending (Span, 
2013) or “more alive” (Battersby, 2012) following discussions of this sort.  
Doughty, Underwood and their projects use the language of increasing awareness of death 
and the necessity of reclaiming death from professionalization in an effort to combat denial or to 
increase comfort with end of life issues. They reiterate many familiar reasons for the lack of 
familiarity and comfort with death: severing from traditional death-related rituals, dying shifting 
from the home to the hospital and funeral preparations from the in-home parlor to the funeral 
parlor. This movement is notably less medical-focused than much of the earlier death awareness 
movement, however. Additionally, the contemporary context is one that sets this movement apart 
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from its precursor. As this article in Marie Claire, of all places, states, young people are very aware 
of death: 
Maybe it's all the apps and fitness trackers that tell us exactly how alive we are at any given 
moment. Or the constant stream of new studies revealing that everything we love will give 
us cancer. Or the collective mourning on social media that immediately follows a celebrity 
death. Or the incessant mass shootings and Reddit threads that follow them. Or the chilling 
headlines about young women being raped and murdered while out on a jog, while leaving 
the office, while on vacation. (Ortiz, 2016)  
As there was in the 1960s with the lingering threat of the bomb and fears of impending 
environmental collapse, there is in some ways a hyper awareness of death in the contemporary 
moment but at a distance. Death positivity is not necessarily about the (medical) care of dying 
people but of reading, thinking and talking about mortality as a way of making life better. Doughty, 
Underwood and others have called for acceptance of death into our lives as a way of making it less 
fearful, embracing it as an inevitable aspect of our lives.  
There are many other facets of this cultural movement: conversation starter projects (Death 
Over Dinner), art projects (Before I Die), apps that remind users of their mortality (We Croak), 
centers for innovation in and the study of end of life issues (Columbia Universities DeathLab, Art 
of Dying Institute), and so on. In general, these groups reiterate the cultural narrative of western 
society, and the US, in particular, as in denial of death or, at the very least, in need of a ‘redesign’ 
for handling death and dying. They create spaces for discussion, art and innovation as a way of 
breaking down those barriers in order to make life better by thinking about and/or improving death.  
In addition to these more formal groups, there is another recent trend noted in the IOM 
(2015) report. Pejoratively called ‘dying out loud’ by Emma Keller (2014) in an article in The 
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Guardian, this trend refers to dying people who choose, in various ways, to make their deaths 
public. Keller’s article was about Lisa Bonechek Adams who discussed her diagnosis, treatment 
and preparations for death from cancer on her well-followed social media sites and blog. We could 
also count Oliver Sacks’ NYT articles (2015) chronicling his terminal diagnosis and decline; 
Brittany Maynard’s public decision to move to Oregon to take advantage of the state’s aid in dying 
law following her diagnosis with brain cancer; Paul Kalanithi’s (2016) book When Breath Becomes 
Air about his diagnosis and death; and so on. Adams and Maynard received a lot of backlash, 
indicating a remaining ambivalence about making dying visible in this way (IOM, 2015, p. 366). 
I see dying out loud as something of a borderline phenomenon between the death positive cultural 
narrative of a death-phobic society that needs to confront and change its relationships with 
mortality and the medical-based push for changes in how individuals approach and are guided 
through dying in advocacy for the well-timed death. Which is to say, dying out loud is the public 
circulation of one individual’s dying process in order to achieve some measure of closure or 
acceptance surrounding their own end – as well as, possibly, some measure of immortality – and 
in order to impact the narratives surrounding approaches to dying, intra- or interpersonally, legally 
or medically. 
2.3.2 Well-Timed Dying 
Agnieszka Janaik (2019) reviews many of the same groups I have discussed above and, in 
reflecting on the death of one of her own close friends, argues that we are entering a new epoch of 
attitudes toward death, one in which death is shared with others:   
Support in dying and mourning is now at the centre of attention. The current attitude 
towards dying is what I call shared death – we no longer leave our relatives’ dying to 
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experts – but we try to stay with them by ourselves: we try to accompany the dying on their 
terms, listening to their individual needs. The more and more common attitude is living 
with the dying. (p. 267) 
In this view of dying, it is the individual who guides the dying process – as with Walter’s (1991) 
version of the individual death in postmodernity, overviewed above. But the work of dying – the 
carrying out of tasks and helping to ensure, inasmuch as possible, that everything goes as the dying 
individual wants – is distributed among friends, family and loved ones, and thus shared. Janaik 
especially contrasts this with the modern approach to dying, against which the death awareness 
movement spoke out, in which doctors and medical institutions took the lead and everyone else, 
oftentimes the patient included, was sidelined. 
However, for every story of a good death, in which the community comes together to 
witness and support the passing of a member in whatever ways the dying person wishes – in which 
dying is shared in the way Janaik described – there are also stories of bad deaths, of prolonged 
endings in pain and suffering, of people who are “left to the experts,” as she terms it, and on the 
“conveyor belt” of care (Zitter, 2015, April). Many of advocates of what I, following Kellehear, 
am calling well-timed dying share narratives of good and bad deaths as a way of attempting to 
persuade people to begin thinking about their own end of life wishes and to share those with loved 
ones and/or doctors. The narratives are also part of advocacy for institutional and cultural changes 
to better support individual decision-making regarding end of life. The rest of this dissertation 
focuses on a subset of these discourses, so I will only provide a brief overview here. 
Advocates for what I am calling ‘well-timed dying’ generally advocate for patient choice 
in dying, with the idea that, given adequate information and opportunity to plan, people will choose 
to forgo curative treatment at the time that is most fitting for their particular medical, cognitive, 
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emotional and social situations. Advocates for aid in dying take this a step further and argue that 
people should be able to actively end their own lives at the right moment – that is, the moment of 
their choosing. Thus, the ideal of well-timed dying, in these discourses, is primarily concerned 
with people who die ‘too late,’ as Kellehear puts it, and stems from the development of medical 
technology that has enabled the prolongation of biological life beyond the point of social death 
and physical or mental capacities, as well as on the movement for patient autonomy.  
Discourses advocating for well-timed dying are thus concerned with a few interrelated 
issues. Responding to a medical and technological situation that allows for the radical extension 
of biological life and against institutional and cultural privileging of the prolongation of life and 
the continuation of treatment regardless of the odds, advocates for well-timed dying assert that 
there is a ‘proper’ time to die. The individual patient’s choice is first and foremost in determining 
when that is. Therefore, most of the focus of these discourses is on improving individual decision-
making at end of life, through advanced care planning, increased access to palliative care and 
hospice and aid in dying laws, as well as changes in institutional and doctoring practices to promote 
individual choice.  
The well-timed death, in these discourses, seems to be one of the patient’s choosing that, 
theoretically, fits with their individual life. As mentioned, the ideal of choice in dying is built 
directly on the foundations of the patient autonomy movement and its acceptance in medical 
institutions, but advocates recognize that medical decision-making surrounding end of life is 
especially fraught. Furthermore, the majority of dying people, at some point in their trajectory, 
will not be able to make decisions on their own (IOM, 2015, p. 119). Advance care planning has 
been promoted as the way to get around this. By considering and discussing end of life care wishes, 
values and goals with healthcare proxies, loved ones and healthcare providers, the goal is that 
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decisions in-line with the patient’s wishes can be made even in situations where the patient is 
unable to make them themselves.  
There are a number of groups dedicated to raising awareness about the importance of 
advance care planning and working to remove barriers to its completion. For example, The 
Conversation Project began in 2012 with the goal of encouraging and supporting people in having 
advance care planning conversations. The website hosts a general starter kit in thirteen languages, 
which first poses questions about a person’s wishes for how involved they would like to be in the 
medical decision-making process, how involved they want loved ones to be, and prompts users to 
consider their values at end of life, and so on, and then offers recommendations for discussing 
those with loved ones. The starter kit is intended as a way to begin what should ideally be a series 
of conversations with loved ones and healthcare providers about nuanced and evolving values and 
preferences at end of life. The Conversation Project also offers starter kits for people with loved 
ones suffering from Alzheimer’s or dementia and kits for people with children facing life limiting 
illnesses, as well as guides for selecting a healthcare proxy and speaking with your doctor about 
your preferences. In addition, the website also includes resources for healthcare providers to 
improve their comfort and skill with end of life communication. The goal of Conversation Project, 
and many of the other advance care planning advocacy groups,24 is to facilitate a difficult and 
complex process, fraught with uncertainty and emotion, to make having these conversations a little 
easier so that, ideally, everyone will have put some thought into their own wishes and share those 
with others before they are in a crisis situation.  
 
24 See National Healthcare Decisions Day website for a list of advocacy groups: https://www.nhdd.org/public-
resources#where-can-i-get-an-advance-directive 
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The movement for aid in dying gained momentum in the 2010s as well. Support for medical 
aid in dying (also known as physician-assisted suicide) has consistently been high, with little 
change in the percentage of people who response that it is ‘morally acceptable’ in Gallup’s polling 
over the past nineteen years (2019). Despite this, legislation has come slowly. Following Oregon 
in 1994, Washington was only the second state to legalize medical aid in dying in 2008. Since 
then, however, seven other states have followed suit and fifteen others are currently considering 
legislation (compasionandchoices.org, n.d.). Brittany Maynard’s high-profile decision to move 
from California to Oregon to end her life through the State’s Death with Dignity Act in 2014 
offered visibility for the movement and sparked the passing the End of Life Options Act in 
California within a year (compassionandchoices.org, n.d.). Resistance to these laws – primarily 
from Catholic and other Christian organizations, as well as disability rights activists – has waned, 
at least in part because even after legislation is passed very few people actually take advantage of 
the option, negating arguments about a slippery slope toward abuse (Span, 2019). While many 
advocates for well-timed dying worry that increased access to aid in dying will be treated as a cure-
all for all end of life issues – weakening support for increased access to hospice and palliative care, 
shared decision-making, advance care planning and so on – the arguments for aid in dying center 
primarily on expanding individual choice at end of life (compasionandchoices.com, n.d.).  
In general, there has been a recent increase in circulation of physician narratives about end 
of life (Kopelson, 2019). In addition to the aforementioned Being Mortal (Gawande, 2014) and 
When Breath Becomes Air (Kalanithi, 2016) – unique in that the Kalanithi was both a neurosurgeon 
and dying of lung cancer while writing – there have been a slew of other books: Volandes’ (2015) 
The Conversation: A Revolutionary Plan for End of Life Care, Zitter’s (2017) Extreme Measures: 
Finding a Better Path to the End of Life, Warraich’s (2017) Modern Death: How Medicine 
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Changed the End of Life, Miller’s (2019) A Beginner’s Guide to the End: Practical Advice for 
Living Life and Facing Death,25 and Puri’s (2019) That Good Night: Life and Medicine in the 
Eleventh Hour. While, A Beginner’s Guide to the End – co-written by BJ Miller, palliative care 
physician, former hospice director and triple amputee of TED Talk fame (2017) – is more of a 
how-to guide on managing practical tasks at end of life, the others all center on medical 
experiences of end of life, generally arguing that the over-medicalization of dying has resulted in 
bad deaths. These arguments mirror Kübler-Ross’ (1969), and others’, criticism that medicine had 
turned toward the prolongation of life at the expense of caring for human suffering (p. 10).  
These works, and other op-eds, newspaper and magazine articles, editorials, blog posts and 
so on, argue not only for cultural changes surrounding end of life – for individuals to realize that 
there may be fates worse than death and to begin preparing for their own deaths, as well as those 
of their loved ones – but also for institutional changes in the way medical facilities and insurance 
companies approach end of life. They tend to make the case for the benefits of palliative and 
hospice care in the pursuit of patient-centered care that honors individual wishes up until the end. 
In the process of making these arguments, they also rearticulate and perpetuate particular images 
of good and bad dying, many retelling narratives of patient deaths. In addition, explicitly or 
implicitly, they draw on notions of the U.S. as a nation in denial about death – in which many 
ignore the fact of their mortality and suffer overly medicalized and professionalized deaths as a 
result – and a medical system that is not designed with the good death in mind. 
Together, the goals of the death positive movement and of advocates for well-timed dying 
are for people to accept that they will die and to live, prepare and, insofar as they are able, time it 
accordingly. These arguments for death acceptance build on the outcomes of the death awareness 
 
25 Co-written with Shoshana Berger, editorial director at the design company IDEO. 
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movement – especially the development of hospice and palliative care, the discursive framings of 
the medicalization and denial of death and their visions of death as a natural part of life and the 
ideal of the good death – seeking to counter denial and taboo with conversation and cultural and 
institutional change. The version of the good death circulating within these discourses is based on 
that of the death awareness movement but centers more on acceptance of death in everyday life 
and at its end in the pursuit of well-timed dying.  In Chapter Two, we turn to examine a set of 
narratives of bad and good deaths told and retold in support of these goals.   
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3.0 Chapter Two: Narratives of Good and Bad Deaths 
The end of life narratives told in support of well-timed dying that are the focus of this 
project are told for persuasive purposes. They not only help illuminate something about the 
authors’ experiences with death and dying, but are also an attempt to influence how others 
understand and approach death and dying. While these narratives have a range of specific focuses, 
in general they all take issue with the ways that patients, loved ones, practitioners and/or medicine 
as an institution approach end of life and are aimed at changing those approaches. The concept of 
the good death thus functions as an ideal to strive for in these stories. I argue that these narratives, 
all authored by healthcare practitioners, focus either on type of treatment, the role of the patient 
and/or on broader social and structural issues, forwarding a collective ideal of the good death that 
results from low medical intervention and in which uncertainty is minimized, the patient retains 
agency as long as possible and the social needs of patients and loved ones are met. 
As noted in the Introduction, I was struck by the fact that many end of life discourses make 
use of narratives. These narratives can be understood as attempts to invent new narratives for end 
of life. In The Wounded Storyteller, Arthur Frank (1995) details prevalent genres of illness 
narratives, one of which is the restitution narrative – essentially the narrative of recovering from 
illness. For many illnesses which patients and their doctors face, this narrative is reasonable. 
However, the restitution narrative doesn’t hold for chronically or terminally ill patients (p. 95). 
Citing a conversation with a physician who lamented the way a particular patient’s life was ending 
– involving high medical intervention, which the doctor believed would be futile – Frank observes:  
Obsessed with cure, medicine cannot place the woman’s story in any other narrative [other 
than the restitution narrative]. Massive resources are expended, and, more important from 
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the perspective of my physician friend, his patient is not being helped to find her way 
toward her own version of a good death. Medicine’s hope of restitution crowds out other 
stories. (p. 83) 
Patients, loved ones and practitioners alike, then, need new types of stories to help make sense of 
contemporary medicalized dying and, in particular, narratives that align with common 
understandings of the good death.  
The narratives told by medical practitioners as part of NYT’s ‘The End’ and those published 
by Gawande (2014) in Being Mortal give images of both good and bad dying. In general, the 
versions of the good death promoted within align with broader literature on the ideal of the good 
death, overviewed in the previous chapters. There are some additional narrative similarities to note 
in the texts as well: The primary characters involved are patients and healthcare practitioners, with 
some narratives including loved ones. With only a handful of exceptions, there are only two 
settings: the hospital – exam room, patient’s room, ICU or doctor’s office – or the dying person’s 
home. Lastly, there are two types of events that drive the plots of these stories: medical events and 
those responding to medical events. Medical events, such as diagnosis, treatment, changes in a 
patient’s medical status and so on, are part of medical knowledge-production and, generally, acts 
of medical agency. In response to this medical agency, patients and/or their loved ones engage in 
acts of ignorance-management: medical decision-making, goal-setting, adjusting to and managing 
new medical or physical situations and so on.  
These similarities are possibly related to the fact that healthcare practitioners are narrating 
the stories; they represent a decidedly medical perspective on dying and approaches to end of life. 
It is from this explicitly medical perspective that the authors describe and evaluate the courses of 
events. These evaluations not only explicate but actively participate in the creation of normative 
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understandings of the good versus bad death. The generalized principles of the good death that 
these narratives reflect and reinforce are only partially applicable to actual, individual deaths, thus 
requiring further narrativization to explicate the good death. 
In order to illuminate these narratives and the concept of the good death constructed within, 
I identify a critical typology of end of life narratives. By organizing the narratives into general 
types, the similarities and differences across the narratives come into relief, enabling me to identify 
how bad versus good deaths are characterized, how the uncertainty inherent in dying is dealt with 
and the roles of medical knowledge and practitioners at end of life. As noted, I found the narratives 
to primarily focus either on type of treatment, the extent to which the patient is able to control 
those treatment choices, or on broader structural or social issues. Within each of these focuses, 
there are stories of both good and bad deaths; I have thus identified six general types of narratives. 
There are (1) narratives of highly invasive treatments – typically curative treatments which are 
intended to alter the course of the disease and to prolong life – and (2) narratives of minimally 
invasive treatments – or comfort care, which privileges managing symptoms but is not aimed at 
curing, altering the progress of the disease nor necessarily prolonging life. An alternative way to 
characterize these courses of treatment is that highly invasive or curative treatment is undertaken 
with the understanding that the patient is sacrificing time now – spending it on treatment, recovery, 
managing side effects, and so on – for the chance of gaining more time later; whereas minimally 
invasive treatments, or comfort care, privileges now. There are also (3) stories of patients unable 
to exercise control over the treatments they receive, (4) stories in which patients are able to define 
their own end of life goals, (5) stories in which broader life circumstances interfere with managing 
the work of dying and, lastly, (6) stories that highlight the importance of social needs at end of life.  
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Narratives of each type offer a set of ‘lessons’ about good versus bad deaths. In the 
predominant narrative view within this archive, I argue a good death is primarily dependent on the 
type of treatment the patient chooses and upon the agency of the patient – with the ideal being a 
patient who chooses low medical intervention and clearly defines their own end of life goals and 
wishes. Additionally, it is clear from the narratives that managing the uncertainty inherent in illness 
and dying is a further element of the good death, which isn’t generally discussed in literature on 
good versus bad deaths. However, the majority of the narratives limit uncertainty to the dying 
person and their loved ones, covering over uncertainty surrounding medicine and medical 
knowledge. From this dominant narrative view, then, the role of the practitioner is to provide 
information to uncertain patients and their loved ones, such that they are then able to make 
appropriate decisions. There are two narratives that challenge this generalization, though, 
demonstrating that end of life decision making is not just a matter of acting on pre-given medical 
information and that medicine is not, and should not be, insulated from the patient.   
In what follows, I identify and describe each type of narrative in turn, offering some 
observations about the conceptualization of the good or bad death within. Next, I overview the 
conceptualization of bad versus good dying found within the narratives in general, including the 
goal of mitigating uncertainty. Finally, I end with the two narratives that are something of outliers 
and consider how they challenge the predominant views in these narratives, especially with regard 
to the role of the medical practitioner at end of life. 
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3.1 Part One: Typology of End of Life Narratives 
3.1.1 Narratives of Highly Invasive Medical Treatments 
There are three primary characteristics of stories about deaths involving high intervention. 
First, these stories are about ugly deaths. Deaths resulting from high medical intervention are 
frequently described as ugly and/or full of pain and suffering: “Depending on how aggressively 
the patient is being treated” death can be “gruesome,” writes Warraich (2015), recounting a 
particularly gross experience performing CPR on a patient with a hole in their abdomen from 
dialysis treatments out of which fluid sprayed with every chest compression. Warraich goes so far 
as to describe the scene as a “macabre theater,” which continues until “the supervising physician 
decides to call it off.” Gawande (2014), describing the final day of a young mother dying from 
lung cancer, sums it up: “There is no prettifying death” (p. 189). In these types of stories, dying is 
difficult to witness, and presumably to live through, usually (though not always) as a result of the 
invasive medical treatments themselves.   
Second, narratives of high medical intervention also tend to focus on the risky or futile 
nature of the treatments themselves. Risky procedures are those with low odds of helping the 
patient move toward their larger goals and high probability of leaving the patient worse off. For 
example, Gawande begins Being Mortal with the narrative of Joseph Lazaroff who, following his 
wife’s death, swore to his son that he didn’t want to die as she had: a prolonged death with extended 
time on life support (pp. 4-5). However, years later when faced with metastatic prostate cancer, 
Lazaroff told doctors and his son that he wanted everything possible done to keep him alive: “Don’t 
you give up on me. You give me every chance I’ve got” (p. 4).  Lazaroff underwent a risky surgery 
and, while the procedure was technically a success, as they removed the tumor from his spine, he 
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never fully recovered and died two weeks later after suffering respiratory failure, infection, blood 
clots and bleeding (p. 5). Gawande is still struck by this case many years later not necessarily 
because he believes the patient choose badly but because, according to Gawande, at least part of 
the reason Lazaroff chose as he did is that none of the doctors spoke frankly about his situation (p. 
5). The surgery had little chance of restoring Lazaroff to anything like the life he had known and 
had great risks of a prolonged, painful death. Yet none of his medical team was comfortable having 
a conversation laying out so plainly that, in all likelihood, the life he had known was over. They 
presented him with treatment options, warned him of the risks, acquired informed consent and did 
what he wanted. In the end, Lazaroff underwent a course of treatment with significant risks of 
“both worsening and shortening his life” (p. 4). 
In a particularly extreme example of futile treatment, Zitter (2015, Feb.) tells the story of 
her encounters with an elderly patient, Vincent, who was suffering a gruesome death as a result of 
his medical treatment. Vincent was a nursing home patient and a “frequent flier” in Zitter’s ICU:  
He would come in dying, we’d plug him into life support, treat his infection, pump up his 
blood pressure and send him back to the nursing home. But then he’d deflate like an old 
tire and be rolled back in by paramedics within anywhere from three days to three weeks. 
By this time, Vincent was no longer competent – the only signs of consciousness coming with 
moments of intense pain which “fired up dormant neurons and his blue eyes flared” – but he had 
filled out an advance directive ten years prior, in which he stated that he wanted all attempts made 
to prolong his life. In addition, a handwritten note stapled to the form left no room for doubt about 
his wishes: “I want you to do EVERYTHING in your power to keep me alive AS LONG AS YOU 
POSSIBLY CAN.” Zitter and the other ICU doctors and nurses followed Vincent’s wishes and 
combated each new issue as it arose – often creating new problems with each fix – doing their best 
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to “keep his body going even when it was trying it’s hardest to die.” Eventually Vincent “was 
suffering, with every terrible dressing change, every lonely hour in an I.C.U. isolation room,” with 
“all of his grit drained from his body.” Zitter’s description of Vincent’s physical condition is worth 
quoting at length:  
On [his] ninth admission, when I took over his care, I was almost unable to complete my 
physical exam. This man’s body was being eaten away to a degree I had never seen. 
Autodigested while dying. Even with the most attentive nursing care, a flaccid, dying body 
has pressure points where thin skin eventually breaks down. … Vincent’s shoulder and 
heel ulcers were severe. But the one that stopped me in my tracks started at the low end of 
his spine and spread toward his left hip, melting skin and muscle away so that his entire 
hip socket lay open to the air. Even as a seasoned I.C.U. physician, I gasped the first time 
I laid eyes on it.   
This death was clearly difficult for Zitter and other healthcare providers to witness. Vincent’s 
suffering was a result of the futile treatments requested in his advance directive. Zitter doesn’t 
believe that anyone would actively choose Vincent’s ending but speculates that he didn’t know 
what he was setting himself up for. In fact, this case leads her to “openly question our blind trust 
in patient autonomy.” Vincent’s medical team tried to address the most pressing medical 
developments but weren’t able to do anything to change the fact that he was dying. In these stories 
of invasive medical intervention, a death is characterized as bad primarily as a result of the pain 
and suffering inflicted on the patient, though it clearly impacts caregivers, as well.  
The third characteristic of narratives about invasive interventions at end of life is that they 
feature prolonged deaths. Prolonged deaths are those in which the dying process is extended via 
medical interventions that have low probability of curing the patient. In many of these cases, the 
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biological life of the patient is extended but often at a low quality of life and only for the sheer 
sake of prolonging the persons’ life. As with Vincent above, in these narratives treatment is 
undertaken with little hope that the patient will recover, rather they seem to serve primarily to 
delay the inevitable, usually with negative impacts on patients, healthcare professionals and/or 
loved ones. In another example, McConnell (2015), an ICU nurse, recounts the story of an elderly 
stroke patient in her ICU who was weak, unwell and having difficulty breathing, but otherwise in 
stable condition. The patient’s family knew about his condition and were considering changing his 
status to ‘do not resuscitate/do not intubate’ but had not yet decided. From McConnell’s 
perspective, it was clear that he would not make it out of the ICU and, furthermore, that available 
treatment options were not helping, but rather keeping him in limbo while the family decided when 
to remove life support. Importantly, for McConnell it was a question of when to remove life 
support, not whether or not to do so. The patient was eventually intubated: “a hard plastic tube 
pushed through his mouth down his trachea, taped to the delicate skin of his face.” Shortly 
thereafter, the man’s family gathered and, finally witnessing first-hand the life sustaining measures 
that keep a dying person ‘stable,’ decided to withdraw life support. This patient spent two weeks 
in the ICU unconscious and slowly deteriorating before his loved ones decided to allow him to die 
by removing life support. According to McConnell, this occurs all too often, with many families 
treating the ICU like a ‘pause button,’ opting for a patient’s life to be sustained via increasingly 
intensive intervention before eventually permitting death: 
Families should realize that this time is the end of life, and they should pay attention to its 
quality just as they would if the patient were dying at home. That’s because although we 
can usually hold off death, we cannot pause time, and an extended stay in the I.C.U. is an 
ugly way to end a life.  
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McConnell refers to the “eerie dehumanization” of both patients and caregivers when loved ones 
don’t recognize that the patient is dying, using this narrative to plead with families to relieve ICU 
doctors and nurses of their legal duty to prolong life regardless of anticipated quality of life. Even 
when a prolonged death is not directly causing suffering, dying that is prolonged via invasive 
interventions without hope of recovery is characteristic of bad dying, in part, because of its effects 
on caregivers and loved ones with minimal benefit for the patient. 
In the narrative view, uncertainty surrounding when the dying person has entered the 
nebulous state “end of life” may result in treatments which not only prolong dying and may 
actively make the patient worse, but also interfere with their ability to perform their dying role. 
For example, Sara Monopoli, a new mother with aggressive lung cancer, made it clear to her 
husband and family that she wanted to die peacefully at home (Gawande, 2014, pp. 165-66). 
However, in meetings with her medical team there was no discussion of comfort care or of stopping 
treatments. Despite knowing intellectually that her disease was incurable, the entire family, patient 
included, remained in “battle mode” (p. 168) until, eventually, her primary care physician 
intervened with concerns about the increasingly invasive and frequent medical interventions. As 
her husband put it after she died, he didn’t know how to act on her wishes, it didn’t seem possible 
for them: “I always wanted to respect her request to die peacefully at home,” he told Gawande. 
“But I didn’t believe we could make it happen. I didn’t know how” (p. 172). As a result, they opted 
for each treatment offered, no matter the likelihood it would result in a desired outcome – either 
altering the course of the disease or dying peacefully at home – and no matter the risks. In the end, 
they never had a chance to say goodbye, reach some measure of closure or do any of those things 
that can make dying meaningful for the family. The courses of treatment they opted for ended up 
taking time away from Monopoli and her family. Gawande, who was part of her medical team, 
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stated: “In the previous month, almost nothing we’d done to Sara – none of the scans or tests or 
radiation or extra rounds of chemotherapy – had likely achieved anything except to make her 
worse. She may well have lived longer without it” (p. 189).  In this case, while the patient and 
family were, in theory, clear on the patient’s preferences for end of life, none of them knew how 
to achieve those preferences because it was never obvious when it became time to prepare for her 
death, instead of continuing curative treatment. As a result, Monopoli suffered a long, slow and 
painful decline. 
Stories about high medical intervention at end of life tend to focus on the pain and suffering 
of the dying person, the futility or riskiness of the treatments themselves and/or the difficulty of 
recognizing or perhaps accepting when a person is actually dying, which often leads to prolonged 
dying. The clear message in these narratives is to avoid this type of ending. By and large, patients 
undergoing invasive, curative treatment are generally described as passive – they are undergoing 
treatment, treatment is being done to them. For some, it seems to be in part because the patients 
are unconscious in the narratives – Vincent and the unnamed elderly ICU patient, in particular 
(Zitter, 2015, Feb.; McConnell, 2015). Sara Monopoli (Gawande, 2014), on the other hand, was 
conscious for the majority of the narrative and furthermore described as being in “battle mode,” 
which on its own seems like an active state of being. But in this narrative, battle mode means 
taking every treatment option there is, seemingly, without consideration of outcomes. There was 
no discussion of end of life goals, no indication of shared decision-making, no weighing the risks 
of treatment versus possible benefits in this narrative. Monopoli and her family are depicted as 
opting for treatment after treatment, almost blindly, while Sara herself wasted away. In contrast, 
Lazaroff was conscious and was described as actively choosing his course of treatment. In 
Gawande’s assessment, Lazaroff simply chose poorly and ended up with what was statistically 
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most likely: a shortened life and a painful death. The goal, then, seems to be a death in which the 
patient has some agency at end of life – a patient who acts versus being acted upon – and uses that 
agency to make (what doctors view as) good decisions. The majority of the time, it seems the 
“right” decision is to opt for lower intervention.  
There is another narrative that makes this point clearly. In this story, a proxy decides that 
doctors should perform a tracheostomy (in which a breathing tube is sewn into the neck) on her 
adult daughter (Zitter, 2015, Oct.). The patient, Michelle Moore, came in with an infected heart 
valve from bad heroin. Her muscles, vital organs and brain were threaded with pus from the 
infection – to such an extent that her hands and feet were dying and her brain was bleeding. The 
medical team treating her, Zitter included, had been sure that she would not recover and counseled 
the family as such:  
I presented Michelle’s mother with both options: Withdraw the breathing tube and allow 
her to die, or replace it with a trach and keep her on machines. When they asked me what 
I would do if this were my family member, I said I probably would not perform a 
tracheostomy. Still, her mother, a religious woman, decided she would hold out for a 
miracle. And so against my better judgment, we trached her. 
For the first several months following the procedure, the doctors and nurses treating Moore viewed 
her as an unfortunate example of non-beneficial life prolongation. That is, until she woke up and, 
in time, made a remarkable recovery. Zitter was struck by doubt following the patient’s recovery: 
Did she make a mistake counseling the family to withdraw life support? Has she made this mistake 
in the past? Will she be able to deliver news of poor prognosis or expected outcomes in the future? 
Should she? Eventually, Zitter concluded that she can count on one hand the number of times she 
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has witnessed a miracle like the one in this narrative and so, while the unexpected can happen, the 
more likely outcome is extended time on life support without hope of recovery. 
The fact is, there are two types of risk in cases like these. One risk is that a patient will be 
deprived of the chance at a miracle. But the far more likely risk is that a patient with no 
chance of recovery will become permanently attached to machinery designed to automate 
breathing and feeding, and spend the rest of her life in a nursing home, being washed by 
strangers, enduring infections and skin breakdown, family visits ebbing because it’s simply 
too painful. Survey after survey shows that most people would never choose this path. 
While this narrative is not technically about end of life, as the patient survived against the odds, 
Zitter uses it to make a point about end of life issues: that most people won’t get a miracle and the 
risks are too high to take the chance. Zitter never outright says that Moore’s mother chose badly – 
and indeed Zitter is almost moved to tears when Moore is discharged – but she does make clear 
that, statistically, it was not the right choice. This conclusion only makes sense if you approach 
the situation as a doctor, rather than as a dying person or as the loved one of a dying person. This 
statistical view considers mortality – which is to say, dying at the population level – whereas a 
person facing their imminent demise, and/or that of their loved ones, are invested in this particular 
death; they’re concerned with dying (or not dying as the case may be) not mortality.  Approaching 
end of life from the viewpoint of mortality, the “right” choice is to cease curative care – at the 
proper time – in favor of comfort care, to forgo non-beneficial life support and to accept that the 
patient will die. Narratives about high medical intervention that leads to bad deaths, as well as 
some of the other types we’ll see, attempt to persuade readers to at least consider, if not outright 
adopt, this statistical view when approaching end of life, in order to achieve a well-timed death. 
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3.1.2 Narratives of Minimally Invasive Medical Treatments 
Stories about low medical intervention at end of life demonstrate three characteristics of 
the good death, which are made possible by choosing comfort, rather than curative, care. First, end 
of life is consistently described as peaceful, at home surrounded by people (or things) the patient 
loved. For example, Volandes (2015) tells the story of a patient who decided not to pursue 
aggressive, curative treatment following a tour Volandes gave her of the ICU. During the tour, she 
witnessed patients on ventilators and sees CPR performed on one patient. Rather than spending 
her remaining time in a similar way, she opted instead for comfort care. She died a few weeks later 
“at home, in the company of friends and family and surrounded by her poetry books, as were her 
wishes.” In another example, Gawande (2014) tells of pancreatic cancer patient, Dave Galloway, 
who was told there was nothing more doctors could do and was given the option of dying in the 
ICU or going home on hospice (p. 162). Galloway chose hospice care and died “at home, at peace 
and surrounded by family” (p. 164).  
Second, dying in a familiar setting, with the people and things one loves most is portrayed 
as in keeping with the life of the dying person. For example, Ms. Douglass, whose adult daughter 
reported: “she drifted quietly to sleep and took her last breath. It was very peaceful. My dad was 
alone by her side with the rest of us in the living room. This was such a perfect ending and in 
keeping with the relationship they shared” (Gawande, 2014, p. 242). Deaths of these sorts are 
characterized as what the person (would have) wanted and, at least in the narrativized version, the 
patient dies without struggle and is as comfortable as possible. Often, these good deaths are 
peaceful for the surviving loved ones and healthcare providers as well.  
Third, this type of death is depicted as more meaningful for loved ones. Gawande retells a 
narrative shared with him by an oncologist who was treating a 29-year-old man with an inoperable 
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brain tumor (pp. 185-7). After a second line of chemotherapy failed to stop the tumor’s growth, 
this doctor had several lengthy meetings first with the patient, then with the patient and his family 
together, and finally one-on-one with the patient’s father. The patient initially came into the 
oncologist’s office expecting to schedule a third type of chemotherapy but the oncologist did her 
best to communicate the very low odds that this therapy, the last option she had to offer, would 
actually extend his life. They discussed what was likely to happen as the disease progressed, as 
well as the side effects and anticipated outcomes of the treatment. The oncologist saw the patient 
slowly realizing that he was, in all likelihood, nearing the end of his life and that the remaining 
treatment options were not going to improve his health or extend his life. While he was able to 
adjust to this information, it took an additional meeting with his family for his wife and mother to 
accept it. The patient’s father required even more convincing and the oncologist visited the father 
at his home to review the experimental treatment options he had researched. The oncologist 
patiently explained why each one was not a good match for his son. The turning point came as the 
oncologist told him “he needed to understand: time with his son was limited” and the patient “was 
going to need his father’s help getting through it” (p. 186). As a result of these conversations the 
patient chose hospice rather than continuing curative treatment, the family successfully 
transitioned out of ‘battle mode’ and they were able to spend the last month of his life together 
without side effects from treatment impeding interaction. After the patient’s death, his father 
thanked the oncologist for helping them to understand the situation and convincing them to spend 
the time as they did. “That last month,” the father said, they “simply focused on being together, 
and it proved to be the most meaningful time they ever spent” (p. 187). In order to have that time 
together, though, patient and family had to first accept that he was dying and shift treatment goals 
accordingly.  
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In the narrative view, the end of life for people who decide to stop treating their disease is 
peaceful and allows for a death that is fitting to their life. As we’ll see below, comfort care creates 
time for the dying person to take up the dying role and for the dying person to spend time with 
loved ones. End of life can then be fulfilling and meaningful for patients and/or loved ones, but 
only once the decision to stop curative treatment and accept that the person is going to die has been 
made. Low intervention doesn’t necessarily make for a good death on its own – there may be other 
circumstances that intervene – but it is worth noting that there are no narratives, in this archive at 
least, in which people who opt for low interventions are depicted as suffering a bad death. 
Interestingly, the timing of the decision to forgo curative treatment is rarely discussed 
directly in the narratives. As all end of life decision-making eventually comes down to the decision 
of when to stop treatment and allow the patient to die, the timing of that decision is a key element 
in whether the death is characterized as good or not. That a ‘prolonged death’ is characterized as 
bad results from the timing of the death relative to the social death of the patient – the death came 
‘too late,’ as Kellehear terms it (2007). That the decision to stop treatment in order to spend 
remaining time with loved ones without the side effects of treatment interfering, for example, is 
characterized as a good has to do with the timing of that decision – too little remaining time and 
the decision came too late; on the other hand, one can also imagine that decision coming too soon 
if there was perhaps more benefit to be gained from curative treatment. The timing of the ‘well-
timed death’ is thus based on the individual medical and life context of the patient. As such there 
is a kairotic element to the decision to stop treatment and to permit death. The choice between 
curative and comfort care is a major focal point in these narratives, and that choice is a major 
source of uncertainty for patients and loved ones, but the timing of that choice is almost always 
based on medical knowledge. Which is to say, the bifurcation moment between curative treatment 
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and comfort care is determined by practitioners – who present the choice to patients to decide after 
a medical event or following competition of a round of treatment, for example – rather than being 
shaped by the individual’s social context.  
3.1.3 Narratives of Patients Unable to Exercise Control Over Treatments 
The third type of story told in these texts are those in which the medical treatment received 
does not align with the patient’s wishes. Some narratives depict situations in which the dying 
person is unconscious and their wishes unknown. In these situations, a proxy is selected to make 
decisions, ideally in the best interest of the patient. In Periyakoil’s (2015) article ‘Pitfalls for 
Proxies,’ she recounts two narratives of patients whose wishes are unknown and whose treatment 
choices are left to loved ones. In both of these stories, according to Periyakoil, the proxies made 
poor decisions based upon their own needs rather than those of the dying person.  In the first 
example, a patient without an advance directive contracted an infection after chemotherapy. He 
was admitted to the ICU but, despite intensive treatment, his condition continued to deteriorate. 
However, his wife would not consider withdrawing life support. Finally, Periyakoil asked the wife 
if she would want this same treatment, were their positions reversed: “Of course not, she said. She 
would want to just die peacefully. So why was she subjecting her husband to this fate? ‘The duty 
of a good wife is to save her husband,’ she said softly and with steely determination” (emphasis in 
original). As Periyakoil describes it, the wife did not consider what would be the best outcome for 
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her husband – nor show any interest in pursuing what Periyakoil seems to consider a good death – 
but instead makes decisions based on her idea of how a good wife should act.26   
In the second example, Periyakoil recounts a story of an old man dying in the ICU. Hospital 
staff eventually track down the patient’s son, John, who has not visited his father for several years. 
Despite being estranged, John becomes his father’s proxy by default and doctors ask him for 
permission to withdraw life support. John declines. According to Periyakoil, John was moved by 
the thought of all the time he had missed with his father and so was “primarily motivated by his 
own need to have one last opportunity to repair the broken relationship and make amends to redeem 
himself.” The proxy heeding the “call of redemption” – or the “call of duty,” in the example above 
– results in overtreatment and a prolonged death, and thus, according to Periyakoil, both are to be 
avoided by carefully naming a proxy in advance and making your wishes clear to that proxy.  
Even in cases where a person’s wishes are known, they can be outright overruled by their 
proxy. Periyakoil further tells of Carl, who used his power as proxy to override his partner, 
Darlene’s, ‘do not resuscitate’ (DNR) status. Darlene had advanced lung disease and a bad case of 
pneumonia resulting in respiratory failure and loss of consciousness. Following what Periyakoil 
named the “call of love,” Carl, “who could not imagine life without Darlene,” made the decision 
to have her resuscitated. Darlene was furious at Carl for not allowing her to die ‘naturally:’ “How 
can I ever trust you again?” Darlene asked Carl after waking up and learning what had happened. 
However, Carl maintained that he had saved her life. Periyakoil’s telling of the narrative does not 
give a sense of Darlene’s actual death, but Periyakoil clearly thinks Carl was in the wrong in this 
situation and uses this narrative in an attempt to persuade readers to choose carefully when 
 
26 It is worth noting here that the patient and wife in this scenario are Korean-American and Periyakoil paints the wife 
as a stereotypical woman of Eastern Asian descent: “Soo-jin was a soft-spoken woman who was respectful and 
deferential to the doctors.” 
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selecting a proxy, noting that a close loved one may not be able to make the best decisions precisely 
because of their love for the patient.  
In these narratives there seems to be little consideration of the potential needs of the proxy, 
or other loved ones, in end of life situations. As discussed in the Introduction a good death is co-
constructed by dying people, their loved ones and healthcare providers. Many have argued that the 
characterization made by the dying person themselves is the most important (see Scarre, 2012), 
but endings do impact loved ones as well. Proxies and healthcare providers have to live with the 
choices they make on behalf of dying people. Periyakoil only takes the (assumed) perspective of 
the dying person – which seems to align with her own views on the good ending to life – into 
consideration in these narratives, without taking seriously, for example, the contextually-bound 
logic driving of the duty-bound wife or the estranged son. 
Lastly, there are stories about medical interventions not in accord with patient wishes that 
result from loved ones being unsure how to respond to medical crisis. For example, Zitter (2015, 
April) tells the story of an 86-year-old with a chronic heart problem whose wife calls the 
paramedics when he collapsed at home. The patient had filled out an advance directive and had 
“adamantly, repeatedly, and clearly told his family he wanted no more of it. No more shocks, no 
more hospitalizations, no surgeries or catheterizations, no pacemakers.” His daughters arrive at the 
ICU a short time after the patient has been stabilized and are, understandably, very upset that his 
wishes had not been followed. Zitter explains that while the patient’s efforts at advanced decision-
making were good, an advance directive does not relieve first responders of their legal duty to 
sustain life once called. She gives the family the correct form for the patient’s situation and sends 
them home with the proper documentation to ensure that the patient’s wishes are respected, 
whether or not he is able to directly communicate them in any future situations. This narrative does 
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have a happy ending because the mistake is corrected such that his wishes were ultimately 
respected: “We sent him home on hospice, Polst [form] in hand, to be with his family for the 
precious time he had left – to live, this time protected from the type of death he feared the most.” 
In this narrative, it seems that the patient’s wife had not intended to overrule his wishes but had 
not known how to ensure that he had “no more of it” given the medical crisis. Without knowing 
that paramedics are legally obligated to prolong life unless they have a physician’s order not to, 
she may not have known that she was going against her husband’s wishes by calling 911 when he 
collapsed. Interestingly, we don’t see any more of her perspective in the narrative, Zitter only 
narrates interactions with the patient’s daughters.  
The lesson of these types of stories is first, to be clear on your wishes and second, to pick 
your proxy well – you want someone who will follow your wishes and, ideally, has enough medical 
literacy to see them through. It is telling that the proxies in each of these narratives make the 
decision for more treatment, even if unintentionally. In each case, these proxies chose such that 
the dying person was subjected to further curative treatment and their lives were prolonged. The 
authors make clear that rather than defaulting to more futile or risky treatment, proxies should be 
protecting their loved ones from that type of death. Again, the moral of these stories is that minimal 
intervention at end of life, especially when the patient is passive and cannot choose for themselves, 
is better.  
3.1.4 Narratives of Patients Able to Shape End of Life Treatments 
The fourth type of narrative depicts patients who define their own goals at end of life and 
have caregivers who are able to help carry those out, to the extent the evolving medical situation 
allows. They tell the stories of patients who are able to make decisions about their care at end of 
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life, ideally defining a good death for themselves, almost all of whom make the decision to stop 
curative treatment. There are a few different characteristics of this type of story. First, it is up to 
the patient to determine and communicate their wishes, often at the prompting of loved ones or 
medical team. This can be a difficult and even awkward, as in two narratives Gawande (2014) tells 
of adult children going through the process of determining their parents’ treatment wishes. In the 
first, palliative care specialist Susan Block left her father’s house the night before he was scheduled 
for surgery on a mass in his spinal cord, when she realized that, despite being his designated 
healthcare proxy, and a palliative care specialist, she didn’t know what his wishes really were (pp. 
183-85). She turned the car around and returned. “Going back in ‘was really uncomfortable,’ she 
said. It made no difference that she was an expert in end-of-life discussions. ‘I just felt awful 
having the conversation with my dad’” (p. 183). She asked what he was willing to endure in order 
to stay alive, what minimum quality of life he imagined would be tolerable. His response – so long 
as he could watch football and eat chocolate ice cream, he would be happy – astounded Block, 
who’d never known her father to watch a football game (p. 183). As it happens, there were 
complications after his surgery the next day and Block had three minutes to decide whether to 
authorize an additional surgery to stop bleeding in her father’s spinal cord, a procedure which 
might save his life but would leave him nearly quadriplegic (p. 184). There was no decision for 
her to make, she realized; he had already made it. When asked, the surgeon confirmed that her 
father would still be able to watch TV and eat ice cream even if he became quadriplegic as a result 
of the second surgery. Block says that without the conversation with her dad, her instincts would 
have been to permit him to die instead, but either way she would have agonized about it. He lived 
another ten years after that surgery, before the trade-offs became too great for him and he decided 
to stop curative treatment for his condition and died at home on hospice care (p. 184).  
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Gawande himself went through a similar experience with his own father. Sitting down with 
his parents to discuss treatment options for the tumor in his father’s spinal cord, Gawande asked 
his father the very questions he’d learned to ask patients from Susan Block: What did he understand 
his prognosis to be? What were his concerns about the future? What kinds of trade-offs was he 
willing to make? How did he want to spend his time if his health got worse? Who should make 
decisions if he was unable? (see pp. 182-83): 
Those questions were among the hardest I’d asked in my life. I posed them with great 
trepidation, fearing, well, I don’t know what – anger from my father or mother, or 
depression, or the sense that just by raising such questions I was letting them down. But 
what we felt afterward was relief. We felt clarity. (pp. 212-13) 
Referencing the story Gawande had told him about Block’s father, Gawande’s own father 
responded that watching TV and eating ice cream would not be enough for him to feel fulfilled. 
He wanted to be able to remain social, to continue to influence his life and those around him.   
In these stories, the dying people are able to determine what minimum quality of life would 
be acceptable to them at end of life – which is to say they are able to identify what they value most 
about living. They and their loved ones use that information to guide medical treatments in 
situations where the patients were not able to speak for themselves. In both cases, it is as though 
the dying person had already made the necessary decisions, though this may not always be the case 
even when loved ones have end of life conversations. There are also times that the dying person 
may need help in determining those goals or even seeing the point of making goals at end of life 
at all.  
Gawande tells the story of Peg Bachelder, his daughter’s piano teacher, who, after years of 
misdiagnosis, was finally diagnosed with soft-tissue sarcoma. After about two years of treatment, 
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Bachelder developed a “leukemia-like malignancy caused by her treatment” that stopped 
responding to intervention (p. 246). Speaking with Peg on the phone while she was in the hospital, 
Gawande reports that she sounded flat and hopeless after doctors had stopped chemotherapy: “I 
asked her what her understanding of her condition was. She said she knew she was going to die. 
There’s nothing more they can do, she said, an edge of anger creeping into her voice” (p. 247). 
Gawande asked next about her goals, but she couldn’t see any point in future goals, even for the 
proximal future. When asked about her fears it was clear that her anxiety was overwhelming her: 
“She choked up as she spoke. She’d been there [in the hospital] for days just getting worse, and 
she feared she didn’t have many more. I asked her if they’d talked to her about hospice. They had, 
she said, but she didn’t see what it could do to help her” (p. 247). Gawande explained that the goal 
of hospice is to work toward one good day and encouraged her to at least talk to them. Peg agreed 
that a good day was worth hoping for and went home on hospice within two days. Rather than 
focusing on medical treatments or altering the course of the disease, the hospice nurse asked how 
Peg wanted to spend her remaining days, what she cared about most (p. 248). Working toward 
these concrete goals, Peg’s anxiety and hopelessness dissipated as the challenges of daily life and 
her symptoms were both managed. She was able to teach piano lessons for the last month of her 
life and, according to Gawande at least, Peg “fulfilled her dying role” (p. 249), as she was able to 
live as a dying person and fulfill other relational roles, reach some measure of closure with her 
students and adjust to the inevitable loss (see Emanuel et al., 2007). This was only possible because 
Gawande played the role of both doctor and friend, and was able to nudge her in what turned out 
to be the right direction. This narrative in particular does not gloss over the fact that dying can be 
overwhelming, that it may not be easy to accept that you’re dying and to decide how to live your 
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remaining days. This task may be especially difficult if all of one’s energy has been focused on 
beating the disease; it can make taking up a dying role seem pointless or impossible.  
The preceding examples also illustrate the second characteristic of this type of narrative, 
that the patient’s broader goals for living at end of life serve as guides for their treatments. Which 
is to say, in the three narratives above each patient was able to decide how they wanted to live at 
the end of their life – eating chocolate ice cream and watching football, fulfilling obligations and 
directing the course of one’s own life, or teaching piano lessons. These life goals, in conjunction 
with their medical status and/or physical state, then determined the treatments, whether curative 
or comfort, each of them pursued and those they declined. This reflects a change from previous 
conceptualizations of advance care planning, in which it was advocated that patients decide – in 
advance – which treatments they would want and which they didn’t. The problem with this is that 
medical situations are too complex and evolve too rapidly for treatment decisions to effectively be 
made in advance. These stories reflect this shift in the literature on good deaths toward focusing 
on values and quality of life in shared decision-making, rather than on specific treatments. 
The third characteristic of stories of patients defining their own goals at end of life is that 
they feature caregivers who help them work toward those goals. As with Block and her father and 
Peg and her hospice nurses, these types of narratives include proxies and/or caregivers able to 
respond to evolving medical situations and make decisions in the patient’s best interests, even if 
not directly in accord with their stated wishes. Hospice nurse Brown (2015, Oct.), described the 
death of a patient that was particularly difficult for her, in part because she didn’t feel she could 
adequately manage the patient’s symptoms and honor his wishes to die at home. Brown and the 
patient’s family thus found themselves at a crossroads, unable fulfill both his wishes to die at home 
and to die peacefully. She and the family decided together to have him transported to the hospital 
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– where managing his pain would be easier – thus privileging the desire for a pain-free death over 
dying at home. However, it was the middle of a Pittsburgh winter, roads were very icy and it took 
the ambulance upwards of an hour to arrive. In the meantime, the patient’s pain and distress 
mounted. Despite this, Brown notes in retrospect, there was a palpable feeling of love in the room 
from the patient’s wife, children and even the family dog. Eventually the ambulance arrived, the 
patient was taken to the hospital and died. While this narrative began with Brown admitting it was 
a difficult memory for her, by the end she has come to peace with it because the “patient died 
peacefully, surrounded by family – the promise of hope was fulfilled.” She clarifies, “Not hope of 
a cure, of course, but of pain relieved and comfort given.” Despite having no choice but to deviate 
from the patient’s stated end of life wishes, the patient died “peacefully, surrounded by family.” 
His death is characterized as good because Brown realizes that they were able to make decisions 
in his best interest and, importantly, because the family and caregivers, namely Brown as the 
narrator, come to terms with his death. 
Despite things not going as exactly planned in these narratives, it seems that the dying 
people still maintain at least some amount of agency to decide. Block and Gawande’s fathers don’t 
get to make their own medical decisions in the moment, but Block and Gawande are both able to 
use their fathers’ end of life wishes to make decisions on their behalf. Peg Bachelder was hopeless 
and anxiety-ridden when no more curative treatment was offered, but, with help from loved ones 
and hospice, she was able to regain agency in her life and take up the dying role. Brown’s hospice 
patient is unable to make his own decisions about which end of life goal to privilege, but his proxies 
are able to act in his best interest, rather than their own, as in the narratives in the previous type. 
Like stories of low medical intervention – those in which patients privilege now instead of 
sacrificing time now for the chance to gain more later – these deaths are depicted as good because 
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the dying person is able to shape their ending, to some degree at least, in accord with their identity; 
their endings fit in some way with their lives. Additionally, and importantly, the other stakeholders, 
whether the doctor-authors or the patient’s loved ones (as narrated by the doctor-author), 
characterizing the death retrospectively feel as though they made the right decisions.  
These narratives further suggest that reducing uncertainty, whether for proxies or they 
dying person themselves, is a central feature of the good death. While medical situations are 
necessarily uncertain – by virtue of dealing with the innate uncertainties of practicing medicine on 
human bodies – by creating space for and respecting the agency of the dying person, the proxy 
acting on their behalf doesn’t have to navigate that uncertainty on their own. Gawande feels relief 
and clarity after the conversation with his father; Block doesn’t have to agonize over whether or 
not she made the right decisions. For Brown, the memory of this particular patient is recurrent in 
part because of her uncertainty of how to reconcile the patient’s goals which were suddenly at odds 
– that of a pain-free death and to die at home. This memory is resolved for her when she remembers 
that the patient’s loved ones maintained a loving space for him and that they did make the right 
decision in the end. Or in Bachelder’s case, the hospice nurse helps Peg shift her focus from dying 
and the future she would miss out on, to living in the present. Peg’s anxiety about the future reduces 
once her medical symptoms are controlled and she feels she is able to live at the end of her life. 
The ability to shape her remaining time reduces uncertainty over the course her disease will take; 
as her symptoms are rendered manageable, she can imagine what her final days will look like. 
Furthermore, taking the view of mortality rather than individual dying is an attempt to manage the 
uncertainty inherent in dying by narrowing one’s image of the future to the most probable 
outcomes. In particular, what narratives of patients able to shape treatment at end of life espouse 
is a merging of statistical and individual views of death. Accepting the most probably outcomes, 
 91 
statistically speaking, and creating space for the dying individual to live through their deaths in an 
individual way is held up as an ideal to work toward at end of life.  
3.1.5 Narratives in which Life Circumstances Interfere with the Management of Dying 
The previous types of narratives focus on the types of medical treatments the patients 
received – highly or minimally invasive treatments – or on the role of the patient in determining 
course of treatment. Dying is also impacted by the life circumstances of patient, social, economic, 
political and so on. This is most evident in the fifth type of story, in which the authors explicitly 
discuss life circumstances that make achieving the ideal of the good death more difficult. For 
example, Crosby (2015), a doctor in a large regional ‘safety net’ hospital, details the case of an 
American citizen, Mohammed, who emigrated from an unnamed African country, has limited 
English and low health literacy. His children had recently arrived in the U.S. and he was struggling 
as a newly single parent, his wife’s visa delayed. Mohammed visited the author with a lesion on 
his head, for which she sought a second opinion and eventually scheduled a biopsy. He never made 
it to the biopsy because life intervened. He didn’t seem to understand the importance of the 
procedure and none of the medical staff noticed or followed up on the missed appointment. When 
Crosby saw Mohammed again for the first time, eight months after that missed appointment, his 
condition had deteriorated rapidly: he had been diagnosed with malignant melanoma, had 
undergone surgery and suffered nerve damage as a result. He died on the floor of his bathroom, 21 
months after diagnosis, on the same day a hospice nurse had been scheduled to come for their first 
in-home visit. Crosby had been able to help expedite Mohammed’s wife’s immigration so neither 
he, nor his children, were on their own, but mitigating that circumstance did not seem to alter the 
circumstances in which he died. In this case, he fell through the cracks, and, as Crosby notes, the 
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medical institution itself is partly to blame. But his overall situation was ‘complicated’ by low 
English literacy, low health literacy and difficulty navigating unfamiliar medical and social 
systems, which resulted in a bad death. All of this points to the fact that there are particular social 
and life circumstances that make achieving the good death more likely than others. 
In another example, doctor of palliative medicine, Puri (2016), tells of her first year of 
practice in which she visited her South LA patients in their homes. She gives a snapshot of a day, 
providing the details of four of her patients who lived in low-income neighborhoods, which also 
have some of the city’s lowest life expectancies: “In these neighborhoods people die an average 
of 10 years earlier than those who live less than 10 miles away. Many of my patients felt that they 
had barely lived their lives when I showed up, ostensibly to help them ‘die with dignity’.” In 
addition to the difficulties of dealing with dying ‘before one’s time,’ they also faced additional 
obstacles as a result of their socioeconomic realities and insurance options. First, Puri visits with 
Sergio, a 45-year-old man with stomach cancer who was being cared for at home by his wife, 
Maria, with occasional help from a neighbor. Neither Sergio or Maria had any family in the U.S., 
and so primary caregiving duties fell to Maria, who was responsible for managing his medication, 
bathing him, helping him in and out of bed, calling someone when he was in distress, and so on. 
Worry over her husband’s deteriorating state kept her from sleeping at night, as she feared missing 
a sign that his condition was worsening. Sergio was sick, but not sick enough to justify, from an 
insurance standpoint, admission to a hospital or other institution which would provide care and 
allow Maria to just be Sergio’s wife, rather than wife and fulltime caregiver. After seeing Sergio 
and Maria, Puri visited Janice, a 60-year-old with advanced breast cancer, who was estranged from 
her family and relied only on her landlady and two church friends to help manage her care. Then 
Joseph, a 50-year-old military veteran who was afraid to keep opiates in his home for fear of being 
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robbed. His lung cancer had spread to his bones and he needed the medication to manage pain, 
which had gotten so bad that without medication he couldn’t walk. Puri was eventually able to 
convince him to try small doses of morphine, promising to help him find a secure hiding place. 
After Joseph, Puri visited Jorge who had Lou Gehrig’s disease. His wife was the primary caregiver 
but she had taken on extra shifts to help make up for Jorge’s lost income. On her previous visit, 
Puri found Jorge alone, short of breath and unable to reach his medication. He assured Puri last 
week that in just a couple more days they would have the money to pay for help so that Jorge 
would not be left alone. On this visit she gently reminded of the need for an in-home caregiver, 
again listing the reasons he couldn’t be left alone.  
It is against these odds that Puri was tasked with attempting to help her patients achieve a 
good death. She writes 
I constantly wonder whether, given these life circumstances, my patients fully benefit from 
the care my team and I try to provide. Aside from assessing symptoms and providing 
medications to ease them, perhaps just treating what I can with compassion is the best I 
can do for them. Still, I try to find some meaning in these visits, in the visits that preceded 
them, in all the visits that await, so that I can get up tomorrow and do this imperfect work 
again. 
This article, more so than the others, makes clear just what it takes to manage dying and that bad, 
or at least less than good, deaths can result from unequal access to the necessary luxuries, as Puri 
calls them: reliable access to medication, money or insurance to pay caregivers, a strong social 
network to help manage the work of dying as well as that of everyday life, a safety net to help 
absorb lost income when the dying person can no longer work and ideally one strong enough to 
allow loved ones to take time off as well, and so on. From the narrative of her day, and the details 
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Puri provides about the obstacles she, her team, her patients and their loved ones face, it is clear 
that bad dying may not necessarily be ugly or involve futile treatment but looms in the inability to 
secure adequate care at end of life. Dying is as much an economic and political issue as it is a 
medical one. All of these narratives are of people who opted for low medical intervention, who, in 
theory, were making the right decisions that should have resulted in good deaths, who want to the 
opportunity to die peacefully at home surrounded by loved ones. However, they have to manage 
additional uncertainty and stress surrounding medical and social issues – primarily as a result of 
their financial situations – making their deaths even more difficult to manage.  
In an example that makes clear the extent to which medicine – and thus medicalized dying 
– cannot be separated from politics and economics, palliative care physician Ira Byock (2015) tells 
the story of a friend of his, Michael, who was undergoing treatments for cancer. Michael had 
exhausted all other treatment options and began a Phase I clinical trial. However, Byock was 
concerned that Michael’s symptoms were not being adequately managed. Speaking with the nurse 
overseeing the clinical trial, he suggested that Michael and his loved ones may benefit from his 
concurrent enrollment in hospice. “‘It’s his choice,’ the nurse said, referring to Medicare rules that 
require patients to choose between cancer treatment and hospice care. It was, but what a terrible 
choice to have to make.” Because of the Medicare rule, Michael, and other people at end of life, 
delay entering hospice and many suffer because of having to choose between curative care and 
hospice, which, significantly, means they have to first accept that they are dying and agree to forgo 
even experimental treatment in order for insurance to cover meetings with hospice. Byock goes on 
to lay out policy changes that would make dying “safer,” (i.e. alleviating unnecessary suffering, 
maximize independence, effectively coordinate care, manage and prevent crises, and so on). The 
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shape that end of life takes is intertwined with political and economic elements over which the 
majority of us have little to no control.27  
In particular, it seems that the necessity of managing financial uncertainty is taken for 
granted in the majority of the narratives in my archive. The three articles discussed here are the 
only which include income or insurance status in the narratives. It is assumed that the dying people 
at the center of the other narratives can afford their treatments, whether curative or comfort. With 
the exception of Crosby, who assures readers that Mohammed was fully insured thus placing the 
blame for his bad death primarily on the medical institution and on herself, the only times financial 
issues are brought up is when they interfere with the management of dying. For insurance reasons, 
Byock’s friend has to choose between an experimental treatment – which, again, was not intended 
to cure him – and hospice; Puri’s patients run the risk of a bad death because they don’t have the 
safety net to absorb lost income, allow family members to take time off or provide for care where 
their insurance falls short. In these situations, it is financial or insurance-related uncertainty that 
creates the possibility of a bad death. The general invisibility of this issue in the majority of 
narratives in my archive reinforces a particular version of dying in the U.S., eliding issues of who 
has access to the possibility of a good death.  
It is worth further underscoring that these broader life circumstances, as I call them here, 
are only the explicit focus of the narrative when they function as barriers to a good death. All of 
the deaths included in this archive are shaped by the life circumstances – which includes the social 
aspects discussed in the next section – of the people involved. Those circumstances recede – or 
are pushed – to the background of the narrative when they set the conditions of possibility for a 
 
27 See, for example, David Wendell Moller’s (2019) overview of the impacts of recent federal healthcare and welfare 
policies on the deaths of poor people in the U.S. (pp. 211-229).  
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good death. Which is to say, the privileges of people who are economically, socially, culturally 
and otherwise advantaged typically go unmarked here and the end of life narratives of people who 
lack access to those privileges are told in comparison to that unmarked ‘norm.’ This is an issue not 
only in this archive but also in much death studies literature in general, though there are authors 
who push back against this (e.g. Collective for Radical Death Studies, 2020; Moller, 2004, 2019).  
3.1.6 Narratives of Social Needs at End of Life 
The sixth type of end of life narrative in these texts are those that center specifically on the 
social aspects of dying, for both patients and their loved ones. This particular aspect of a patient’s 
life circumstances is especially important in whether or not a person has a good or bad death. Many 
of these narratives focus specifically on the importance of spending meaningful time together at 
end of life. One reason comfort care and other forms of low medical intervention are portrayed as 
good is that, so long as the patient’s symptoms are adequately managed, there is opportunity for 
the family and loved ones to spend quality time together, thus providing opportunity for social 
roles to be fulfilled, social recognition to be maintained and, generally, for the person to die in a 
manner that is in keeping with their life.  
For example, Friedrichsdorf (2015), the director of the center for pain management, 
palliative care and integrated medicine at a children’s hospital, tells the story of Ethan – a baby 
born with a congenital heart defect who suffered a major stroke while undergoing life-saving 
surgery at 10 days old. Ethan was left with limited brain function, his life sustained by a ventilator, 
without hope of recovery. Friedrichsdorf begins this article by stating outright, “Ethan Butler’s 
best chance to truly live was for his parents to accept the fact that their infant son would die.” He 
asked Ethan’s parents what, beyond a miracle, they hoped for in the situation. They responded that 
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they didn’t want Ethan to suffer or to spend his entire life on the vent, and that, above all, they 
wanted him to be comfortable. Together, family and doctors decided to perform a ‘compassionate 
extubation’ and remove the vent from Ethan. They took him outside to see the sun for the first time 
and, to everyone’s surprise, his breathing became regular and comfortable. The family was able to 
take him home two days later and spent the next several months with him before he died. As 
Friedrichsdorf puts it, “Ethan had as good a life, as long a life, as he possibly could have” and it is 
because his parents took the risk of taking him off the vent. They were able to treat him, generally, 
as they would a healthy baby – going to restaurants, the movies, boat rides and giving members of 
the family a chance to form memories with him – that would have been otherwise impossible if all 
their time and energy was put into curative treatment, managing the symptoms and side effects of 
life on a ventilator, hoping for a miracle. This way his parents and older sister were able to perform 
their roles as family members; his mother was able to live, for a short time, as Ethan’s mother and 
to form memories of this time. While we do not have Ethan’s perspective in any of this – which 
marks this narrative as different from the generalization that a passive patient typically results in a 
bad death – the author’s and his interpretation of the parent’s view is clear: Ethan had a short but 
good life and a good death in which his symptoms were managed and family was able to spend 
meaningful time with him, enacting their social roles.  
As discussed in the Introduction, diagnosis often marks a moment of change in identity for 
the dying person. This change in identity impacts loved ones too. Hospice nurse Brown (2015, 
April) tells the story of an old Italian woman who kept trying to cook for and feed her dying 
husband, despite the fact that he could neither chew nor swallow and that ingesting food would, 
likely, make him feel worse. Food was her way of caring for and connecting with her family and, 
Brown speculated, “the last concrete gift she had to offer” her husband. Brown surmises that when 
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loved ones no longer need food it makes their dying more real to their loved ones.28 It is thus as 
important for loved ones to accept an impending death and to adjust to their new roles – as 
caregiver and, to the extent possible in advance, as bereaved – as it is for the dying person. Brown 
ends the article by suggesting different ways that loved ones may be able to express care for dying 
people but it is not clear if she was able to help the woman in this narrative adjust to her new role 
in this way.  
Social recognition also is an important element of a good death, though it is primarily 
referenced in passing in the narratives. Healthcare practitioners, especially hospice care workers, 
often come into their patients’ lives at the end, but they want to be seen as individuals who have 
lived full and meaningful lives, not just as dying patients. For example, when Puri (2016) arrives 
to her first home visit of the day, Sergio has a photo album waiting to share with her: “‘I wanted 
to show you who I used to be,’ he tells me softly in Spanish. I barely recognize him in the photos.” 
This desire is also expressed in the desire to die at home, with loved ones; a death that is ‘in 
keeping’ with who the patient is and was, is partly about being recognized as an individual and 
being able to live at end of life, to the extent possible, as yourself. As Gawande’s (2014) research 
shows, dying people want to be able to continue to shape their life story, to live and be recognized 
even as they’re dying (p. 146). 
Loved ones and healthcare providers thus play important roles for patients at end of life. A 
recurring lesson in these narratives is that time and energy is often better spent being with loved 
ones – focusing on saying goodbye, closure, life completion and so on – than pursing treatments 
that have a low chance of advancing the patient’s goals or extending the amount of high-quality 
 
28 I think Brown misreads the situation slightly, here; rather than seeing feeding dying loved ones as an act born of 
denial, I think these actions can be better understood as motivated by helplessness, by the need to continue to care for 
our loved ones but reflecting a lack of understanding of how to do so at end of life.  
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time they have remaining. This is true not only of the three narrative examples in this sixth section, 
but, as indicated by the previous paragraph, can also be mapped onto the rest of the narratives 
analyzed. All of these authors are healthcare practitioners and so, understandably, they have a 
primarily medical focus. However, the importance of social roles and social recognition at end of 
life is such that one has a hard time evaluating a death as good or bad without reference to them. 
While many of these narratives center on treatment decisions and patient agency in decision-
making, the good death is also importantly about the dying person’s positioning in light their social 
needs and roles.29 
3.1.7 Bad versus Good Dying 
From these six types of end of life narratives we can infer the conceptualizations of bad 
versus good deaths operating within. Bad deaths are ugly, painful and full of unnecessary suffering, 
often resulting from futile or risky interventions. Prolonged dying is generally characterized as a 
bad death, as the patient’s life is sustained without hope of recovery, often with negative side 
effects – physical, emotional and/or social – that may impact loved ones and caregivers as well. 
Additionally, deaths may be characterized as bad if the medical interventions leading up to death 
are not what the patient wants or if it is unknown what the patient wants. In general, bad deaths 
involve treatments that actively do harm, either physically as a result of side effects and recovery 
time, or socially and emotionally as in treatments that interfere with the dying person’s ability to 
take up their dying role. Furthermore, stories of bad deaths frequently portray the dying person as 
 
29 This may also partly explain why much of this work is undertaken by women. (See Order of the Good Death, as 
well.)  
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a passive recipient of treatment. Deaths of these sorts are told through narratives about high 
medical intervention and those in which patient’s wishes are unknown or not followed.  
Good deaths, on the other hand, are peaceful, often occurring at home, usually surrounded 
by loved ones and, insofar as the situation allows, in accord with the patient’s wishes. In good 
deaths, the dying person is active, able to identify end of life goals or last wishes, and these are 
worked toward by both the dying person and their social networks. Ideally, it is these goals that 
guide treatment plans at end of life as well, rather than the ‘default’ goal of prolonging life at all 
costs. In those situations where it is not possible to follow the patient’s wishes – because they are 
unknown or because the situation evolves such that their original wishes are no longer feasible or 
in the patient’s best interest – a healthcare proxy, or in some cases medical team member, is able 
to make decisions in the best interest of the patient. Lastly, in good deaths the social needs of the 
dying person and their loved ones are met – everyone gets the appropriate social recognition, the 
dying person and their loved ones adjust to the patient’s impending death and have time to say 
goodbye, to mourn or to just to be together. Good deaths are described in narratives of low medical 
intervention, in which patients define their own goals and in stories centering on the social needs 
of dying people and their loved ones. Indeed, the ideal death in these narratives in one following 
low intervention, in which medical uncertainty is managed as much as possible, the dying person 
is able to exert some control over their death and the social needs of patients, loved ones and 
caregivers are met.  
As noted, this conceptualization of the good death generally aligns with academic literature 
on the ideal of the good death. It is not surprising, then, that this conceptualization perpetuates 
some of the biases in that literature, insofar as this ideal primarily pertains to people who die of 
terminal or chronic disease and further can secure adequate care at end of life. Under this ideal of 
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good dying, sudden, traumatic deaths are necessarily bad deaths. Furthermore, the risks of these 
sorts of deaths disproportionately impact poor people, Black people and other people of color. 
Additionally, people within these vulnerable populations are predisposed to the very conditions 
that typically result in long dying, however, as discussed by Puri (2016), many lack access to the 
necessities that increase the likelihood of achieving a good death. Lastly, the narratives within this 
archive are generally silent on the identities of the dying individuals and how each patient’s unique 
positioning impacts their attempts to construct a good death. Which is to say, there may be 
perfectly sound rationales behind the choices made by the people in these narratives, but the 
judgments of the author-practitioners do not necessarily contextualize those choices when 
evaluating them as good or bad. All of which is to say that the good death constructed within this 
archive is cast in decidedly medical terms and discussed as though it applies to the U.S. population 
generally, when, in fact, it is constructed from the deaths of particular patients and addressed to 
particular audiences. 
3.2 Part Two: Uncertainty in End of Life Narratives  
One of the important things to note throughout these narratives is that, almost exclusively, 
uncertainty is experienced by patients and/or their loved ones, as opposed to medical practitioners. 
Despite the necessarily uncertain nature of practicing medicine – of diagnosis, prognosis and 
anticipating treatment outcomes – doctors, nurses and other care providers are rarely shown 
grappling with this uncertainty in these end of life narratives. The narratives cover over these 
sources of uncertainty by focusing on the uncertainty inherent in medical decision-making, which 
is the most prominent source of uncertainty for dying people and loved ones. The types of decisions 
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faced by patients and loved ones seem to be constrained, generally, by the dichotomy of curative 
treatments versus comfort care; within each option there are then further choices between specific 
treatments or care strategies. In the narrative view, these choices should be made based on the fit 
between courses of treatment and the dying individual’s life, goals and current medical situation. 
The ideal of patient autonomy dictates that it is the choice of the patient – or of their proxy if the 
patient is unable – yet it is medical team members that have access to and control over the 
information about the medical situation, treatment options, outcomes and so on (see Segal, 2000, 
p. 31). In the narratives, shared decision-making between these parties comes down to how 
patients/proxies act on the information and options presented to them, without discussion of that 
information itself.  
The fundamental decision that patients face in these narratives is whether to approach their 
disease(s) via curative or comfort care – whether to privilege the future by sacrificing time now to 
curative treatment or whether to privilege now by managing symptoms with comfort care, without 
attempting to alter the course of the disease. Deciding between these approaches to treatment 
figures as one of the major events in almost every narrative; this act of decision-making moves the 
story along, while a delay in decision-making delays the progression of the plot. All medical 
decision-making, and especially those decisions made as a person is nearing end of life, is 
permeated with uncertainty. As the possibilities of gaining more time later – and more time at a 
tolerable quality of life – reduce, the more difficult the decision may become. Eventually, end of 
life decision-making inevitably comes down to the question of when to allow death to take its 
‘natural’ course by stopping treatment. This puts additional pressure on end of life treatment 
choices. In other medical contexts patients or proxies may choose between different types of 
treatments but, ideally at least, treatment is stopped when the problem is fixed, or deemed 
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unfixable, rather than with the understanding that doing so will lead, more or less directly, to the 
end of the patient’s life. It makes sense, then, that end of life decision-making would be portrayed 
as particularly important in pursuit of the good death, and central to these narratives, as the 
decisions of which treatments to undergo, which to forgo, when and why are made either in the 
attempt to prevent death or to shape the ending of a life into a meaningful experience for patients, 
loved ones and doctors. 
Consistently, the authors of these narratives portray themselves and other healthcare 
practitioners as knowing which is the ‘right’ decision. A statistical view of dying weighs the 
probable outcomes and determines a course of action based on that. From there, the authors – 
writing with the advantage of hindsight – characterize a death as bad or good. What is not portrayed 
as uncertain in these stories is the medical knowledge that produced those possible courses of 
action and probable outcomes. From this view there is little room for discussion of what role 
medicine should play in end of life or how an individual case may impact medical knowledge. 
Furthermore, not acknowledging upfront the uncertainties inherent in medical treatment 
contributes to a lack of preparation for the unexpected, an unpreparedness for death itself.30   
There are, however, two additional narratives that challenge this generalization, indicative 
of exceptions in narratives about end of life.  First, Gawande (2014) tells of one of his patients, 
Jewel Douglass, whose goal was to be stable enough to attend her best friend’s upcoming wedding. 
Unfortunately, an unforeseen development with her ovarian cancer prevents her from attending 
 
30 It must be noted that there are a few narratives in which the author, and/or other medical team members within the 
story, show uncertainty regarding a particular case: Zitter (2015, Feb.) narrates uncertainty regarding whether or not 
she should continue to treat Vincent; Brown (2015, April) is uncertain whether to privilege the patient’s wish to die 
at home above that of being pain free; Zitter (2015, Oct.) displays uncertainty over whether or not she should have 
given shared the poor prognosis with Michelle Moore’s family after her recovery; in a brief narrative not overviewed 
in this chapter, Gawande (2014) is unable to answer the question of whether or not a particular patient is dying when 
asked by a member of the patient’s family. 
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that wedding. Gawande met with Douglass upon her readmission to the hospital to discuss options. 
In light of the development of her medical situation, she was uncertain how to proceed. Douglass 
had fears about both what the disease would do as it progressed and about the possible side effects 
and range of anticipated outcomes of treatment options. There was the possibility of gaining more 
time with the surgery Gawande proposed, but there were also high risks of negative side effects. 
Eventually, after a discussion about what she hoped for and what, specifically, she feared about 
both the disease and the treatment, Gawande was able to translate Douglass’ competing concerns 
into a medical plan which accounted for her aversion to taking risky chances but still offered her 
a chance at relief from escalating symptoms. Gawande did exploratory surgery but was unable to 
complete the procedure without taking what they had decided together were unnecessary risks. 
Douglass eventually enrolled in hospice care, was discharged from the hospital and was able to 
spend the last weeks of her life visiting with old friends and family members, which she described 
as her “lifeblood” (p. 242).  
As part of the retelling of this narrative, Gawande comes to understand some of the 
difficulty of medical decision-making, especially at end of life in which people are weighing hopes 
against fears, trying to choose between possible, debilitating side effects and trying to gain as much 
high-quality time as possible. “The choice, I realized, was far more complicated than a risk 
calculation. For how do you weigh relief from nausea, and the chance of being able to eat again, 
against the possibilities of pain, of infections, of having to live with stooling into a bag?” (p. 236). 
Here, Gawande to begins to understand what it is to approach end of life like a patient, rather than 
a doctor. In practice, the individual’s view of the situation is much more complex than the 
statistical survival curve and the choice to sacrifice precious time now for the chance of gaining 
more time later – or to sacrifice later in favor of now – is fraught with uncertainty, with emotions, 
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hopes and fears, those of the dying person as well as those of any loved ones.31 In the moment 
there is not always an obvious ‘right’ decision. Coming to appreciate the position of the patient at 
end of life allows Gawande to practice true shared decision-making, and come up with a plan that 
works for Jewel Douglass as an individual.  
The second narrative that deviates from the portrayal of medical knowledge as certain in 
end of life narratives is told by Gross (2015), a hospice and palliative care physician. Despite 
knowing she will not make it out of the ICU alive, Gross’ patient, Ms. Weatherby, opts for what 
are typically considered invasive, life-sustaining treatments with the explicit purpose of prolonging 
her life as much as possible. Ms. Weatherby’s hopes are pinned not on cure or on staving off death 
for its own sake, but rather on trying to gain as much time as possible to help reunite her fractured 
family before she dies. She spends her final weeks working to bring her family together, conscious 
and intubated – an intervention which is generally considered so uncomfortable it requires sedation 
that “renders most people essentially unconscious.” The attending physician is confused about how 
intubation is considered palliative care but Gross pushes the issue, questioning whether there 
should be a stark difference between comfort and curative care. Ms. Weatherby has no doubts 
about her goals and is willing to undergo the medical treatments necessary to achieve them. 
Additionally, she was in a somewhat unique position to be able to communicate those wishes to 
her medical team directly, as a result of remaining conscious while intubated. Importantly, Ms. 
Weatherby defines a good death for herself and she accepts that she is dying. It may also be 
significant that her end of life goals were socially oriented; if she had other goals that drove her to 
extend her life as long as possible – earning a bit more money on the stock market or to cut a 
 
31 Many patients will opt for treatments they do not want if they think a loved one wants them to do it (Gawande, 
2014, p. 186).  
 106 
disliked relative out of some inheritance, for example – her death may not have been characterized 
as unambiguously good. Overall, this narrative is the clearest demonstration that it is not just highly 
versus minimally invasive treatments that leads to the characterization of a death as bad or good 
but rather whether or not social needs are met. In this case, Ms. Weatherby is portrayed as meeting 
her own social needs, essentially through her own force of will.  
Beyond this, though, the narrative of Ms. Weatherby is also about a patient challenging 
doctors’ assumptions about acceptable quality of life. The medical-knowledge that produces 
possible courses of treatment and on which doctors rely to make recommendations is grounded, at 
least in part, on assumptions about the quality of life an individual may experience as diseases 
progress and/or after treatments. There are practical, as well as emotional, difficulties to those sorts 
of predictions and healthcare professionals are not insulated from cultural norms regarding 
evaluations of the worthiness and quality of life given particular embodied conditions (see 
Christakis, 1999; Timmermans, 1998). Not to mention that the lived experience of a disease or 
treatment varies with the individual and evidence suggests that what may seem unbearable in the 
hypothetical may not be in actuality (see for example Lulé, 2009). Ms. Weatherby defied the 
assumptions of her medical team by remaining conscious while intubated and by stating she 
wanted to be re-intubated if the circumstances arose. Indeed, Gross began the article 
acknowledging that practitioners should be willing to be affected by their patients: “The real test 
for physicians, then, is being willing to meet the challenge of discovering our patient’s true wishes, 
the fulfillment of which may push us well outside our own professional comfort zone.” 
Furthermore, within the narrative at least, Gross acts as Ms. Weatherby’s champion, pushing other 
doctors on their assumptions. She states that this case challenged others’, as well as her own, 
assumptions about what ‘counts’ as palliative care:  
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“I’m sorry? You’re telling me she wants to be re-intubated?” Ms. Weatherby’s attending 
physician exclaimed. “I’m not clear how this is palliative care? She’s never leaving the 
hospital.” When advanced life support becomes comfort care, where do we draw the line? 
Based upon what I learned from Ms. Weatherby, I would argue that palliative care begins 
by removing the line. 
Ms. Weatherby defied her doctors’ expectations and, ultimately, impacted Gross’ understanding 
of medical practices. Based on her experiences with Ms. Weathersby, Gross suggests that the 
dichotomy between curative and comfort care should be broken down. Rather than focusing on 
the decision-making that leads to a good (or bad) death, Gross’ narrative focuses on medical 
practices and the role of the practitioner in delivering good care.   
Ultimately, these two narratives teach us something about the roles of medical knowledge 
and the medical practitioner at end of life. In general, the narratives in my archive aim to change 
end of life care primarily by encouraging readers (as potential future patients and/or their loved 
ones) to recognize the statistical view of death, asking them to (prepare to) accept that they will 
die and be willing to recognize and cease futile care at the appropriate time. Some provide images 
of patients and loved ones able to merge the statistical and the individual views by recognizing 
and accepting end of life and responding such that the individual’s death was meaningful for 
patient and loved ones by fitting the patient’s life. As noted, though, none of this necessarily 
impacts the doctor’s approach to end of life. Gawande’s project and the narrative Gross provides 
of Ms. Weatherby are about the ways that medical practitioners can and should adjust how they 
approach the ending of a patient’s life, too. Gross openly questions some of the medical knowledge 
that shapes how doctors approach patients at end of life. She calls for a re-envisioning of end of 
life care, one acknowledging that curing and comfort may not necessarily be distinct. Gawande 
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calls for doctors to enter into actual deliberative encounters with patients at end of life, one in 
which both parties are offering information and deciding future courses of action together, in which 
both are active. 
The argument within these two narratives is not one in which patients simply learn to make 
better decisions at end of life, which in most accounts is predicated on a more realistic outlook and 
in accepting death as a part of life, nor is it one in which practitioners simply learn to communicate 
better. Rather, the shift called for here is in how practitioners and medical institutions approach 
end of life and end of life decision making as a whole. By acknowledging medical uncertainty in 
the face of death – represented by Gawande’s realization that there is no clear, ‘right’ course of 
action and Gross’ willingness to say that doctors’ expectations of treatments and approaches to 
care in general may be fallible – these narratives challenge our assumptions about the roles of 
medical knowledge at end of life, of what ‘counts’ as relevant knowledge from which to approach 
dying and who has access to that knowledge.   
Furthermore, in both cases the patient determines or alters not only the courses of treatment 
undertaken but the courses of treatment actually offered. Gawande and Jewel Douglass work 
together to come up with a plan that will, ideally, achieve the desired outcomes without being too 
risky – what Gawande calls a “palliative operation, an operation whose overriding priority […] 
was to do only what was likely to make her feel better immediately” (p. 240). Ms. Weatherby 
requests what is typically considered curative treatment as her comfort care. Instead of 
practitioners coming to patients with predetermined treatment options, instead of medical 
knowledge setting the conditions of possibility for patient/proxy decision-making, in these two 
narratives the patient refigures the options for living at end of life. In these ways, these narratives 
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move us toward acknowledging the extent to which medical institutions and practitioners shape 
end of life, and good and bad dying. 
In focusing on type of treatment, patient control over treatments or on broader social and 
structural issues at end of life, the majority of the narratives in this archive collectively build an 
image of the good death as one resulting from low medical intervention – with pain and symptoms 
managed to the best of caregivers’ abilities – and in which patient/proxy uncertainty is minimized, 
the patient is able to influence treatment choices and the social needs of patients and loved ones 
are met. This conceptualization of the good death is largely presented as a goal for patients/proxies 
and any loved ones to work toward. However, in covering over uncertainty on the part of medical 
practitioners and, in essence, pinning the possibility of a good death on individual moments of 
decision-making on the part of patient or proxy (decisions that are based on medical knowledge 
and advice given by practitioners), these narratives also cover over at least some of the difficulty 
of shaping a good death within contemporary medical institutions, as well as potential spaces of 
possibility between practitioners and patients/proxies to address those constraints.  
Building from this conclusion, the next chapter considers some of the implications of this 
conceptualization of the good death and the role practitioners and medical institutions play in 
shaping end of life. In Chapter Three I read these same narratives from a different theoretical lens 
– that of choice versus care – in order to argue that the conclusions Gawande and Gross point us 
toward here may have a chance of actually changing care at end of life, precisely by shifting 
narrative attention away from decision-making at end of life. 
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4.0 Chapter Three: The Logic of Care in End of Life Narratives  
Building off the discursive shifts inaugurated by the mid-twentieth century death awareness 
movement, and working within a particular conceptualization of the good death that centers on the 
patient’s (or proxy’s) ability to make good decisions, the narratives presented in the NYT series 
‘The End’ and in Gawande’s Being Mortal are about the failures of contemporary medical 
institutions to shape good deaths. Even narratives of good deaths are presented as goals to work 
toward, rather than the expected norm. The blame for this failure is laid in different places, 
depending on the argument forwarded: medical institutions and insurance practices that push 
patients, proxies and practitioners toward particular types of treatments, doctors who aren’t 
prepared to communicate about end of life, patients who haven’t clearly communicated wishes or 
who are not ready to accept mortality, unequal access to resources and so on. The arguments for 
fixing these issues differ based on where blame is placed. However, the majority of the solutions 
offered come down to enabling patients to make better decisions – more informed, more practical, 
more fitting decisions – through advanced care planning, more effective practitioner 
communication, changing institutional priorities or insurance practices, shifting individual 
assumptions and expectations about mortality or end of life, and so on. In this chapter, I argue that 
the narrative focus on decision-making may actually be counterproductive to the goal of 
advocating for a well-timed death.  
Following from my close reading of the narratives in Chapter Two – in which a good death 
is typically portrayed as dependent upon treatment decisions, the ability of the patient to influence 
those treatments and outcomes, as well as on the social positioning of patients and loved ones 
throughout the dying process – we can see that a good death is shaped by both the material 
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conditions under which a person dies and the perceived ‘fit’ between the ending and the rest of the 
person’s life. Which is to say, the good death is narratively constructed based on decisions that 
affect pain and symptom management, courses of treatment, where and when a person dies, who 
is present while the person is dying, who is in charge and so on, as well as from the perceived fit 
between those effects and the dying person’s roles, relationships, values, interests and overall life 
narrative. What I show in this chapter is that both the material conditions and the perceived 
narrative fit are shaped by the underlying logic through which end of life is approached and, 
importantly for our purposes, through which the narrative of that ending is articulated.  
Adapting Annmarie Mol’s (2008) framework of the logic of choice versus the logic of care 
in medical practices, I argue that reading these narratives through the logic of care shows that what 
makes a good death possible is not necessarily the discrete decisions or actions of individual actors 
that are typically highlighted in practitioner narratives of end of life, as my analysis in Chapter 
Two demonstrated. Rather, I argue, good dying is facilitated by an enabling of care that allows the 
patient and their social networks to co-create a good death. While the deaths in my archive are 
overwhelmingly narrativized through the logic of choice – in which the autonomous patient, or 
their proxy, makes decisions based upon the (ideally) value-neutral information presented by 
healthcare providers, who then enact patient decisions – rereading them through care exposes the 
limits of choice at end of life: the logic of choice cannot account for the historical life of the dying 
person and can actually foreclose caring practices by cutting patients off from caring networks, 
preventing members of those networks from taking an active role in helping to end the dying 
person’s story. The perpetuation of the logic choice in end of life narratives perpetuates the risks 
of bad deaths and does not address the causes of the failures to create the conditions of possibility 
for good dying. Shifting the logic through which end of life is narrativized shifts the 
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conceptualization of the good death – one frame through which end of life is evaluated – thereby 
shifting standards of judgment for understanding the ending of a life. 
This is not to say that there cannot be narratives of good deaths told from within the logic 
of choice – indeed, my analyses in Chapter Two counter that idea. But, as I discuss in more detail 
in Part One below, the narrativized logic of choice points us toward the wrong things in 
conceptualizing the good death. In particular, the logic of choice in end of life narratives covers 
over the necessity of other actors at end of life, especially the role of others in bringing the dying 
person’s life to a close. Ending the dying person’s story – helping to bring their life story to a 
coherent conclusion and facilitating or even taking on their responsibilities and projects – is a 
crucial element of the good death, as one of the goals is fit between the life of the individual and 
the way in which they die, including the timing of their death. People with chronic or terminal 
illnesses who are approaching end of life are increasingly dependent upon others, which means, 
among other things, their social and medical networks are crucial to their ability to take up the 
dying role, come to some kind of closure, endure the work of daily life and, generally, shape their 
dying. An ecological or networked view of agency, such as the one Mol gestures toward in 
articulating the logic of care,32 considers not only the other human actors crucial to one’s living 
(and, in this case, dying), but also the various medical technology and devices, spatial, institutional 
and social arrangements, and discourses (and so on) that enable the completion of these tasks at 
end of life. I primarily use the term ‘network’ in a narrower sense in this chapter, to refer 
collectively to the loved ones, medical practitioners and any other human actors who share in the 
work of dying – primarily calling those ‘social’ or ‘medical’ networks.33 There are also times, 
 
32 Discussed in the next section. 
33 This is not intended as a strong distinction between the medical and the social, but rather to highlight different 
collectives dying people are embedded in. 
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though, when I refer to broader ‘care’ networks to label the various (human, non-human, 
ideological, discursive and material) arrangements that enable healthcare practices.  
In what follows, I first discuss the logic of choice and the logic of care in more detail and 
consider, in particular, their role in end of life narratives. Perceptions of good dying are partly 
about the stories we are able to tell, and, when viewed through the logic of care, we see a different 
emphasis in the conceptualization of good dying. In Part Two, I turn to the narrativized logic of 
choice which perpetuates the ideology of the autonomous individual as decision-maker and 
typically renders the healthcare practitioner as narratively passive, before considering the 
narrativized logic of care, which directs attention to the necessary distribution of agency in caring 
practices – thus shifting the conceptualization of the good death and the resulting evaluations of 
end of life – in the last section. 
4.1 Part One: The Logic of Choice and the Logic of Care  
Mol’s (2008) project is about contrasting choice with care, rather than the more common 
contrast between choice and no choice or between choice and force. The logic of choice, under 
which the choice-no choice dichotomy falls, places responsibility for outcomes onto the patient-
decider (pp. xi-xii), as in statements like “It’s his choice” in response to whether or not the patient 
wants to continue with the clinical trial or switch to hospice care (Byock, 2015). Mol argues that 
the logic of choice, which is predominant in healthcare institutions and is foundational in the West 
in general, is primarily concerned with autonomy. Individuals are called upon to make medical 
decisions based on information given them by healthcare providers. Within the institutional logic, 
communicative roles are assumed to be neatly divided: doctors, nurses and other healthcare 
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professionals present neutral facts, customer-citizens choose based on their values, goals and 
preferences and, finally, professionals implement those choices using treatments and medical 
technology as means to the patient’s chosen end. However, this oversimplifies not only medical 
knowledge – mirroring my conclusions in Chapter Two regarding the narrative absence of 
uncertainty on the part of healthcare practitioners – but also presumes a direct relationship between 
treatment, as the means, and a patient’s goals as the ends, eliding the possibility of unexpected or 
unintended effects. These effects are then considered ‘complications,’ rather than matter of course 
when dealing with unpredictable bodies. Furthermore, treatments are activated by the moment of 
choice; the moment of choice is presumed to occur before treatment begins, everything else 
follows from that choice, overlooking all the interventions in a patient’s life (as well as those of 
any loved ones) before treatment ‘officially’ begins. Overall, Mol contends that the logic of choice 
does not translate well into healthcare settings, especially in cases of chronic illnesses like diabetes, 
which is the focus of her study, as living with a disease is a complex, necessarily uncertain and 
ongoing process.  
In contrast, Mol articulates the logic of care which she sees at work in some doctoring 
practices. The logic of care takes caring for patients to be a process, beginning from a view of 
patients as embedded in collectives – which is to say, in various networks – and accounting for the 
varied, daily practices of life with chronic disease. Rather than privileging the moment of choice, 
in which a patient decides their goals and permits doctors to enact treatments to get them there, 
care is an ongoing process, not a bounded-transaction or a contract. The central question of a care-
centered approach is ‘Do the actions and reactions of the actors involved in caring fit with one 
another and work to better the patient’s life?’ Rather than a concern with who has the authority to 
make decisions, as articulated in concerns over patient autonomy, doctoring founded on the logic 
 115 
of care enables different members of the care team – which, importantly, includes the patient 
themselves – to engage in caring practices as needed: “[T]he main emphasis is not on autonomy 
and the right to decide for oneself, but on daily life practices and the attempts to make these more 
livable through inventive doctoring” (p. 84). Additionally, good care recognizes that the facts of 
medicine are never value-free – and do not necessarily precede decision-making nor action – and 
especially not so when addressed to patients. It is not only pancreatic cancer in general that matters, 
but it is the cancerous growths within this patient’s pancreas, how that impacts their life, identities, 
relationships, future and so on. The relevant facts depend upon what can be done to better this 
particular patient’s life. By asking, “what can be achieved in practice?” (p. 51), the logic of care 
begins with the life of a specific patient, considers a range of possible parameters as goals, 
incorporates as many actors as necessary and encourages inventive doctoring in order to improve 
the patient’s life.  
We can extend Mol’s discussion of logics in healthcare settings to consider the articulation 
of those logics in narrativizing healthcare situations. A logic “carries a whole world with it,” as 
Mol writes about the ideal of choice: “a specific mode of organizing action and interaction; of 
understanding bodies, people and daily life; of dealing with knowledge and technologies; of 
distinguishing between good and bad; and so on” (p. 7). We could add to this a particular mode of 
narrativizing: ways of discursively presenting action, actors, interactions, bodies, choices, etc. 
Within healthcare, the logic of choice shapes knowledge, perceptions of the body, relationships 
between people and between objects, actions, reactions, aesthetics, ethics, and so on, organizing 
them into the rational and irrational, the good and bad. The logic through which it is approached 
shapes how a medical situation is perceived, responded to and, importantly, talked about, which 
further impacts how future situations are perceived and responded to. Most of the practitioner 
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narratives about patient deaths reflect and perpetuate the logic of choice, thus reflecting, shaping 
and perpetuating particular standards for evaluating the good from the bad, the desirable death 
from the undesirable.  
In addition, though, perceptions of good versus bad dying is also shaped by the narrative 
itself. The dying person co-constructs a good death with loved ones and healthcare practitioners 
while they are alive, however it is the surviving members of their social and medical networks who 
tell the story of the death – who reflect on, construct the meanings of, fit together into a cohesive 
whole, and so on – after the fact. And how these stories are told matter in perceptions of the death. 
For example, Brown’s (2015, Oct.) piece “Finding the Meaning of Death in the Concert Hall,” 
discussed in the previous chapter as an example of a narrative in which the patient is able to shape 
end of life treatment, makes this point quite clearly. Brown recounts the difficult death of one of 
her hospice patients, a memory that was “unresolved,” as she put it, one she hadn’t come to terms 
with; the patient wanted to die at home, however they were unable to control his symptoms and 
eventually decided to transfer him to the hospital. In the meantime, the patient was suffering 
through an ugly, painful death while they waited for an ambulance to navigate icy winter streets. 
The memory of this patient’s death is unresolved until Brown is able to reframe it by focusing not 
on the patient himself – his pain and suffering and her helplessness to alleviate it – but on the 
“feeling of love in the room” from the whole family, including the dog. Shifting her focus away 
from the dying individual, and the choices he made that she was not able to honor, and toward the 
family instead enabled Brown to tell a different story. Which is to say, focusing on the family as a 
whole, how they acted in his best interests to the best of their ability and maintained their familial 
relations throughout, rather than on the failure to honor the individual’s choice, allowed Brown to 
re-narrativize this death. Through this reframing after the fact, Brown shifts this story from being 
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a bad, unresolved death to an, at least, good enough death. Brown’s ability to narratively de-center 
the patient is what allowed this to become a narrative of a good death. This retelling opens the 
possibility for understanding end of life otherwise and for shaping approaches to future end of life 
situations. 
A good death is thus both about what happens in the time leading up to death and how the 
story is conceived of and told afterwards. The logic through which these stories are narrativized 
reflects both narrative decisions made by the doctor-author, as well as, presumably, the logic 
through which the medical situation itself was approached. Overall, as with many of the other 
narratives I analyze, Brown’s narrative is told through the logic of choice, though she gestures 
toward the logic of care in expressing her dissatisfaction with the story she is initially able to tell 
through the ideal of choice. Even while narrativized through the logic of choice, many of the stories 
expose the limits of that logic and the risk of foreclosing care inherent within that approach.  
It is part of my argument in this chapter that changes in how end of life is narrativized can 
impact our perceptions of end of life, as well as our standards of judgment with regard to death 
and dying, and of what it takes to create the conditions of possibility for good dying. Which is to 
say, if, as I argue in Chapter One, one of the collective goals of these narratives is to advocate for 
‘well-timed dying’ – a good fit between the life and the death of the dying person, or, to state it 
with a slightly different focus, between the biological and social deaths of the dying person – 
narratives that can’t account for the historical life of the person, that cut dying people off from the 
social networks that make up their social lives and that are responsible for the completing the dying 
person’s narrative, won’t help people achieve that end. Rereading these narratives through the lens 
of choice versus care shows a different version of the good death, one which accounts for both the 
material and the narrative conditions under which a person dies. 
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As we’ll see in more detail below, end of life as narrativized through the logic of choice 
emphasizes elements similar to the ones Mol found in her direct observations of diabetes 
treatments and discourses: the patient as autonomous individual and decider, the moment of choice 
as the agentive moment in medical practice, the healthcare practitioner as the one who dispenses 
(theoretically) value-free medical information, proposes possible plans of action – based on patient 
condition, wishes, values and so on – and enacts those wishes. In general, within the logic of 
choice, the good death looks like what I already discussed in Chapter Two. The dying person 
defines their own end of life wishes and, insofar as is possible, those wishes are followed, resulting 
in deaths that are in keeping with who the dying person was. The patient retains agency as long as 
they are able – and even longer with the help of advance care planning – and side effects and 
negative symptoms are minimized, ideally through the choice of comfort care (as opposed to 
highly invasive curative treatments), so that the social needs of the dying person and their loved 
ones can be met. In these narratives, the choice between low or high medical intervention – 
between curative and comfort care – is the decisive moment.  
However, as noted in Chapter Two, the situation isn’t always so simple. In addition to the 
people who are narrativized as having made ‘bad’ choices and end up with bad deaths as a result, 
or vice versa, there are some people who don’t quite fit the neat breakdown between bad and good 
deaths – most often people who made the ‘right’ decisions but didn’t have the anticipated outcomes 
or, on the other hand, people who made the ‘wrong’ choices to good outcomes. What we see in 
this dominant narrative vision, then, is an ideal of the good death that hinges on patients (or 
proxies) making the right decision at the right time in order to create space for a fitting and 
meaningful death. While there are exceptions, the majority of these stories effectively place 
responsibility for constructing a good death on the dying person themselves. Rereading these 
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narratives through the logic of care, however, gives us a view of good dying which is an ongoing 
process co-constructed by various actors, illuminating the extent to which the logic of choice more 
often functions as a barrier to good dying.  
Narrativized from within the logic of care, good dying is about the end of the historical life 
of a person, about ending a person’s story in such a way that fits with the rest of their lives and 
that their surviving loved ones, and healthcare team, understand it as a good death after the fact. 
When we talk about whether or not a person’s death was in keeping with their life – whether or 
not their wishes were honored, whether or not they maintained their social roles and so on – what 
we are really talking about is the ending of the dying person’s story. Which is to say, insofar as 
the self is an ongoing project in both the neoliberal, control society, self-governance sense (see 
Deleuze, 1992; Rose, 2007) and in the sense of the continual narrative construction of self (see 
Linde, 1993), then a person’s death is of special importance as the ending of that project. Gawande 
reminds us that dying people want the chance to continue working on those projects, to continue 
to influence their story, even as they are faced with increasing dependence (p. 146). It is up to 
others in the dying person’s social and medical networks, then, to facilitate that work and perhaps 
even to take it on when the dying person is no longer able.34 Thus, the responsibility of ending the 
dying person’s story falls upon both the dying person and the loved ones they leave behind.35 The 
dying person and members of the person’s care networks are jointly responsible for that ending as, 
at end of life, the dying person’s projects – including their role in their own care – and their legacy 
 
34 For a particularly striking example of this, see the story of Adam Warner whose wife, Meghan Baker, was diagnosed 
with breast cancer approximately one year after they began dating and died the following year, one month after they 
were married. Following her death, Adam took over Meghan’s blog, where she had chronicled her experiences with 
breast cancer, as well as the list of goals she wanted to complete before she died. Adam writes “Because of Meghan 
and for Meghan I am finishing her list of goals. … my underlying purpose through all of this is to complete what 
Meghan couldn’t … My hope is to tell her story and spread her message of love and inspiration...” (Warner, 2010). 
35 See also Lingis (2000) ‘To Die With Others’ 
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are increasingly distributed among their social and medical networks. What that distribution looks 
like differs on the logic on which treatments, doctoring and caring practices are founded, and 
through which the stories are narrativized. But agency at end of life is always networked.   
When approached through the logic of care, the good death is not primarily dependent upon 
the specific choices an individual does or does not make. Rather, good dying is dependent upon 
the attunement of the dying person’s care – including the actions of patient themselves, loved ones 
and practitioners, treatments, medical technologies, medicines and everything else that intervenes 
in and shapes the dying person’s life – to the historical life of the dying person, and the attunements 
of those caring practices to each other. Reconsidering these narratives through Mol’s framework 
of choice versus care reveals that what matters most in shaping the conditions of possibility for 
good dying is the enabling of caring practices that allow the dying person and their social or 
medical networks to co-construct a meaningful death in keeping with the dying person’s life. 
Insofar as these narratives both reflect and shape how the good death is understood – that is how 
a death is evaluated – and how future patients and loved ones may approach end of life situations, 
the logic through which end of life narratives are told and are read is of particular importance.  
Narratives that center primarily on individual decision-making and courses of treatment 
chosen don’t seek to shift public discourse or understandings of the good death toward distributed 
agency in caring practices. Instead they perpetuate the myth of the autonomous individual in the 
face of death making the right decision at the right time in order to construct a meaningful death. 
End of life narratives told through the logic of choice perpetuate the idea that it is primarily up to 
the individual to align their biological and social deaths – the material conditions under which they 
die and the fit with their life story – whereas those told through the logic of care highlight that the 
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work of dying is shared and it is the coordinated actions of many actors within the broader caring 
network that enables good dying.  
4.2 Part Two: Logic of Choice in End of Life Narratives 
Mol talks specifically about diabetes but calls for approaching other healthcare situations 
through the logic of care (pp. 90-91). Following this, I extend Mol’s framework to consider the 
roles of the logic of choice and the logic of care in healthcare practitioner’s narrativization of end 
of life and depictions of good versus bad deaths in particular. Here, I reconsider in detail four 
narratives from my archive that, generally, display the logic of choice approach to healthcare 
situations, in which the patient is the autonomous individual and decider, the moment of choice is 
the moment of agency and the practitioner is, typically, rendered narratively passive. Revisiting 
these narratives allows us to flesh out some of the implications of the constructions of the good 
death discussed in Chapter Two and provides an opportunity to consider how this 
conceptualization could be shifted and to what end. I consider the narrative constructions of 
patient, the act of decision-making and practitioners in turn, before turning to the narrativized logic 
of care in Part Three. 
4.2.1 Patient as Autonomous Individual  
Within the logic of choice, the dying person is approached first and foremost as an 
autonomous individual who – barring any evidence to the contrary – is capable of rational decision-
making with regard to their health. In the event that they are unable to actively decide at some 
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future point in time, the individual is still the decider, even if it is a matter of their proxy or other 
member of their social network being asked to guess what the patient ‘would have wanted;’ the 
ideal, though, is to have an advance directive that reduces future uncertainty by detailing the 
patient’s wishes. Advocacy for advance directives, and other advance care planning, is typically 
articulated through the logic of choice. In general, advance directives are an attempt to assert 
control over future situations in which one wouldn’t otherwise be able to exercise that control. 
Many have noted that advance directives should be treated more as conversation starters, a way 
for loved ones to have some idea of your values and what you as a patient would want in possible 
future circumstances. In either case, though, the patient is asked to consider in advance a general 
approach to future treatments based on their goals, values and/or wishes, fill out and make 
available the proper paperwork documenting these wishes or at least speak with loved ones and/or 
doctors about them. Zitter’s (2015, Feb.) narrative of Vincent – a “frequent flier” in Zitter’s ICU 
primarily because of his advance directive, which made absolutely clear that he wanted everything 
done to keep him alive as long as possible – narrativizes this autonomy and its potential impacts 
quite clearly.  
The narrativized logic of choice emphasizes that courses of treatment are the individual’s 
choice.  Despite no longer being “with us,” Vincent was approached, first and foremost, as an 
autonomous individual and, thus, primary decision-maker. As an autonomous individual, 
Vincent’s choices ten years prior in his advance directive became the guide for his treatment. Zitter 
observes that most advance directives from nursing homes are “cookie-cutter similar,” as 
Vincent’s was except for the handwritten note reiterating he wanted absolutely everything done to 
keep him alive. The majority of these directives state that they want all measures taken to prolong 
their lives. Advance directives are signed by two people, in these cases typically the admissions 
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clerk and social worker and “Almost never the physician,” Zitter states. In this way, Vincent’s 
situation potentially failed to meet even the ideals of the logic of choice, in which a doctor talks 
the patient through diagnoses, prognosis, treatment options and the patient’s goals and values, so 
that they can make an informed decision in keeping with their individual life. Additionally, 
advance directives should ideally be revisited regularly, and especially whenever one’s medical 
situation changes, to confirm that the directive still match the patient’s wishes. As noted, Vincent’s 
advance directive had not been updated in ten years. Zitter points out these shortcomings and, yet, 
Vincent’s choice, documented in the advance directive, guides his treatment. 
At same time that the patient’s choice is emphasized, the agency of the practitioners is 
deemphasized. In Zitter’s narrative, the practitioners caring for Vincent seem to exist solely to 
enact the patient’s decisions and are not depicted as actors themselves. Vincent was admitted the 
first couple times for septic shock resulting from pneumonia caused by coughing food into his 
lungs. In order to address this recurrent issue, surgeons inserted a feeding tube into Vincent’s 
stomach, but that only made matters worse and did not actually solve the problem of food in his 
lungs.  From that initial action by surgeons, Zitter writes, “More tubes sprouted,” seemingly of 
their own accord. The tubes “sprout” in response to the decisions Vincent made ten years ago, not 
in response to the decisions and actions of the practitioners actually inserting them. In the name of 
patient autonomy, then, Vincent became a carrier for various tubes – a stomach tube for feeding, 
a neck tube for breathing and a bladder tube to avoid urinary tract infections – and a host to 
antibiotic resistant bacteria. Narratively, Vincent’s relationship to his own body and the relations 
between him and his medical care team were produced by choices that Vincent himself made “a 
life time ago,” rather than by the actions and decisions of his care team.  
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The act of deciding a course of treatment – or, in this case, a general orientation to treatment 
(i.e. curative care) – is the agentive moment in the narrativized logic of choice. Vincent’s situation 
causes Zitter to question medicine’s “blind faith” in patient autonomy. She instead considers that 
perhaps some patients shouldn’t be in charge of their own care, as she doesn’t imagine that Vincent 
could possibly have known what he was setting himself up for. In the narrative, though, there is 
no indication that the cause of Vincent’s ending could lie anywhere other than Vincent himself – 
even though by her own admission he probably didn’t know what he was really choosing – or in 
the medical institution’s conception of patient autonomy. Which is to say, Vincent suffered as he 
did either because he made a bad choice ten years earlier or because the medical institution 
privileged that choice. Either way, it was that choice that produced these results. That Vincent had 
a prolonged, gruesome death was narratively not the fault of the individual practitioners because 
they aren’t granted narrative agency. In questioning the ideal of patient autonomy, Zitter is 
gesturing beyond the logic of choice but does not seem to have an alternate framework through 
which to narratively construct her relationship to the patient. And so, either the patient (or proxy) 
chooses and doctors enact those choices or the practitioners choose for them. Either way, it is the 
act of decision-making that matters in end of life care.  
To be clear, Vincent did not necessarily suffer a bad death because his treatment was 
approached through the logic of choice. Rather, as discussed in Chapter Two, it was a bad death 
because the specific choice(s) he and his healthcare providers made resulted in pain, a prolonged 
death and a series of futile treatments which isolated and dehumanized him, turning his physicians 
into “medical vending machines.” Narrativized through the logic of choice, fault lies with Vincent 
for making bad choices or with the medical institution for allowing him to make those decisions, 
eliding other possible sources of responsibility. The logic of choice does not invite readers to view 
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the situation otherwise. However, that his ending was not altered by anyone ostensibly caring for 
him, was a result of the logic of choice dominating the relationships between Vincent, his 
treatment, the medical institution, doctors, his nursing home and so on.  Which is to say, Vincent’s 
death is narrativized as it was because the logic of choice privileges the moment of choice as the 
moment of agency, while at the same time constraining what counts as a ‘choice’ and who is 
empowered to make them. 
In the narrativization of the logic of choice the practitioner-patient relationships are 
constrained such that the practitioner is not able to fully take responsibility for the dying person. 
Within Zitter’s narrative, Vincent, as an autonomous individual, is severed from potential networks 
of care – namely individuals and possible processes or procedures at both the nursing home and 
the hospital – by the inherent values of the logic of choice. If Vincent had someone in his life who 
was seen as capable of intervening on his behalf he may have been spared. Zitter puts it very 
simply: “there was no family, no friend, no person from Vincent’s life to serve as a guide for our 
treatment goals.” Thus, Vincent was narratively “abandoned” – cut off from particular elements 
of his networks – and approached as a patient without an agentive network. However, Vincent 
lived in a nursing home just down the street from the hospital, presumably staffed with caregivers 
and social workers, yet there was no one in his life who could speak for him. His advance directive 
was witnessed by the admissions clerk and a social worker from the home, and still there was no 
one authorized to intervene on his behalf, who could make treatment decisions for him, either 
overruling or confirming his stated wishes. On his eight visits to the ICU before Zitter took over 
his case, Vincent was treated by practitioners who were oriented toward the task of his treatment 
by institutional structures and medical knowledge, granted authority to enact particular procedures 
and processes in pursuit of that goal, but none of whom were able to guide his treatment. So, while 
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Vincent was certainly embedded in networks of humans and bureaucratic procedures at the nursing 
home and the hospital, he was also isolated, cut off from these networks – or rather these 
individuals were constrained in their relations to him and thus he was approached first and 
foremost as an autonomous individual. While it is elided in the narrative, inherent in this is that he 
was approached by someone, by his healthcare providers and by the institutions that were caring 
for him, backed up by the various arrangements that make treatment possible, and who were 
making ongoing decisions about his treatment. 
The logic of choice frames the relationships between patient and other human actors such 
that loved ones, as possible proxies or next of kin, are empowered to make decisions for the patient 
and healthcare providers or institutions are prevented from doing so, except in the most extreme 
circumstances. Agency at end of life is always distributed across networks, but practitioners are 
narratively – and presumably otherwise – constrained in their capacity to act for and with their 
patients. This is not to say that practitioners do not take responsibility for their patients. It is to say, 
though, that some members of a patient’s networks are granted agency to act on their behalf 
(typically loved ones), while in other situations a patient is simply a node in more general processes 
that are merely interrupted or activated. Vincent’s advanced directive and medical condition 
activated a certain set of procedures within Zitter’s ICU – founded on the logic of choice – that led 
to disastrous results for Vincent and dehumanized the people treating him.  
In sum, Vincent’s narrative should not be read primarily as a case of medical intervention 
gone awry, though it certainly is also that. Rather, it should be understood as a case of individual 
autonomy gone awry. Zitter points us toward this failing by questioning the “blind faith in patient 
autonomy” but, as mentioned earlier, she does not seem to have an alternative framework through 
which to understand the role of the patient and the relationships between practitioner and patient. 
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Thus, Vincent is approached as an autonomous individual who simply lacks a network. But this 
shouldn’t necessarily be an issue in the logic of choice, which intentionally approaches patients 
first and foremost as autonomous individuals. Even as end of life is narratively constructed through 
the logic of choice and even when the agency of any other actors is narratively erased, elements of 
the narratives themselves expose that the patient isn’t, couldn’t possibly be, the only or even the 
primary agent. The logic of choice is founded on an ideology of individual decision-making but 
always, more or less secretly, relies upon networks of actors assisting in healing, treating and 
dying.36  
It is worth underscoring that end of life is a time of increasing dependence for most people. 
The image of the dying individual as primary decision-maker shaping their death in accord with 
their wishes, even if they are unable to directly communicate them, emphasizes autonomy, self-
control and self-discipline in a context that necessarily exposes the fundamental limits of the ideal 
of the autonomous individual. This is one attempt to capture the ending of life from that 
dependence, from those limits. Within the logic of choice, the autonomous individual remains 
autonomous even in the face of death, in the face of increasing dependence and in situations where 
others have to decide what courses of action to take. Even in those situations where the patient can 
decide, they still require others to act on their behalf, to act with, within and for them. The limits 
of the ideal of the autonomous individual are exposed by the execution of those choices that 
necessarily call upon networked, rather than individual, action. Agency at end of life is always 
networked; the crisis comes with the narrative foreclosing of those networks and the failure to 
understand the dispersal of responsibility in bringing a person’s life to a close.  
 
36 Similarly, as Gil Eval (2013) argues, the expertise of doctors, and that of experts in other fields, is made possible 
by a range of ‘background practices’ and “the social, material, spatial, organizational, and conceptual arrangements 
that serve as its conditions of possibility” (p. 871).  
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In contrast to this narrative, it might be fruitful to briefly consider the story of Ms. 
Weatherby (Gross, 2015). As discussed in detail in Chapter Two, Ms. Weatherby knew she was 
never leaving the hospital but opted for life sustaining treatment as comfort care in order to gain 
more time to repair relationships within her family before she died. This death is narrativized as a 
good death and points palliative care specialist and author, Gross, to consider that curative 
treatments and comfort care shouldn’t be treated as two distinct categories; in other words, she 
realizes that treatment can be caring. Ms. Weatherby is an ideal patient within the logic of choice 
because she knows exactly what she wants and is willing to do whatever it takes to get there. She 
is the idealized agentive patient, self-disciplined and self-controlled even as her body is 
increasingly out of her control; she is the center of her social network and narratively she maintains 
and directs those ties. She displays remarkable self-awareness in her ability to clarify and reiterate 
her wishes and, with help from Gross, determination in sticking with them in the face of push-back 
from conventional medical wisdom. However, this story is only narrativized as a good death 
because of her apparently singular personality and strength of will. Ms. Weatherby creates her own 
good death against the odds. It is only because she is able to defy the odds and expectations that 
Ms. Weatherby is able to make the most of the logic of choice and shapes a good death by 
extending her life to continue her work herself. This narrative demonstrates the faultiness of the 
ideal of choice at end of life: most will not be so lucky as Ms. Weatherby. Even this good death, 
largely narrativized through the logic of choice, points the author away from that logic and the 
neat division of the choice between curative treatments and comfort care, in particular.   
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4.2.2 Moment of Choice as Agentive Moment  
As seen in Vincent’s narrative, in the narrativization of medical practices it is the decision, 
the moment of choice, that activates and authorizes all the actions that come after. Treatment thus 
cannot begin until after the patient or their proxy reaches a decision about how to proceed. Even 
when the decision-making of practitioners is narrativized, their agency is narratively erased and 
they are not portrayed as decision-makers. In ‘The I.C.U. is not a Pause Button,’ McConnell 
(2015), an ICU nurse, recounts the experiences of caring for an unnamed elderly man who was 
weak and unwell, not “rising to the challenge to consciousness and physical independence,” 
primarily due to a lack of oxygen. The patient and ICU team are awaiting a decision from the 
patient’s proxy about whether to change his status to ‘do not resuscitate / do no intubate’ but the 
family is unable to decide. The patient had been on a ventilator but it was removed once his 
condition became stable. However, his oxygen levels did not improve, so the ICU team switched 
him to continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP), which pushes oxygen into the lungs through 
a mask. The CPAP is not designed for an unconscious patient who is unable to pull the mask off 
as needed, however. If, for example, he vomited with the mask on, the CPAP would push the vomit 
into his lungs along with air. The ICU team were avoiding using the CPAP because it didn’t fit his 
specific situation but he wasn’t getting enough oxygen on his own. In this case, the patient’s nurses 
and doctors are making a range of decisions about his care, however those decisions are not 
articulated as decisions in logic of choice-based narratives. The logic of choice privileges some 
choices over others – the decision to continue life support and/or curative treatment or to transition 
to comfort care, in particular – which covers over the fact that many decisions are being made all 
the time in support of patient’s lives and deaths. 
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The idea that medical treatment ‘pauses’ to await one particular decision from patient (or 
proxy) stems from a view of treatment as a bounded transaction that occurs in response to moments 
of choice and that understands the choice between curative treatment and comfort measures as a 
strong bifurcation.  As stated, the patient’s family knows of his condition and is waiting to decide 
what to do. According to McConnell, they seem to view the situation as being ‘on pause,’ which, 
she points out, of course it is not:  
The patient was living through these hours and days, mask on, mask off, a feeding tube in 
his nose, IVs in his arms, having his dry mouth sponged, his throat suctioned, defecating 
and being cleaned up. He was alive, and while he wasn’t in pain, he wasn’t passing the 
time pleasantly. 
While narratively erased, his care team is actively making decisions and enacting these life support 
treatments and daily care. Despite this, because the end of life decision (when to stop treatment) 
has not happened yet, the situation is registered ideologically – and narratively – as ‘nothing 
happening,’ by those not present at least.  
Furthermore, the actions and reactions of the patient in response to and as active partners 
in their treatment are narratively erased by the primacy of the moment of choice as well. The 
narrativized logic of choice does not account for the body of the patient as agentive in the broader 
network. Even in this case, while the patient is unresponsive, his body is still active and reacting 
to treatment. On some level, he is an active as well as a passive part of the treatments. It is worth 
quoting McConnell at length on this point:  
It is harder to believe in this pause button when you witness the constant poking and 
suctioning, the invasive examining and monitoring, the parade of medications and the 
contraptions necessary to deliver them, the lights and alarms, the coughing and grimacing 
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and shuddering – or, in the less responsive, the bloating and stiffening or slackening and 
eventually the eerie dehumanization of both the patient and the caregiver. Thinking that 
intensive care can pause the march of time is a misunderstanding or willful fantasy. There 
are always bargains to be made and discomforts to be faced in a place that is staving off 
death.  
Witnessing these medical practices, it is impossible to believe that treatment, and life support in 
particular, is a bounded transaction. Healthcare providers are continually acting on their patients 
and patients are continually acting and reacting in response to their embodied conditions, to 
treatments and to the impact treatments have on their lives and beings. Even unresponsive patients 
respond to those treatments as healthcare providers act within and on them, and the monitors, lights 
and alarms react to and mediate the patient’s responses. In the absence of a specific order from 
patient, proxy or doctor to limit treatment, this process “will continue indefinitely, regardless of 
the anticipated outcome in quality of life.” Additionally, according to McConnell’s narrative at 
least, the family seems to believe that their responsibilities are limited to choosing a course of 
treatment. The humanity of everyone involved is eventually subordinated to the pursuit of 
prolonging a life. Patient and healthcare providers are dehumanized but the machines continue 
unphased, while the family deliberates over their (perceived) one moment of action. In this way, 
medical interventions intervene in not only our bodies, but also who we are and in our humanity, 
in our being in the world. 
The monitors and machines that represent the status of the patient are relied upon to tell us 
whether or not the choice – or the default of prolonging life in situations where we act as though a 
decision has not yet been reached – is being honored. As others have noted, in the ICU in particular, 
a patient is often approached first and foremost through the range machines which monitor and 
 132 
support vital functions (see Butler, 2013, p. 79). It is the readings on the monitors that guide the 
care a patient receives; the living person can fade into the background. McConnell calls attention 
to this through an anecdote of an interaction with another nurse: “Another nurse walking by put it 
bluntly, as nurses tend to do. “Is he alive?” Of course he was alive. We could both see the safe 
numbers and steady weaves marching across the monitor.” According to the information available 
on their monitors, both nurses can clearly see that the patient is alive, but that sense of ‘alive’ 
means something different; that isn’t what this question is about. The physical body represented 
on the screens and monitors is living in a technical sense but the lived, historical life of the patient 
– into which treatments also intervene and which is of major importance in the course of ending 
that life – cannot be accurately represented. Healthcare providers are bound to those 
representations and the meanings of their actions are bound to that as well.  
This is one reason, following Mol, our issues with end of life care cannot be fixed from 
within the logic of choice. Choice cannot account for the historical life of the person, and 
furthermore, the logic of choice constrains the networks of care the person is in, as well as 
understandings of what constitutes treatment and so on. The reduction of ‘aliveness’ to 
representations on monitors prevents practices that care for the whole person. Privileging that 
‘aliveness’ constrains a patient’s caring networks.  
The final point to take away from this narrative is to reiterate that oftentimes practitioners 
are prevented from taking on a more caring role, even when they want to, by institutional 
commitment to the logic of choice. Within the ICU, and other medical institutions, the ends are 
largely set: prolong life. This is one reason the narrative bifurcation of the choice between curative 
and comfort treatment is so strong. At end of life, living longer will eventually be out of reach and 
so those parameters should be revisited. In cases where the patient is unresponsive, a proxy is 
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tasked with deciding what the goals should be. It is clear in McConnell’s narrative that she believes 
prolonging life should no longer be the goal in this case, but she doesn’t have a choice in the 
matter:  
Doctors, nurses and technicians care about our patients, but sometimes we cannot express 
our care by doing what we think is best for them. In the I.C.U., that is not our job. Our job 
is to preserve life. 
In the absence of a particular choice from patient or proxy, the decisions that McConnell, and 
others, can make are constrained by pre-established parameters. With choice as the ideal, and the 
specific choice between prolonging life or not as the most important of those choices, practitioners 
are unable to care, in Mol’s sense, which forecloses the patient from doctoring based on the logic 
of care. The risks of a bad death are multiplied by the magnification of one particular choice, made 
by a dying person or their proxy, likely in a moment of crisis. 
4.2.3 Healthcare Practitioner as Passive Actor 
As seen from the previous analyses, healthcare practitioners are typically narratively erased 
or portrayed as passive. The patient is the autonomous decider and the primary roles of the 
practitioner are to provide information, counsel the patient/proxy if necessary or if requested, and 
enact treatments in accord with patient wishes or goals. As these narratives are told from the point 
of view of the practitioner-author, we do read more of the doctors’, nurses’ or specialists’ 
motivations, thought processes and the obstacles they face in treating people at end of life: Zitter’s 
horror at Vincent’s condition, Gross acting as a champion defending Ms. Weatherby’s choices, 
McConnell’s frustration with her ICU patient’s family and the institutional barriers that prevent 
her from doing what she thinks is best, and so on. While these behind-the-scenes images of 
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healthcare practitioners are good, these stories still center on patient choice and, by and large, the 
role of the practitioner is narratively constrained by those choices. Given the tendency to 
narratively construct practitioners as agentively passive, in some ways it is easiest to see the 
narrative norms for practitioners by considering those stories where they push against those limits.  
One such example is the practitioner who goes above and beyond in their responsibility to 
the patient, typically to shape a patient’s decision in accord with what the practitioner thinks is 
right given the medical situation. A prime example of this is the story of an unnamed 29-year-old 
told by Gawande (2014, pp.185-87), who was told this patient’s story from the oncologist who 
treated the patient for inoperable brain tumors. The patient eventually opted for hospice, rather 
than pursing a third type of chemotherapy after the first two had failed. The initial conversation 
between the patient and the oncologist to make this decision took more than an hour, though, as 
the patient expected to continue curative treatment. Then the oncologist met with the patient and 
his family all together and, a few days later, individually with the patient’s father at his home to 
discuss the list of experimental trials and treatments he had found on the internet. She patiently 
went through each one with him and explained why they were not a good fit for his son’s condition. 
“The oncologist noted wryly how much easier it would have been for her just to prescribe the 
chemotherapy” (pp. 186-187), Gawande writes, but instead she was able to convince the family 
that the patient’s life was ending, that more treatment would likely make him worse and that, in 
her opinion, the best course of action was to privilege their remaining time together rather than 
continue to fight for the unlikely chance of more time in the future. The patient opted for hospice 
and, as discussed in the previous chapter the family ended up grateful for the opportunity to spend 
his last month together without the demands of curative treatment in the way.    
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While exhibiting caring practices, this narrative is still primarily told through the logic of 
choice. The oncologist is clearly narratively active and, importantly, considers not only the 
opinions and wishes of the patient but also the impacts of his loved one’s opinions and wishes on 
his decision-making; however, the focus remains on the patient’s decision. All of this activity and 
communication is ancillary to the act of deciding, which contributes to their devaluing. The 
oncologist goes above and beyond her duty to the patient in her attempts to convince him and his 
family that he was making a mistake. Importantly, the oncologist did not force him to decide one 
way or another, did not say she would not treat him, but wanted to help him make a truly informed 
decision by being frank about his condition, the treatments she had to offer and what she saw as 
the best course of action. The primary point Gawande draws from this narrative is how much time 
and energy it requires from practitioners in order for patients to make well-informed decisions. 
Again, the issue is narratively constructed as the patient’s decision-making process (ill- versus 
well-informed), practitioner communication practices (whether or not the practitioner is willing to 
be frank and to go the extra mile) and/or institutional procedures that shape the outcomes of these 
decisions (i.e. that make it “easier… just to prescribe the chemotherapy”). The emphasis remains 
on the ideal of patient decision-making and what institutions and practitioners can and should do 
in support of that. 
In addition, stories like this demonstrate that the primary issue with which the logic of 
choice is concerned – autonomy or who has control – isn’t even adequately addressed by the logic 
of choice. Doctors actively and passively influence, direct and, at times, even manipulate patient 
decisions. In treating the doctor as an expert who is bound to the patients who consume their 
services, the doctor is in the position to decide how much of what types of knowledge to disclose, 
despite the patient being the one ostensibly ‘in charge.’ 
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Narrated through the logic of care, we thus see practitioners constrained in their ability to 
assist patients at end of life. We see practitioners attempting to persuade patients and loved ones 
to choose in particular ways, as in the example above, or we see practitioners following the 
patient’s lead and offering what they think the patient wants. Gawande gives us an example of this 
in his conversations with an oncologist at his hospital, Dr. Marcoux, who treated Sara Monopoli 
(pp. 149-52). Monopoli was 34 years old and pregnant with her first child when doctors discovered 
she had advanced, non-small cell lung cancer. A few days after inducing labor and delivering a 
baby girl, Monopoli, her husband Rich and her parents met with Dr. Marcoux to discuss options. 
He proposed chemotherapy options and explained that, for some patients with similar conditions 
‘“responses [to the treatments] can be long-term”’ (Dr. Marcoux, qtd in Gawande, 2014, p. 151). 
According to Gawande, “it seemed harsh and pointless to confront” them with the fact that lung 
cancer is terminal and the median survival time is about a year – i.e. for Dr. Marcoux to clarify 
what he meant by ‘respond’ and ‘long-term.’ Monopoli went through three rounds of chemo which 
had minimal impact on the course of her disease. Even at this point, a few months later, Dr. 
Marcoux stated that the ‘signal’ he got from the family was to continue considering treatment 
options: “They did not want to talk about dying” (p. 165). Thus, Monopoli ended up pursing a 
fourth round of chemo, “And it all happened because of an assuredly normal circumstance,” writes 
Gawande, “a patient and family unready to confront the reality of her disease” (p. 167). According 
to conversations Gawande had with Rich after Sara died, while they knew there was no cure for 
her disease and Sara said she did not want to die in the hospital on multiple occasions, they never 
discussed ceasing curative treatment (pp. 165-66). Practitioners are continually making decisions 
about how to communicate with patients and loved ones, how much of what types of information 
to give and how to frame it. In this narrative, Dr. Marcoux followed the lead of patient and family, 
 137 
leaving them unprepared for the inevitable. Which is to say, Gawande narratively seems to place 
responsibility for their preparedness on the family, without directly attributing it to the choices that 
Dr. Marcoux himself made in discussing prognosis or treatment options. 
A logic of care approach within these narratives would enable us to discuss with more 
clarity how practitioners shape end of life treatments and choices, as active participants in framing 
medical knowledge and creating the conditions of possibility in which decision-making, as well as 
other medical action occurs. Narratively presenting practitioners as (to the extent they are able) 
neutral providers of information and passive enactors of treatment centers responsibility on the 
patient as decision-maker, rather than asking readers to consider how Dr. Marcoux, for example, 
contributed to their unpreparedness because of his narrative role as the provider of medical 
information. Focusing on the practitioner as an active, agentive member of the patient’s caring 
network would encourage readers to consider that possible plans of actions – the possible options 
that patients are to choose between – are not set and to acknowledge the role healthcare 
practitioners play in shaping end of life wishes, decisions and the conditions of possibility for good 
dying. It would also enable us to see more clearly that doctors, nurses and other practitioners are 
actors who require support and care themselves.  
One thing that is important to acknowledge here is that the decision of when to cease 
curative treatment is a bifurcation point in end of life decision-making, treatment and narratives. 
This decision of general approach to treatment is about the parameters the caring network should 
be reaching toward – generally speaking, toward the attempt to prolong life, privileging the future, 
or toward attempts to make a person’s life more comfortable, privileging now. The discussion of 
parameters is important in any healthcare situation, though, as discussed in Chapter Two, this 
decision at end of life is particularly fraught. However, as we saw in Gawande’s story about Ms. 
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Douglass and Gross’ (2015) narrative of Ms. Weatherby in Chapter Two, the strong division 
between cure and comfort – which is upheld narratively, in medical knowledge and by institutional 
and insurance care silos – may limit options at end of life. Furthermore, it may also constrain 
caring practices by limiting parameters to two, distinct options (cure or comfort) and shape what 
those look like, what treatments and practices are or can be involved.  
To be clear, the division between the logic of choice and the logic of care should not be 
conflated with one between life-prolongation or hospice/palliative care. Instead, the logic of choice 
presupposes a narrative in which the cogency of individual choice is the best way to understand 
and evaluate the bad or the good death. Thus, medical practitioners offer the individual actor the 
choice between curative treatment options or the choice to cease curative care. The logic of care 
insists that there is not a cogent, individual narrative to be had there, as agency at end of life is 
networked and it is the attunement of action across that network that helps shape the conditions of 
possibility for good dying. Within narratives told through the logic of choice, the patient is given 
a choice between attempting to live longer or not; practitioners shape when that choice is offered 
and what practices those choices entail, despite narratively constructing that choice as the 
responsibility of the patient. It is something of a false choice though. When faced with terminal or 
life limiting illnesses, inevitably the goal of living longer will eventually be out of reach; a patient’s 
choice may have nothing to do with it. As we’ll see in the next section, narratives told through the 
logic of care begin with the embodied condition of the dying person and, to the extent possible, 
account for the historical life of the person and ask what can be done, by which actors, to improve 
this person’s life, however long that may be. 
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4.3 Logic of Care in End of Life Narratives 
There is only one narrative in my archive that seems to be narrated through the logic of 
care: the story Friedrichsdorf (2015), a physician at a pediatric hospital in Minnesota, tells of Ethan 
Butler’s death. Ethan suffered from a congenital heart defect and a rare complication from surgery 
ten days after he was born resulted in a stroke, required him to be on a ventilator and left him 
subject to seizures, with limited brain function. There were no available curative treatments; Ethan 
was expected to live the rest of his life on the vent. Friedrichsdorf and his team from the department 
of pain medicine, palliative care and integrative medicine were invited in to meet with Ethan’s 
family.  
Within the narrativized logic of care, medical practitioners approach patient and their loved 
ones as active members of the patient’s caring network. Friedrichsdorf and the palliative care team 
ask the family “Just in case the miracle does not happen, what else are you hoping for?” Rather 
than presenting the prognosis and asking what the family wants to do, the palliative care team in 
this narrative assert their active roles in his care, ask how they can help and what are the next steps 
they can take together, rather than delivering bad news and laying out treatment options. By tabling 
hope for a miracle to begin with, the medical team positions themselves as part of Ethan’s care 
network and on the same side as the family. They do not dismiss the desire for a miracle – indeed 
by bringing it up, it seems they share it – but suggest that there may be more to be done to improve 
Ethan’s life than wait for one.  
It is worth noting here that Gross asks a similar question of Ms. Weatherby and her other 
hospice patients: “If I had a magic wand, what would you wish for today?” These types of open-
ended questions – that, importantly, don’t center on medical treatment while still creating space 
for patients to discuss treatment issues if they wish – narratively give patients and/or loved ones 
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space to consider their concrete goals and wishes in that moment. This allows the care team, 
including the patient, to assess and, hopefully, address the patient’s needs, positioning them to 
actively improve the life of the patient.  
Choices are still a part of narratives told through the logic of care but the moment of choice 
is not the only moment or even the primary moment of action. This narrative hinges on a decision, 
as with many narratives told through the logic of choice, however it is a decision that the family 
and the medical team make together in order to give Ethan the best life possible. The family 
responds to Friedrichsdorf’s question that they don’t want Ethan to spend his entire life on the 
vent. As a result of this decision, Ethan’s familial and medical networks come up with and enact a 
plan for him to live as long and as well as possible. They remove the vent, manage his symptoms 
and take him outside in an attempt to facilitate good dying: to let Ethan see the sun for the first 
time and die outside with his family around him. Unexpectedly, Ethan survives. His breathing 
stabilizes and he is able to go home a few days later. The initial decision to remove the vent enables 
the rest of the narrative but it is not the only moment of action in the narrative: doctors act to ease 
Ethan’s symptoms, palliative care staff members make home visits, the family learns to care for 
Ethan, form memories with him and so on. 
Even after leaving the hospital, Ethan is still narratively embedded in social and medical 
networks of care, as the palliative care team visits the home daily at first, and then less frequently 
over time as the family is increasingly able to care for him on their own. The palliative care team 
supports Ethan and his family, teaching them how to care for him physically but also encouraging 
them to treat him “like any other baby.” In this way, the palliative care team and his family are 
actively engaged in Ethan’s care and they are all actively responsible for his life and its ending.  
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Narrativized through the logic of care, the necessity of ending the dying person’s story 
comes to the foreground. As discussed in Chapter Two, this narrative emphasizes the importance 
of the family creating memories with Ethan, of living out their roles as Ethan’s mother, father, 
sister and family while they are able. Additionally, his family, and his mother in particular, are 
well attuned to his physical condition and possibly able to sense that his death was nearing, giving 
opportunity to facilitate the good dying they hoped for: “He was looking a little gray and they had 
a feeling the end was near. By the [water]falls, under the sun in his mother’s arms, Ethan looked 
up into her eyes and took his last breath.” Ethan’s medical and social networks are thus responsible 
not only for caring for Ethan at the end of his life, seeing to his day to day needs, but they are also 
responsible for his legacy, for ending his story by forming memories with him that they themselves 
carry into the future and which become part of their own life stories.  
That this narrative is about an infant, a patient who is too young to have a fully developed 
sense of self or agency, is telling. Ethan’s care is, by necessity, already understood to be networked 
and the narrative can emphasize those networks because there isn’t an autonomous, agentive 
patient to be the decision-maker. Ethan is incompatible with the logic of choice; even more so than 
an incompetent or incapacitated adult, because he doesn’t have motives to speculate on or a fully 
formed identity beyond that which is projected onto him. Read through the logic of choice on the 
one hand, this simplifies the question of ‘who is in charge’ because there is one less (agentive) 
actor. Through the logic of care, on the other hand, we see that Ethan’s age forces proxies, loved 
ones and healthcare practitioners to stop acting as though the patient is fully autonomous; we 
literally cannot imagine that his network could not be activated by his condition or involved in his 
care. 
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To be clear, I am not saying that Ethan is the ideal patient within the logic of care, nor that 
we should treat dying people like infants or narratively infantilize them. I am saying, though, that 
it is not a coincidence that the one narrative in my archive that is told primarily through the logic 
of care features an infant. Ethan’s social positioning and his (lack of) agency means that he falls 
outside the logic of choice and, thus, responsibility for his care and for ending his life falls directly 
on his caring networks. It is Ethan’s social positioning and his agency that allows the doctor-author 
to narrate this death through the logic of care, in which care is an ongoing process, the work of 
which is distributed across social and medical networks, and the primary question is “what can be 
done in practice to better this person’s life?” Ethan’s narrative is instructive because it shows how 
dying could be narrativized.  
This narrative also emphasizes loved ones and medical practitioners, who will typically 
take on an increased role in any end of life situation. Ethan was too young for us to get his 
perspective. But we never get a final perspective from any dying person (see Lingis, 2000) and, 
statistically at least, the majority of dying people will lose the ability to make decisions and act as 
agents of their own care in the process of dying. From the perspective of the dying person, if they 
are aware they are dying, good dying is about the time they live as a dying person, their imagined 
ending and the imagined futures of the people they leave behind. To loved ones and healthcare 
practitioners, good dying is about that and also the actual ending of the dying person – the time 
after the patient loses consciousness, the moment of death, the memories they carry about the 
person’s death and of their life. Ending the dying person’s story becomes an element of the loved 
one’s story; the dying person’s projects – their hopes, fears, wishes, plans and responsibilities – 
and their legacy are extended and diffused across their networks. Ethan shows us this quite clearly 
by being something off an outlier. The death of this 4-month-old child is narrativized as a good 
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death because his family shared the responsibility for his life, identity and projects. He lived as 
their son and brother; they formed memories with him; they cared for him physically and socially. 
This narrative enables us to see them clearly as his legacy.  
Thus, we can see that end of life as narrativized through the logic of care would shift 
conceptualization of the good death to emphasize the historical life of the patient and the caring 
practices distributed across the patient’s caring networks that work to improve the dying person’s 
life and bring their story to a close. Good dying, in the logic of care, is facilitated by the attunement 
of those various practices with one another and with the life of the person. The logic of choice, on 
the other hand, narrativizes the good death as the result of individual decision-making and, in this 
focus on the autonomous individual, can actually foreclose caring practices by narratively cutting 
dying people off from their caring networks, which are crucial in the work of dying. 
Following Mol, the logic on which end of life treatments, doctoring and narratives are 
founded shape how a person dies in practice and, from the present analysis, the perceived fit 
between their life and their death, insofar as that logic and the stories that are told from a particular 
death shape how a death is perceived. Insofar as the narrativized logic of choice does not easily 
account for the historical life of the person – in reducing the moment of agency to a single choice 
which cannot possibly reflect that historical life – and approaches the dying person first and 
foremost as an autonomous individual – responsible for their own self-knowledge and self-control 
– the issues articulated as the medicalization, professionalization and denial of death, and through 
concerns over the timing of a person’s death, cannot be addressed adequately nor broadly through 
the logic of choice.  
As these narratives are all told for persuasive affect, to enact some type of change in how 
end of life is conceived of and approached, part of the underlying argument of this chapter, and 
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indeed the whole dissertation, is that how dying and end of life are narratively characterized has 
some impact on public discourse at least, as well as possibly individual beliefs and actions. Which 
is to say, a renewal of thinking with regard to possibilities at end of life is possible through careful 
attention to how these narratives arrive at their conclusions. These narratives contribute to 
standards of judgment with regard to death and dying, reflecting and shaping expectations, desires 
and conceptualizations of what is possible and desirable at end of life. When read through the logic 
of care, they point us toward a reconceptualization of the ways medicine is conceived of, practiced 
and institutionally organized.   
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5.0 Conclusion 
In the NYT op-ed, ‘Dying Shouldn’t be so Brutal’ (2015) – discussed in Chapter Two – Ira 
Byock, palliative care physician and author of the now classic Dying Well (1997), briefly recounts 
his experiences with a dying friend, Michael, who must choose between hospice care and 
experimental treatment as part of a Phase I clinical trial. Byock laments the policy and institutional 
structures that prevent people from dying in the ways they wish, that fail to facilitate comfort, well-
being and dignity for dying patients, stating that what we have is “brink-of-death care” not end of 
life care. “Dying is not easy,” Byock writes, “but it needn’t be this hard.” 
Byock’s article is part of an archive of contemporary discourses that collectively advocate 
for acceptance of death through arguing for well-timed dying or, stated another way, against 
unwanted and/or futile prolongation of life, which often results in ugly and painful deaths. The 
ideal of the good death – the idea that the physical effects of dying can be mitigated; psychological, 
emotional, relational and/or economic impacts can be managed; and, ideally, the dying process 
can be meaningful for a dying person and their loved ones – animates this advocacy. Generally 
speaking, these contemporary discourses extend the arguments of previous movements for death 
awareness in their articulations of the issues of medicalization and denial of death, though they are 
responding to the contemporary medical, technological, social and discursive contexts. Within the 
contemporary practitioner narratives that make up my archive, the good death follows from low 
medical intervention chosen at the kairotic moment by the patient (or proxy) and is one in which 
patient/proxy uncertainty is managed, the patient retains decision-making ability as long as 
possible and the social needs of patient and loved ones are met. This version of the good death that 
emerges from these narratives generally aligns with contemporary literature on the good death, 
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reflecting the rise of a hospice and palliative care approach to end of life overall, which, again, is 
a legacy of the earlier death awareness movement.  
While this is not necessary problematic in itself as an ideal to work toward, these narratives 
reinforce the myth of the autonomous individual decision-maker and, in essence, leave the 
responsibility of shaping a good death to the decision-making of patient and/or proxy. The 
narratives I analyzed here are attempts to facilitate better decision-making in pursuit of good 
deaths, however in their general reliance on the individual as decision-maker – that is, insofar as 
they are narrativized through the logic of choice – they perpetuate the risk of bad deaths by not 
acknowledging the necessarily distributed nature of the work of dying. In directing attention to the 
dying individual as agent and the moment of choice as the agentive moment, good deaths 
narrativized through the logic of choice run the risk of failing to account for the full work of ending 
a life – including medical and daily care aspects, as well as the work of ending the dying person’s 
story – and the necessarily distributed nature of that work.  
It is worth underscoring that these narratives are something of a shift from what came 
before. As I cover in Chapter One, while the death awareness movement did, in some senses, bring 
end of life to public discourse in new ways, it had limited impacts on the medical situations in 
which people actually died. Similarly, contemporary advocacy for death acceptance may be 
bringing renewed awareness of death, dying and end of life issues to more people, and it may be 
moving people toward accepting that they, and everyone they know, will die. And, insofar as death 
acceptance discourses generally advocate for at least skepticism, if not outright rejection, of the 
‘conveyor belt’ of treatment at end of life, they may be moving people toward recognizing that 
there comes a time to stop striving for a cure or to beat the odds. As such, they may be developing 
new narratives for letting go, as opposed to fighting death until the end. There are small gains here.  
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However, in reproducing the neoliberal, control society ideal of the autonomous individual, 
in centering the dying individual as the primary, or even sometimes only, agent that matters in a 
story, in reducing the primary work of dying to choosing between treatment options and/or 
between comfort and care, and hinging a good death upon making the right decisions at the right 
moments, these narratives don’t necessarily guide future patients or their loved ones toward 
achieving good deaths. There is no such thing as the right decision, except in hindsight, and given 
the necessary distribution of agency at end of life, there is no coherent narrative to be told about 
the individual who made the right decisions, enacted the right treatments and shaped a good death 
as a result. The decisions a person makes are always made in conjunction with others, the actions 
a person takes are always predicated on a host of background practices and arrangements that make 
action possible – in end of life situations, primarily the medical practitioners who frame the 
conditions of possibility for that decision-making; medical knowledge and institutions that 
generally make up the situations in which decision-making occurs; any loved ones who take on 
the responsibilities of caring for dying people and ending their life stories, and so on.  A dying 
person can make all the ‘right’ decisions and end up dying a painful, drawn out death because 
dying in inherently uncertain and out of anyone’s control. 
The logic of choice, through which these narratives are overwhelmingly narrativized, 
cannot adequately account for the work of dying. As an example, according to research published 
at the end of 2019, for the first time since the early twentieth century, in 2017 more people died at 
home than in hospitals (Cross & Warraich, 2019, Dec. 12). Older, white men and, across the board, 
people with cancer were the most likely groups to die at home or, in the case of cancer patients, 
on hospice. However, as Cross and Warraich (2019, Dec. 11) and others (see Kolata, 2019) report, 
honoring the decision to move the site of care to the home does not necessarily lead to a good 
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death. It runs the risk of inadequate pain and symptom management and in many cases places a 
heavy caregiving burden on loved ones, the full scope of which may be unforeseen. While 
changing the site of dying to more closely align with patient wishes is not a bad thing, if that shift 
does not also address the systemic and structural, as well as narrative, issues that perpetuate the 
risks of bad deaths, then it only shifts these issues to a new site. Discourses that perpetuate the idea 
that the good death follows from the choice of low intervention at the right time and, generally, 
making decisions in line with one’s values overstate our ability to control dying and place undue 
responsibility on dying people. As the good death is one lens through which people understand 
death and dying, a shift away from the logic of choice in end of life narratives and away from the 
autonomous decision-maker would enable us to discuss, conceptualize and evaluate the goals at 
end of life differently.  
In Chapter Three, I propose the narrativized logic of care as one way of recasting end of 
life. The narrativized logic of care, for example, can shift us away from aiming for the ideal of the 
good death – or the individual ‘a good death’ – instead focusing on good dying, shifting standards 
of judgment by extending end of life from its conceptualization as a singular moment to a process 
that is shaped by various practices undertaken by various actors, including the dying person, over 
time and which are attuned to the goal of making a dying person’s life more bearable, insofar as 
that is possible. These narratives would center on bringing the biological and historical lives of the 
person to an end and the distribution of caring practices across the patient’s caring networks in 
pursuit of those goals. While there are certainly moments of caring within institutions, interactions 
and narratives founded on the logic of choice, the two logics themselves are incompatible, 
necessitating a broader shift toward the logic of care in order to address issues at the heart of the 
logic of choice within healthcare settings.  
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Stories that center on distributed responsibility, agency and caring practices in support of 
the project of ending a dying person’s life won’t fix our healthcare system. As this project focuses 
on the level of the narrative – on how stories of dying are told – I don’t necessarily have answers 
for how a shift away from the logic of choice in actual doctoring practices or in medical institutions 
would be possible, nor what that might look like within institutional settings. However, taking 
seriously the idea that public narratives surrounding healthcare situations in general, and end of 
life in particular, can shape how past, present and future medical situations are understood, acted 
upon and judged, a general shift away from the narrativized logic of choice may enable people to 
see different elements of the situation, may enable practitioners to see their roles differently, may 
enable loved ones to have different conversations and for all stakeholders to work toward different 
goals. End of life narratives, as a type of illness narrative, are a form of epideictic rhetoric and, as 
such, reflect, reinforce and influence our collective values. Careful attention to the concept of the 
good death and how it is conceived of within end of life narratives reveals not only how we do 
approach and conceive of death and dying, as well as how we might organize around the fact of 
our mortality otherwise, but also our highest collective values. A shift in the rhetoric of dying 
might also shift interactions with medical institutions, judgments about end of life and our 
identities as (future) dying people and their loved ones.  
Dying is a necessarily uncertain and out of human control. We can do things to mitigate 
the physical impacts, to extend or shorten the length of a dying person’s life, to try to shape the 
economic, social, psychological and emotional impacts of dying, and so on, but it is still inherently 
uncertain and uncontrollable. And yet, we all still have to act in the face of death. Decisions must 
be made about what the goals should be, how we might get there and what potential barriers may 
arise in a dying person’s life. Presenting medical information as certain, as the majority of these 
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narratives do, is one response to this inherent uncertainty; it is an attempt to set the conditions of 
possibility within which choices must be made, to limit the total uncertainty, in the best of cases, 
in the hopes that patients and their loved ones may be able to act. However, as I stated in Chapter 
Two, practitioners who don’t acknowledge the uncertainty inherent in their own professional 
knowledge or in practicing medicine within human bodies likely contribute to patient 
unpreparedness for the ‘unexpected.’ Accounting for the certainty of unintended consequences 
and, furthermore, the extent to which any course of treatment impacts one’s life and way of being 
as much as it impacts a person physically, is another possible response to acting in the face of 
uncertainty. Which is to say, acknowledging that there is not necessarily a correct decision may 
not make acting in the face of uncertainty any easier, but it may relieve some of the pressure.  
The narratives I analyzed here are told by medical practitioners and, as such, also implicitly 
reflect the institutional logic in which these narratives played out. Narratives told by people in 
other positions would emphasize different aspects of end of life and may even construct a slightly 
different conceptualization of the good death,37 but, as the logic of choice is a foundational 
ideology in American society broadly, I would be surprised if the majority of end of life narratives 
were not narrativized through the ideal of choice. That is one possible avenue for future research: 
How do dying people themselves frame end of life in contemporary public discourse? What types 
of stories do people tell about their loved ones’ deaths? Additionally, several of the practitioners 
who authored the NYT articles in this archive have gone on to publish more recent books on end 
of life. It may be interesting to consider how the end of life narratives compare across media, as 
 
37 See for example Meier et al. (2016) on differences in conceptualizations of the good death among dying people, 
loved ones and healthcare providers.  
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there is simply more space in a book than in an op-ed to develop ‘characters,’ comment on 
decision-making processes, the contexts in which those decisions occur and so on.  
Furthermore, it must be acknowledged here that the focus of this study is necessarily 
limited by my choice of texts. These texts represent discourses that have circulated through one 
dominant public, though, generally, they present the versions of dying they cover – and the ideal 
of the good death – as largely a-contextual. In following this particular set of discourses, I am, in 
many senses, perpetuating the oversight that most death studies work is guilty of: an over-emphasis 
on middle class, largely white people who die of cancer or other terminal or chronic illnesses. Even 
those narratives that call attention to this generalization (e.g. Crosby, 2015; Ouyang, 2016; Puri, 
2016) do so, generally, by lamenting that the deaths of the people in the narrative fall short of this 
ideal; which is to say, even as they draw attention to the fact that the ways people die are culturally-
bound and reproduce inequalities experienced in life, they still prop up the discourses that circulate 
in support of this overarching system.  
One of my goals in providing a snapshot of these discourses was to understand the extent 
to which they differ from what came before. This broader contemporary discourse in support of 
death acceptance claims to be working against a perceived taboo surrounding death, dying and end 
of life issues and, generally speaking, positions itself as a break from the status quo. When 
beginning this project, I wondered in what ways they deviated and in what ways they reproduced 
that status quo. The answer is that, while breaking some barriers and shifting the discourse in some 
ways, as noted earlier in this conclusion, these texts also generally reproduce the hierarchies and 
power structures surrounding end of life, even when they are calling attention to them.  
There are thus several blind spots within this archive and therefore the conclusions I draw 
in this work. First, the narratives that make up this broader discourse tend to focus primarily on 
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those who die ‘too late’ – articulated in the concern over futile or unwanted medical treatment and 
prolonged dying – as opposed to those who die ‘too soon.’ This focus leaves out the people who 
die in accidental or traumatic ways, which includes the third most common cause of death 
according to the CDC (2017) – unintentional injuries – as well as all deaths from gun violence, 
suicide, drug overdoses, State-sponsored violence and so on. The version of the good death 
constructed within these texts is incompatible with deaths of these types, leaving a large portion 
of people out of the conversation and, possibly, contributing to unpreparedness for these sudden, 
unexpected deaths.  
Second, as mentioned in Chapter Two, by and large these narratives leave out much 
information that may help to contextualize a particular patient’s approach to and decision-making 
at end of life. With a few exceptions, the positionalities of the people in the narratives are not 
explicitly identified, instead the narratives, conclusions and conceptualizations of the good death 
constructed and perpetuated within are presented as acontextual. This archival silence does little 
to further discussions about what actual people who live and die in the particularities of their 
individual lives might want or need at end of life, nor prompt readers to think about how their own 
end of life plans, wishes or goals – as well as those of loved ones’ – are shaped by their 
positionality. For example, what are the specific considerations for LGBTQ+ people at end of life? 
How might especially vulnerable populations approach end of life and what particular kinds of 
care might they need? Might people of different races or ethnicities, classes, religions and so on 
have different end of life goals not adequately reflected in the good death conceptualized here?38 
 
38 See Acquaviva’s (2017) LGBTQ-Inclusive Hospice and Palliative Care, Moller’s (2004; 2019) Dancing with 
Broken Bones (2004) and Dying at the Margins (2019), as well as the archives of The Collective for Radical Death 
Studies (2020) for studies that do take these and other particularities into account. 
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The overall point here is that death and dying are culturally-bound, as is caring. The 
concept of the good death portrayed within these narratives comes from a medical perspective. On 
the most basic level, this mean that the deaths narrated within are those of people who have access 
to medical care and who die with enough forewarning that they have the opportunity to discuss 
end of life with their healthcare providers and make end of life decisions. There are too many who 
are not so lucky and who, largely, are overlooked within death studies and in these national 
conversations surrounding end of life issues. In focusing on these particular discourses, I too 
contribute to this reproduction. It is a necessary next step to compare, for example, the speculations 
on the logic of care at end of life within this work with the narratives about end of life for poor 
people in the inner-city that are the focus of David Wendell Moller’s (2004; 2019) work. The 
narratives Moller shares in these works about the particular challenges of dying while poor and 
the particularities of caring for poor people at end of life would no doubt enrich, complicate and 
challenge the more general conclusions I attempt to draw here. More work focusing explicitly on 
the narrativization of the good death for marginalized, vulnerable and/or oppressed people – and 
especially those authored by people within those communities – is a much-needed update to the 
death studies canon,39 as well as contemporary discourses surrounding the good death, one which 
would help provide a fuller sense of the range of standards of judgment for evaluating a death and 
contribute to the project of facilitating better dying and coping with death for more people. 
In ‘Contesting Death, Speaking of Dying,’ Segal (2000) noted a bifurcation between the 
ways dying is discussed in mainstream public discourse, where it is largely constructed as a human 
experience, and how it is discussed in hospitals, where it is a biomedical construction and, largely, 
considered a failure. I think that these two discourses have at least begun to merge over the fifteen 
 
39 The Collective for Radical Death Studies (2020) is compiling just such an update.  
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years between that article’s publication and when these narratives were published. The narratives 
in this archive are representative of a medical viewpoint and still generally cast dying as a human 
experience. Some of them comment on the need to bring the human experience of death back into 
medical institutions (for example see Warraich, 2015), but many seem to understand that dying is 
already a human experience, even within medical institutions. On the whole, these narratives are 
part of the attempt to account for the human within the biomedical, through encouraging patients 
to make the best choices in the context of their own lives in response to medical information. It 
seems that death itself is no longer necessarily a failure within these narratives. The concern is not 
that medicine cannot make people immortal, but that people continue to fail to die well, that 
institutions fail to facilitate good deaths.   
In addition to this failure, the author-practitioners of these narratives are also reacting to 
their institutional context more broadly. Patient autonomy movements have fought hard for the 
right to be fully informed of diagnosis and prognosis, even when terminal, for the right to informed 
consent for treatment and the right to refuse treatments, among other things. The idea of patient 
autonomy and the protection of patient agency have been hard won gains in response to both 
atrocious and mundane wielding of institutional power. However, as Gawande (2014), Zitter 
(2015, Feb.) and others note, the shift from a more paternalistic style of medicine toward one that 
attempts to facilitate more patient autonomy hasn’t necessarily granted patients actual agency, nor 
necessarily resulted in good deaths. Zitter asserts this has transformed doctors into “medical 
vending machines” who dispense medical treatment at customers’ request, but also notes 
elsewhere that the option not to treat is rarely offered (see for example 2015, Oct.). Similarly, 
Gawande (2014) concludes that while decision-making was easy for patients under the old, ‘Dr. 
Knows-Best,’ paternalistic system – because there weren’t any real decisions to be made – under 
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this ‘Dr. Informative’ model, patient decision-making is still constrained by the pressure to treat 
(p. 220). The embrace of the logic of choice within healthcare settings is clearly a response to this 
and the author-practitioners can be read as attempting to carve out more space for their patients to 
make actual decisions, that fit with who they are as actual people.  
The attempt to carve out space for dying people to exert some measure of control and have 
a say in how the rest of their lives proceed within this institutional situation where patients, 
historically, don’t have much real agency and in the contemporary moment only have limited 
agency, is admirable. And especially so when that advocacy necessitates some amount of ceding 
of medical practitioners’ power. However, as I’ve stressed here, overreliance on the logic of choice 
puts further pressure on patients to make the right choice in a situation where they only have access 
to the medical knowledge that is shared and framed by practitioners and in a moment when who 
they are – or will be soon – is possibly radically different than who they have known themselves 
to be previously. Furthermore, as indicated in Chapters Two and Three, in many of these narratives 
the practitioner-authors want their patients to make the right choice, which is another way of saying 
they want them to make a particular choice, typically to switch to hospice or other minimally 
invasive treatment options at the proper time. All of which is to say that there are alternative logics 
on which to found that agency, ones which fit healthcare situations and end of life in particular 
better.  
The concept of the good death affects how we prepare for end of life in advance, how we 
live through dying and the narratives that are told after the fact. All of that is shaped by the logic 
on which the conceptualization is founded. The ideal of choice cannot account for the uncertainty 
and lack of control inherent in dying, nor the loss of agency that comes with dying. The 
perpetuation of the logic of choice within end of life discourses does not prepare us for the work 
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of dying. Founded on the logic of care, good dying is about ending a person’s story as much as it 
is anything else. End of life narratives founded on a logic that attempts to attend to the lived 
experience and history of the patient, keep the patient embedded within their social and medical 
networks, direct attention to the distribution of responsibility, agency and care across those 
networks and acknowledge the prevalence of unintended consequences is already well positioned 
to account for the loss of control and acting in the face of mounting uncertainty that those who 
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